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FORD, administrator, v. CLARK

Supreme Court of Georgia1907-08-14
129 Ga. 292

Summary

Holding. The judgment of the trial court setting aside the verdict and judgment in the ejectment action and reinstating the case was affirmed. Courts of law may vacate judgments for irregularities not appearing on the record through proper proceedings by petition with rule nisi and service on interested parties, provided the moving party establishes both the irregularity and diligence in seeking relief.

A defendant in an ejectment action sought to set aside a judgment and verdict rendered against him, claiming the judgment was obtained through fraud and irregularity. The defendant demonstrated he possessed a valid prescriptive title defense to the ejectment suit and moved promptly upon learning the plaintiff had obtained judgment in violation of an agreement to dismiss. The court examined Georgia precedent regarding the proper procedures for vacating judgments, distinguishing between motions based on defects appearing in the record and those grounded in irregularities not evident from the record itself. The court concluded that while such proceedings traditionally required a petition with a rule to show cause rather than a simple motion, the substantive right to vacate judgments for fraud and irregularity remains available in courts of law through appropriate pleading and notice to interested parties.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in setting aside the verdict and judgment. The defendant established a meritorious defense, acted diligently by moving immediately upon discovering the plaintiff's breach of their dismissal agreement, and posed no delay to the proceedings. The court found no error in the lower court's decision to reinstate the case for trial.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Procedure for vacating judgments based on fraud or irregularities not apparent on the record
  • Whether a meritorious defense and prompt action support setting aside a judgment
  • Distinction between motion practice limited to facial record defects and petition practice allowing inquiry into external irregularities
  • Trial court discretion in vacating verdicts and judgments

Procedural posture

The defendant moved in the trial court to set aside a verdict and judgment rendered against him in an ejectment action, which the trial court granted, and the plaintiff appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Evans, J.

(After stating the facts.)

There is no doubt that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may be set aside, by the court which rendered. it, for fraud and irregularity. Mobley v. Mobley, 9 Ga. 247. An examination of previous adjudications of this court discloses some apparent conflict as to the proper procedure. In Dugan v. McGlaun, 60 Ga. 353, it was said that a judgment may be vacated for fraud, accident, or mistake, unmixed with the negligence or fault of the complaining party, by decree in chancery, or in a court of law with appropriate pleadings, but can not be set aside on either of those grounds on motion. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a motion to set aside a judgment must be based on some defect which appears on the face of the record. Regopoulas v. State, 116 Ga. 596 (42 S. E. 1014), and cit. But not all motions to set aside judgments are necessarily based on matter appearing on the face of the record. For example, any judgment or verdict entered up in consequence of perjury may be set aside “upon motion and notice to the adverse party.” Civil Code, §5366. Here we find clear recognition of the right to set-aside a judgment, on motion, for a defect not apparent on the record. In Mobley v. Mobley, 9 Ga. 244, there was a motion made-in the court of ordinary to set aside a judgment granting letters-of dismission to an administrator, on the ground of fraud. Objection was made to the evidence offered to -prove the fraud alleged, on the ground “that fraudulent acts, however flagrant,, could not be given in evidence” in a motion to set aside a judgment. ‘ In the course of the discussion of this point, Nisbet, J.,. said: “Fraud in procuring a judgment is ground for its reversal, both at law and in equity; it is an irregularity which vacates-it. It may be inquired into by the court which rendered the judgment.” At common law a motion to set aside a judgment could be predicated upon any irregularity in the judgment, whether appearing in the face of the record or not. Judge McCay-said, in Fannin v. Durdin, 54 Ga. 479, that the provisions of our code were merely declaratory of the common law; but his remarks were said to be obiter dicta in the case of Begopoulas, supra. Be that as it may, we find that, as early as the case cited from 9 Ga., it was considered proper procedure, to vacate a judgment procured by fraud, to file a petition addressed to the court wherein the judgment was rendered, distinctly alleging the specific fraud, and praying a rule against all the- parties interested, to show cause-why the judgment should not be set aside. When -the rule was served, the court, on the day therein appointed, would proceed to hear evidence relating to the alleged fraud. This practice was approved in Turner v. Jordan, 67 Ga. 604. In the late case of Union Compress Co. v. Leffler, 122 Ga. 640 (50 S. E. 483), it was held: “In a proper proceeding by petition, with rule nisi or process, and service upon the necessary parties, the courts of this State may exercise the jurisdiction, which obtained at common law, to set aside judgments for irregularities not appearing on the face of the record.” See also Ayer v. James, 120 Ga. 578 (48 S. E. 154). Whether such proceeding be technically a motion to set aside a judgment, or denominated by other appropriate- name, it is certainly a proceeding in a court of law, and it would be immaterial to the parties haled into court whether they were cited to appear by a rule issued by the judge, or process in the name of the judge, issued by the cleric.

The movant submitted evidence to sustain the truth of the grounds of his motion. He proved that he had a meritorious defense to the ejectment suit, viz., a good prescriptive title. His motion was made at the trial term of the ejectment suit, and he offered instantly to plead and to announce ready for trial. The plaintiff in ejectment would not have been delayed, for he could not have had a trial at an earlier term of the court. The movant was diligent, in that he moved instantly upon knowledge that the plaintiff had taken judgment against him in violation of his promise to dismiss the suit. An application to vacate a verdict and judgment is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the judge; and the court did not err, under the evidence submitted, in setting aside the verdict and judgment, and in reinstating the case.

Judgment affirmed.

Alldhe Justices concur.