Staeger versus The Commonwealth

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1883-05-21No. No. 320

103 Pa. 469

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment was affirmed. The defendant's conviction for the misdemeanor of burning a barn was proper, as he had been indicted and tried under the misdemeanor statute, and the technical error of including the word "feloniously" in that count did not invalidate the conviction.

Staeger was indicted on seven counts related to setting fire to a barn. The first six counts charged felonious arson under one statute, while the seventh count charged the misdemeanor of burning a barn under a different statute. He was convicted solely on the seventh count and sentenced for the misdemeanor. On appeal, Staeger argued that all counts in the indictment alleged felonies, making his misdemeanor conviction improper because he had not been indicted for a misdemeanor.

The court rejected this argument, finding that Staeger had in fact been charged with burning a barn under the statute governing misdemeanor barn-burning. The court explained that the distinction between felony and misdemeanor arson depends on the barn's relationship to a dwelling house. When an indictment simply charges burning a barn without alleging it was part of or adjoining a dwelling house, it properly invokes the misdemeanor statute. The erroneous inclusion of the word "feloniously" in the count was merely surplusage that did not affect the charge's validity after verdict. The court also found no misjoinder of counts, as they all arose from the same transaction and merely represented different framings of the same conduct.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a defendant indicted on felony counts can be convicted of a lesser included misdemeanor
The distinction between felony arson and misdemeanor barn-burning under the applicable statutes
Whether surplusage in an indictment affects its validity after conviction
Whether counts charging felony and misdemeanor versions of the same conduct may be properly joined

Procedural posture

The defendant was convicted in the trial court of misdemeanor barn-burning and appealed, with the case removed to the appellate court for review of alleged errors in the indictment and conviction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Paxson

delivered the opinion of the court,

The plaintiff in error was convicted in the court below of a misdemeanor in willfully and maliciously setting fire to a barn. The indictment contained seven counts, in the first six of which he was charged with felonious arson under the 137th section of the Crimes Act of March 31st I860, P. L. 415, and in the last count with the misdemeanor of burning a barn under the 138th section of said Act; upon this last count he was convicted and sentenced.

The record having been removed into this court for review, it was assigned for error “ that all the counts in the indictment under which he was -tried charged the defendant with felonies, and the verdict of the jury convicts him of a misdemeanor for which he was not indicted or tried.”

The defendant below was indicted for burning a barn, and it is that offence and no other of which he was convicted. Hence, there is no room for the allegation that he was convicted of something with which he had .not been charged. The grade of the crime depends upon circumstances. In Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Out. 192, we pointed out the distinction between the 137th and 138th sections of the code. Speaking of the latter section we said : “ This section was manifestly intended to provide for the burning of a barn that is not parcel of a dwelling-house, nor belonging nor adjoining thereto, and which is so situated as not to endanger a dwelling-house.”

There can be no doubt that the last count of this indictment was framed under the 138th section and was intended to charge a misdemeanor only. The pleader, however, has inserted the word “feloniously.” If the act charged was a misdemeanor, this mistake of the pleader cannot avail after verdict. It was surplusage, and if objection had been taken at the trial could have been stricken out. Mere technical matters which do not affect the merits receive much less consideration now than they did a century ago.

It was urged, however, that as this count charges the burning of a barn, without any averment that “ it was not parcel of a dwelling-house,” the offence comes within the 137th section and amounts to a felony. I can understand that in order to convict of felonious arson under the 137th section the indictment must aver and the proof must show that the barn is parcel of a dwelling-house, or belonging or adjoining thereto ; or that by means thereof a dwelling-house has been burned ; but I am at a loss to perceive how the absence of such an averment can make a felony out of a mere misdemeanor. There is no legal presumption that a barn is parcel of a dwelling-house; hence when an indictment charges the burning of a barn it means that and nothing else.

The defendant below having been convicted of a misdemeanor, thé only remaining question is, was there a misjoinder? Upon this point we are in no doubt. The offences charged in the indictment are not repugnant, but grew out of the same transaction. The different counts are mere variations of the statement of the same act; viz., the burning of a barn. The authorities are uniform that such counts may be joined in the same indictment even though some of them charge the offence as a felony and others as a misdemeanor: Henwood v. The Commonwealth, 2 P. F. S. 424; Harman v. The Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 69; Commonwealth v. Birdsall, 19 P. F. S. 482; Stevick v. The Commonwealth, 28 Id. 460; Hunter v. The Commonwealth, 29 Id. 503.

Judgment affirmed.