BRIGHT et al. v. FOOD GIANT, INC.

Court of Appeals of Georgia1986-02-03No. 71234

177 Ga. App. 641340 S.E.2d 272

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly granted summary judgment for Food Giant because the plaintiff failed to establish that the store had actual or constructive knowledge of the slick spot hazard, as the condition was not visually detectable and could not reasonably have been discovered by store employees through ordinary diligence.

Susan Bright slipped and fell on a slick spot on the floor at a Food Giant store and sued for damages. The trial court granted Food Giant's motion for summary judgment, finding no liability. The Brights appealed, arguing the store should be held responsible for the hazardous condition.

The court affirmed the summary judgment because the evidence established that Food Giant lacked both actual and constructive knowledge of the slick spot. Susan Bright could not identify how long the hazard had been present, and there was no proof that Food Giant caused it. Although store employees were working nearby, the uncontested evidence showed they could not have discovered the slick spot through ordinary observation, since it was invisible to the eye and could only be detected by touch.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a store owner has liability for a slip-and-fall injury caused by a substance the owner did not create
Whether constructive knowledge of a hazard can be established when employees were in the area but could not visually detect the condition
Whether summary judgment was proper when no factual dispute existed regarding the store's duty to maintain safe premises

Procedural posture

The Brights appealed after the trial court granted Food Giant's motion for summary judgment in this slip-and-fall premises liability case.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Sognier, Judge.

Susan Bright and her husband, Timothy Bright, Sr., brought suit against Food Giant, Inc. in this slip and fall case. The trial court granted Food Giant’s motion for summary judgment and the Brights appeal.

Appellant Susan Bright was a customer at one of appellee’s food stores when she slipped and fell on a “slick spot” on the floor. No employee of appellee’s was in the aisle at the time of appellant’s fall and although a cashier was at her register within eight feet of appellant when she fell, it is uncontroverted that the “slick spot” could not be seen from that employee’s station. Furthermore, the evidence is uncontroverted that the “slick spot” could not be detected merely by looking at the floor. In her affidavit, appellant stated that “[t]he slick area was not visible, but was easily felt and discovered by touch of the hand and by rubbing your foot over it.”

Decided February 3, 1986.

Jack O. Morse, for appellants.

Deborah A. Finnerty, Donald R. Andersen, for appellee.

“In slip and fall cases, ‘[t]he true ground of liability is the proprietor’s superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the premises. [Cit.] . . . Georgia courts have uniformly held that where the customer slips on a substance placed on the floor by others than the owner, it is necessary to prove that the defendant had knowledge or that under the circumstances he was chargeable with constructive knowledge of its existence. [Cit.]’ Winn-Dixie Stores v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 344 (226 SE2d 142) [(1976)]. Constructive knowledge may be established by showing that (1) the substance had been there for such a time that ordinary diligence by the defendant should have effected its discovery; or (2) that an employee of the defendant was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition and could have easily seen the substance. [Cit.] ” Lend Lease Transp. Co. v. McBride, 169 Ga. App. 902-903 (315 SE2d 449) (1984). See also Caree v. Revco Discount Drug &c., 175 Ga. App. 487, 488 (333 SE2d 387) (1985). In the present case, appellants concede that there is no evidence that appellee had actual knowledge of the “slick spot.” Susan Bright admitted she had no idea how long the “slick spot” had been on the floor and there was no evidence that appellee was responsible for its presence on the floor. Thus, no question of fact exists from which a jury could infer any failure on appellee’s part to exercise reasonable care to keep its store in safe condition. See Dillon v. Grand Union Co., 167 Ga. App. 381, 382 (1) (306 SE2d 670) (1983). Similarly, it was not shown that appellee had constructive knowledge of the presence of the “slick spot” since, even assuming appellee’s employees were in the immediate area, the evidence is uncontroverted that those employees could not have easily seen or discovered the substance in order to remove the hazard. See Winn-Dixie Stores, supra at 345. Therefore, in the absence of any questions of material fact, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee. See Filmore v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 170 Ga. App. 891, 893 (318 SE2d 514) (1984).

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.