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CENTRAL ICE CREAM COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOLDEN ROD ICE CREAM COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit1958-04-23No. No. 12139
257 F.2d 417

Summary

Holding. The court reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with directions to overrule the motion to dismiss, holding that Central Ice Cream's complaint stated sufficient facts that, if proven, could entitle it to relief under the applicable federal statutes.

Central Ice Cream Company sued Golden Rod Ice Cream Company alleging violations of federal antitrust and civil rights statutes. Both companies manufactured ice cream in Illinois using ingredients imported from other states, but Golden Rod allegedly sold only within Illinois while Central distributed across state lines. Central claimed Golden Rod engaged in discriminatory and unlawful competitive practices, and that Golden Rod's sales to Harvey Restaurant chain—which placed the ice cream on interstate passenger trains—constituted a channel for Golden Rod's product to move in interstate commerce.

The district court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the court applied the standard for evaluating motions to dismiss, which requires that a complaint be dismissed only if no set of provable facts could entitle the plaintiff to relief. The appellate court found Central's allegations, taken as admitted, were sufficient to survive dismissal. While the opinion noted that the actual impact on interstate commerce remained a matter for proof at trial, the factual allegations about discriminatory practices and the indirect flow of Golden Rod's product into interstate commerce through Harvey's dining car operations were substantive enough to warrant proceeding with the case.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a complaint alleging antitrust violations and discriminatory competitive practices states a claim upon which relief can be granted
  • Whether indirect involvement in interstate commerce through a third-party distributor satisfies jurisdictional requirements
  • Standards for evaluating the sufficiency of factual allegations in a motion-to-dismiss context

Procedural posture

Central Ice Cream appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

FINNEGAN, Circuit Judge.

We are reviewing the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive relief and damages grounded in the: Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Clayton Act, Robinson-Patman Act, Civil Rights Act and, the National School Lunch Act. Without adjudicating the truth of plaintiff’s allegations we can assume those which are well pleaded because of defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and, then evaluate it, bearing in mind Mr. Justice Black’s statement: “In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow * * * the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 1957, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. See also Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.

Central Ice Cream Company, plaintiff, from whose complaint we report some admitted facts, and Golden Rod Ice Cream Company, defendant, are each respectively engaged in manufacturing ice cream from milk, cream and other ingredients in Illinois. After bringing in some essential ingredients from Wisconsin and other states, plaintiff sells its ice cream in Illinois and other states using interstate trucking for delivery. On the other hand defendant, as well, imports ingredients, for its product, in interstate commerce, and plaintiff alleges:

“So far as the plaintiff is informed the defendant makes no sale or deliveries of its ice cream outside of Illinois. But the defendant sells very substantial quantities of its ice cream to the Harvey Restaurant chain, whose exact corporate name is unknown to the plaintiff but is well known to the defendant. The defendant makes its deliveries of such ice cream to the Harvey restaurant chain at all or most of the railroad depots in Chicago. The Harvey chain, regularly and continually places a large portion of the ice cream that is thus delivered in the depots by the defendant on dining cars of passenger trains traveling in interstate commerce, the Harvey chain having dining car concessions with respect to many such trains. Thus the defendant is a conduit for the regular and continuous flow of such ice cream from the defendant’s manufacturing plants in Illinois, where the ice cream is manufactured largely from ingredients imported into Illinois in interstate commerce, to the dining cars of passenger trains traveling in interstate commerce.”

There are allegations about defendant’s discriminatory and unlawful methods of competition which, conclusions of the pleader aside, manifest enough to warrant an assumption on our part they existed. What impact, if any, on interstate commerce there was is now a matter of proof, and Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 1954, 348 U.S. 115, 75 S.Ct. 148, 99 L.Ed. 145, warrants letting this complaint survive defendant’s motion.

The case is reversed and remanded to the district court with directions to overrule the motion to dismiss the complaint.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1.

. 15 U.S.C.A. § 13.

. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13a and 13b.

. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3).

. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1753.