Lay v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co.

Supreme Court of Georgia1908-08-18

131 Ga. 345

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment was reversed because the trial court erred by instructing the jury on matters of negligence law, which amounted to expressing an opinion on the evidence in violation of Georgia law, regardless of whether Alabama courts had used similar language in their opinions.

A railroad brakeman sued in Georgia for injuries sustained while working in Alabama, claiming the defendant railroad negligently constructed and maintained an overhead bridge. The trial court gave specific instructions to the jury that effectively told them whether certain conduct constituted negligence as a matter of law—namely, instructing the jury that a bridge was negligent only if workers could not avoid danger by bending or stooping, and that railroads were not negligent simply for failing to use safety devices that other railroads had abandoned. Georgia law prohibits trial judges from expressing opinions to juries about what the evidence does or does not prove, and instructing the jury on legal conclusions about negligence violates this rule. The court also clarified that when a case arises from events in another state, the substantive law of that other state (here, Alabama's common law of master and servant) governs the merits, while Georgia's procedural rules apply to the trial itself.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a trial judge may instruct a jury using language that effectively determines whether conduct constitutes negligence
Application of substantive law from another state when the cause of action arises there
Whether Alabama court language may be imported into jury instructions in Georgia proceedings
Procedural requirements for properly assigning error regarding admission of evidence

Procedural posture

An appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a damages action tried before a jury in Dade Superior Court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Fish, O. J.

1. Where suit is brought in this State to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in the State of Alabama, the rights of the parties as to the merits of the case are to be determined by the law of Alabama; and where no statute of that State is pleaded or shown, it will be presumed that the common law is in force there. While the courts of this State will follow the decisions of a sister State in construing the statutes thereof, they are not bound by the interpretation placed upon the common Jaw by the courts of other States.

2. In the present case, no statute of the State of Alabama having been pleaded, the rights’ of the parties as to the merits of the controversy were dependent upon the common law of inaster and servant, the general principles of which, as applicable to the ease, are embodied in the Civil Code, §§2611, 2612.

Submitted. January 14,

Decided August 18, 1908.

Action for damages. Before Judge Fite. Dade superior court. April 29, 1907.

Arnold & Arnold, J. Z. Foster, .and Harvey Hill, for plaintiff.

Brown & Spurlock and Bayne & Bayne, for defendant.

3. Upon the trial of a case in this State, founded upon a cause of action originating in another State, the procedure of this State governs. A statute of this State prohibits the trial judge from expressing or intimating to the jury his opinion of what has or has not been proved, and makes a violation thereof absolute cause for a new trial. Civil Code, §4334. It has been repeatedly held by this court that an instruction to the jury that certain facts do or do not constitute negligence is a violation of such statute. Accordingly, on the trial of an action brought in this State by a brakeman of a railway company, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in Alabama on account of the alleged negligence of the defendant company in the construction and maintenance of an overhead bridge across its track, it was error, requiring the grant of a new trial, for the judge to give the jury the following instructions: “If they [the company] should erect it [the bridge] so low that the parties passing under it on the ears, the brakemen, can not-avoid the danger by bending or stooping, then it would be negligence, . otherwise it would not be so;” and, “If many railroads abstain from their use [the use of whipping cords, or telltales] the failure to use them is not negligence; and their use by a majority of rail: roads does not require all railroads to use them, nor impute negligence on account of the failure to use them.” The fact that substantially the same language may have been used by the Supreme Court of Alabama, in delivering an opinion, did not authorize the trial judge to embody it in his charge. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Shipper, 125 Ga. 368 (8), and cit. (54 S. E. 110).

4. None of the other instructions excepted to was erroneous for any of the reasons assigned.

5. An assignment of error was not well made which was to the effect that the court erred in admitting in evidence, over plaintiff’s objection (which was stated), “three law-books purporting to be Reports of the Supreme Court of Alabama, and to introduce in evidence three cases reported therein, to wit: the case of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Hall, 87 Ala. Reports, pp. 708 to 725; same railroad v. Hall, 91 Ala. Reports, 112-124; the same railroad v. Banks, 104 Ala. Reports, 508-519.” A ground of a motion for a new trial should either be complete in itself, or rendered so by an exhibit.to the motion.

6. In view of the decision rendered in Stirk v. Central R. Co., 79 Ga. 495 (5 S. E. 105), and especially as no point was made as to variance between the allegations of the petition and the proof submitted by the plaintiff, we can not say that -the evidence in the present case demanded the verdict found in favor of the defendant.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.