The State v. Hill, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri1879-04

69 Mo. 451

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded because the trial court's instructions on murder degrees, provocation, and self-defense improperly constrained the jury's consideration of evidence and shifted burdens of proof in violation of established state law.

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in the trial court for killing James Johnson and sentenced to hang. On appeal, the court identified multiple instructional errors that undermined the fairness of the trial. The trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the distinctions between first-degree and second-degree murder, instead requiring proof of a technical 'heat of passion' before reducing the charge—a standard inconsistent with prior state law. Additionally, the court's instructions on provocation were worded in a way likely to confuse jurors about what circumstances could mitigate the offense, suggesting only physical violence could do so rather than permitting consideration of insulting words and threats that preceded the killing.

The trial court also committed error by placing the burden on the defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, when the law required only that the defendant introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind. Although a reasonable-doubt instruction was given, it applied only to first-degree murder and did not address the jury's obligation to acquit if they harbored reasonable doubt about guilt on any theory. The cumulative effect of these errors prevented the jury from properly weighing the evidence and applying the correct legal standards.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Proper instruction on elements distinguishing first-degree from second-degree murder
Role of provocation and insulting words in reducing a murder charge
Burden of proof for self-defense claims in homicide cases
Necessity of reasonable-doubt instruction applicable to all possible verdicts

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence from the Pike County Circuit Court to the state appellate court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Henry, J.

At the September adjourned term 1878, of the circuit court of Pike county, the defendant was indicted for the murder of James Johnson on the 15th day of September, 1878. At the ensuing March term of said court he was tried, found guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to be hanged. Erom the judgment he has appealed to this court.

The first instruction defined murder in the first degree, but no instruction was given properly defining murder of tlie second degree. The fifth instruction for the State was as follows: “If the jury be lieve from the evidence that defendant wrongfully killed James Johnson with malice aforethought, but without deliberation, in the heat of passion, they will find him guilty of murder in the sepond degree.” This required the jury, before they could reduce the crime from murder of the first, to murder of the second degree, to find that the killing was done in a heat of passion, and is in direct conflict with what was held to be the law on this subject in the State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13. There was evidence of an altercation between the parties,- of previous threats made by deceased against the life of the defendant, and of grossly insulting and opprobrious epithets applied by him to defendant, immediately preceding the killing, which, although not sufficient to produce technical heat of passion, were circumstances which the jury, nevertheless, should have been permitted to consider in determining whether, if murder, it was committed with deliberation.

The third instruction for the State was also erroneous. It was as follows: “If you find that the defendant did willfully draw a pistol and shoot and kill " . , , T , j ames J ohnson simply because said J ohnson used words of reproach towards him, and that he thought of the killing any length of time, however short, before he shot Johnson, the offense is murder in the first degree.” This instruction declares a willful killing to be murder in the first degree, ignores the element of deliberation, and is, therefore, in conflict with what we held in the State v. Wieners, supra; The State v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 192, and cases there cited. The fact that an instruction was given by the court, properly defining murder in the first degree, did not cure the error in the third instruction. The State v. Mitchell, supra; The State v. Dearing, 65 Mo. 532.

The second instruction was calculated to mislead the jury. It declared that: “ Provocation, to be sufficient to mitigate or extenuate homicide, as applicable to this ease, should amount to personal violence or injury to the defend ant. Mere words of reproach, how abusive or grievous soever they may be, are no provocation sufficient to free the party killing from the guilt of murder.” The first clause of the instruction declares that no provocation will mitigate or extenuate a homicide, unless it amount to personal violence or injury to defendant. The contrary was held in the State v. Wieners, supra, and, while the court may not have intended, and probably did not intend to’ declare that no provocation less than personal violence or injury to defendant, would reduce the crime from murder of the first to murder of the second degree, but that no other provocation would reduce it to manslaughter, the instruction was so worded and constructed as to be calculated to mislead the jury.

The sixth instruction was also erroneous. It declares that: “ In order to acquit the defendant upon the ground of self defense, the defendant must show to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, that he killed the deceased in the lawful defense of his person,” &c. In the State v. Wingo, 66 Mo. 181, it was held that the burden of proving defendant’s guilt continued upon the State from the beginning to the termination of the trial, and that all that was required of the defendant, to entitle him to an acquittal, was to-introduce evidence of the justification, excuse or mitigation relied upon by him, sufficient to create, in the minds-of the jury, a reasonable doubt of his guilt. The State v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 158. The instruction in question required the defendant, by a preponderance of evidence, to establish the facts relied upon by him as constituting his excuse, or justification, or as mitigating or extenuating the’crime. Nor was there any instruction declaring to the jury that if, upon the whole case, they had a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, they should acquit him. • In the Wingo case it was held that such an instruction would cure the error of the sixth instruction. There was an instruction in regard to a reasonable doubt, given for the defense, but it related solely to the crime of murder in the first degree-The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

All concurring

Reversed.