Randolph TURNER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit1958-07-10No. No. 14446

258 F.2d 165

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the District Court's denial of Turner's second § 2255 motion, holding that a district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to entertain successive motions for similar relief when the petitioner provides no allegation or evidence of a justifiable reason for the prior failure to raise the claims or unawareness of their significance.

Turner was convicted in 1958 of narcotic violations and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Three years later, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming a juror's misconduct denied him a fair trial, but the District Court denied relief and this court dismissed his appeal. Turner then filed a second § 2255 motion raising both new constitutional claims and issues previously raised on direct appeal.

The District Court denied the second motion without a hearing, treating it as a successive motion and alternatively finding the record conclusively showed no entitlement to relief. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that where a petitioner has already had an opportunity to raise claims—either on direct appeal or in a prior § 2255 motion—the district court may properly deny relief without a hearing unless the petitioner demonstrates a "justifiable reason" he was previously unable to raise the claims or was unaware of their significance. Turner's petition contained no such allegations or evidence, and most of his claims could have been raised earlier.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Successive habeas corpus motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Requirement to show justifiable reason or unawareness for delay in raising constitutional claims
District court discretion to deny evidentiary hearing on previously available claims
Standard for determining which claims are barred as successive

Procedural posture

Turner appealed the District Court's denial of his second § 2255 motion challenging his 1958 narcotic conviction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted in 1958 for violation of narcotic laws. On direct appeal we affirmed. About three years later, appellant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, alleging denial of a fair trial by misconduct of a juror — described now by his counsel as the juror’s failure to live up to a promise to be “sympathetic” to appellant. The District Court denied his motion and on appeal from that denial we dismissed.

In December 1957, appellant again filed a motion under section 2255, alleging a number of violations of constitutional rights; some new, and some previously raised on the direct appeal. The District Court denied relief without a hearing, on the ground that the motion was a second or successive motion, and alternatively, that the files and records conclusively showed that appellant was entitled to no relief.

Where there has been a previous appeal or a previous 2255 motion, the District Judge has discretion to deny relief as to those allegations which could have been, but were not, raised in the earlier proceeding, unless the petitioner has “some justifiable reason he was previously unable to assert his rights,” or unless he was “unaware of the significance of relevant facts.” Absent some allegation or evidence as to what is the “justifiable reason” or “unawareness,” the District Court is under no duty to grant a hearing on what appear on the face of the petition to be old claims; indeed without such allegations the District Judge cannot even be aware of a possible basis for exercising his discretion to grant a hearing, applying the standards of Price v. Johnston, supra note 4. Here those of appellant’s allegations reviewable on a § 2255 motion could readily have been raised on the first § 2255 motion, and of course all of the allegations could have been raised on the direct appeal. No indication of any “justifiable reason” or “unawareness” is apparent or alleged. Hence, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing relief on the grounds this was a second or successive motion for similar relief.

Affirmed.

BAZELON, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.

. Carrado v. United States, 1953, 93 U.S. App.D.C. 183, 210 F.2d 712.

. Turner v. United States, No. 13178 (Oct. 4, 1956).

. “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Cf. Belton v. United States,-U.S.App. D.C. -, 259 F.2d 811 (dissent); Salinger v. Loisel, 1924, 265 U.S. 224, 44 S. Ct. 519, 68 L.Ed. 989.

. Price v. Johnston, 1948, 334 U.S. 266, 291, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356; cf. Wong Doo v. United States, 1924, 265 U. S. 239, 44 S.Ct. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999.

. Under Price v. Johnston a second or successive petition for habeas corpus may properly be entertained if it (1) asserts a claim not previously passed on and (2), asserts or demonstrates “some justifiable reason [why petitioner] was previously unable to assert his rights or was unaware of the significance of relevant facts * * At page 291 of 334 U.S. at page 1063 of 68 S.Ct.

. See Lipscomb v. United States, 8 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 812, certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 971, 76 S.Ct. 445, 100 L.Ed. 843, rehearing denied 350 U.S. 1003, 76 S.Ct. 550, 100 L.Ed. 866.