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The County of Lehigh versus Schock

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1886-10-04
113 Pa. 373

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Section 13 of the Act of 1791 requires costs in all cases where charges appear unfounded to be paid from county funds, not by the accused, and that the term "crime" in the statute applies to all indictable offenses including both felonies and misdemeanors.

The County of Lehigh challenged a magistrate's decision regarding cost allocation in cases where criminal charges were determined to be unfounded. The court examined statutory provisions governing who bears the financial burden when a person is accused of a crime but the charge lacks merit. The defendant presented no contradictory evidence, and the court found no defect in the magistrate's good faith performance of official duties regarding the dismissals.

The court interpreted Section 13 of the Act of 1791, which mandates that when charges appear unfounded, costs must be paid from county funds rather than by the accused person. The court clarified that the term "crime" in the statute encompasses all indictable offenses, including both felonies and misdemeanors. This interpretation means that regardless of the severity or classification of the offense charged, an innocent person cannot be required to pay prosecution costs. The statute reflects sound public policy by not discouraging good-faith prosecutions while protecting innocent parties from financial burden.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Interpretation of "crime" in cost-allocation statutes
  • Whether costs in unfounded prosecutions must be borne by accused or county
  • Application of statutory language to felonies versus misdemeanors

Procedural posture

The County of Lehigh appealed from a magistrate's decision regarding cost allocation in cases of unfounded criminal charges.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Tbunkev

delivered the opinion of the Court,

It is highly improbable that a magistrate would so conduct himself at the hearing and discharge of persons accused of crime, that his docket would not be conclusive that the cases were dismissed as unfounded. No evidence was offered by the defendant, nothing impeaches the good faith of the plaintiff in the performance of his official duty, and therefore the fourth, fifth and sixth assignments are not well taken. Nor is there anything in the case to require notice of the third assignment.

The eleventh section of the Act of 1791 provided that cost on bills returned ignoramus by the grand jury should be paid out of the county stock, and not by the party charged with any felony, breach of the peace or other indictable offence. Section 13 of that Act, still in force, provides “ that when any person shall be brought before a court, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, on the charge of having committed a crime, if such charge shall appear unfounded, the cost shall be paid out of the county stock, and not by such innocent person. The word “crime” is used in its general sense and means all indictable offences, just as it is used and means in section 64 in the Criminal Procedure Act of 1860. The context in the Act of 1791, as well as in the Act of 1860, shows that the word “ crime ” includes indictable misdemeanors. Properly speaking, crimes and misdemeanors are synonymous terms; in common usage the word “crimes” is made to denote such offences as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye, while smaller faults are comprised under the gentler names of “misdemeanors: 4 Blackstone Com., 5.

The word “crime ” is not a synonym of “felony.” In the Criminal Procedure Act some provisions are made respecting costs in all prosecutions, except felony. Some crimes are felonies, others are commonly called misdemeanors; and often infamous crimes, as forgery and perjury, are called misdemeanors, thereby distinguishing them from felonies, in our statutes relating to costs in criminal cases. The provision respecting costs “in all cases of conviction of any crime ” applies to felonies and misdemeanors.

Section 13 of the Act of 1791 applies to every case where a person is before a magistrate on a charge of having committed a crime, and the charge appears unfounded. No difference is made between crimes that are felonious and those that are not felonious, or by reason of some being infamous and others not, or because some are of a deeper dye than others. The innocent person shall not pay costs. Prosecutions made in good faith are not discouraged by permitting the magistrate to impose the costs on the party who made complaint. This statute has stood for nearly a century, and still seems in accord with the wise policy of the Commonwealth.

If it be true, as alleged, that the justices of the peace in Le-high county, until recently, imposed the costs of unfounded prosecutions upon the complainant, or some other private person, it is well that they have at last learned not to violate the statute.

Judgment affirmed.