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LOUDERMILK et al. v. MARTIN

Supreme Court of Georgia1908-04-15
130 Ga. 525

Summary

Holding. The trial court properly granted an interlocutory injunction preventing timber removal where the plaintiff presented evidence of an equitable interest in the land acquired through a contract with her mother, took possession in reliance on the contract, and made valuable improvements, even though material factual disputes existed regarding ownership. The judgment is affirmed.

The plaintiff sought an injunction to stop the defendants from cutting trees on land she claimed to own. The defendants argued that the plaintiff's mother held title to the land in fee simple and that they were acting under her authority. The plaintiff asserted that she and her sister held remainder interests under their father's will, and that her mother had conveyed the disputed parcel to her in exchange for annual payments of $10. The plaintiff presented evidence that she entered possession of the land following a formal division by county surveyor in 1903, paid the agreed annuity, paid taxes, and made improvements to the property.

The court found that regardless of whether the plaintiff held a remainder interest under the will, she acquired an equitable right to the land through the alleged contract with her mother whereby she promised annual payments, took possession, and made valuable improvements in reliance on that agreement. Because title was genuinely disputed on the evidence presented, the court properly exercised its discretion in issuing an interlocutory injunction to prevent ongoing timber removal pending trial of the factual disputes, rather than requiring the plaintiff to pursue multiple damage actions.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a plaintiff with an equitable interest in land, acquired through contract and possession with improvements, may enjoin timber removal by the original owner
  • Whether an interlocutory injunction was the appropriate remedy to prevent ongoing trespasses rather than requiring multiple damage actions
  • Standard of review for trial court's discretion in granting preliminary injunctive relief when title is disputed

Procedural posture

Plaintiffs appealed from an order granting an interlocutory injunction in favor of the defendant in error (the person seeking the injunction).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Holden, J.

The defendant in error made application to> enjoin the plaintiffs in error from cutting and removing growing trees from lands which she claimed. T.o the order of the court, granting an interlocutory injunction, the plaintiffs in error excepted. The original defendants, who admitted that they were cutting timber from the land in dispute, claimed that they were acting for the plaintiff’s mother, who was made a party defendant and made- the- same-answer as the other defendants. The defendants claimed- that tile-plaintiff’s mother owned the land in fee simple. The plaintiff claimed that she and her sister held the remainder interest in a. tract of land devised by their father to their mother for life, andi offered evidence to show, that the tract of land was divided between her and her sister by their mother; that her mother relinquished all her interest in the land to her and her sister, in consideration of their paying annually $10 each to their mother, which the plaintiff had paid to the time of the trial and would in the future continue to pay; that on the 23d of November, 1903, her mother had the county surveyor to make the division of the land,, and the land in dispute was assigned to the plaintiff, and all agreed! to the division; that soon after this division was made, she went, into possession of the land in dispute, and is now in possession,, •and has paid the taxes and made valuable improvements thereon. She testified that her mother gave her “the deeds, that deeds might later be made to plaintiff, and plaintiff is still in possession of said ■deed.” The defendants introduced evidence controverting all the material portions of the plaintiff’s evidence.

Whether the plaintiff did or did not own a remainder interest in the land under the will of her father, she acquired an equitable right thereto as against her mother (the only defendant claiming title to the land), if her mother sold her the land in consideration of a promise by the plaintiff to pay her $10 annually, and the plaintiff went into possession of the land in dispute under this contract, paid the annuity, and made valuable improvements on the land upon the faith of the contract. Grace v. Means, 129 Ga. 638 (59 S. E. 811) ; Bell v. Sappington, 111 Ga. 391 (36 S. E. 780) ; Denham v. Walker, 93 Ga. 497 (21 S. E. 102). Upon proof of such equitable right, the plaintiff had the right to object to a trespass by the person from whom she bought, or by any one acting for that person. McArthur v. Matthewson, 67 Ga. 134 ; Downing v. Anderson, 126 Ga. 373 (55 S. E. 184).

As the plaintiff claimed under her mother, it was not necessary, in an action to enjoin the mother and those acting under her, that the plaintiff should prove title in the person from whom her mother •claimed title. The material portions of the evidence of the plaintiff were disputed by the defendants, and we do not mean to intimate what was the truth of the disputed issues, but the question of title was one of fact, under conflicting evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion in granting an injunction until the issue could be tried and passed upon by a jury. Whether the defendants were solvent or insolvent, the plaintiff, to prevent a multiplicity of suits for damages occasioned by trespasses, could, maintain an injunction against the cutting and removal of timber by persons who had no right to cut and remove it, where the evidence showed that the trespasses were being committed and would be continued from day to day. Gray Lumber Co. v. Gaskin, 122 Ga. 342 (50 S. E. 164) ; Garbutt Lumber Co. v. Camp, 129 Ga. 411 (58 S. E. 870). There is nothing in the record to show that, ■the court abused its discretion in granting an interlocutory injunction, and the judgment is therefore

Affirmed.

All the Justices concur.