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WHITE v. FRED F. FRENCH MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC.

Court of Appeals of Georgia1986-02-04No. 71261
177 Ga. App. 661340 S.E.2d 276

Summary

Holding. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the management company was affirmed because uncontroverted evidence established that the groove was visible in plain view and the invitee had equal means of knowledge of the hazard, eliminating any duty to warn.

Audrey White fell down stairs outside her workplace while employed at a location managed by Fred F. French Management Company. She caught her heel in a quarter-inch groove running along a metal anti-slip strip affixed to the stair edges. White had used these stairs approximately 300 to 350 times over two to three months before her fall without incident and testified she had never noticed the metal strip or groove beforehand. The management company's insurance representative testified that the grooves were visible to someone standing at the bottom of the stairs looking up, without needing to bend down or get close.

White argued that summary judgment was improper because factual questions remained about whether the groove created a dangerous condition and whether she was ignorant of the danger. The court rejected this argument, applying established principles that a property owner's duty to warn invitees depends on whether the owner has superior knowledge of the hazard. When an invitee has equal means of knowledge as the owner, the invitee assumes the risk by voluntarily proceeding despite that knowledge. The court found that the groove fell within the "plain view" doctrine—the evidence showed White had repeatedly traversed the stairs and should have been aware of any hazard through ordinary care for her own safety.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Property owner's liability to invitees for visible hazards
  • Comparative knowledge and duty to warn doctrine
  • Plain view doctrine applied to stair hazards
  • Invitee's assumption of risk through repeated exposure

Procedural posture

The appellant appealed from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the property management company.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Sognier, Judge.

Audrey White brought suit against Fred F. French Management Co., Inc. for personal injuries received when she tripped and fell down stairs maintained by the management company. White appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the management company.

Appellant fell outside her place of employment while walking down a flight of four steps maintained by appellee, when the heel of one of her shoes caught on the top or second to the top step of the stairs. A metal strip, 1-1/2 to 2 inches wide with adhesive strips similar to sandpaper, was affixed to the edge of each step. Each metal strip contained a groove, 1/4 inch wide by 1/4 inch deep, extending the length of the metal strip and which served as a drainage channel for rainwater. Appellant contends her fall resulted when the edge of her shoe heel caught in this 1/4 inch groove. Appellant testified that she had traversed these steps two and sometimes four times each work day for two to three months prior to her fall but that she had never noticed the metal strip before. Similarly, she stated she had not paid any attention to the groove in the metal strip. However, no evidence controverts testimony by William Hicks, regional claims manager of appellee’s insurance company, that the grooves could be seen by one standing at the bottom of the stairs and looking at the steps and that it was not necessary to bend over or get down close in order to see the grooves.

Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellee because questions of fact exist concerning the dangerous condition of the groove in the metal strip and appellant’s knowledge of that danger. “[I]n order for appellant to recover, two elements must exist: (1) fault on the part of the owner, and (2) ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee, [cit.].” Pound v. Augusta Nat., 158 Ga. App. 166, 168 (279 SE2d 342) (1981). “ ‘ “The basis of the proprietor’s liability is his superior knowledge, and if his invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting in view of his knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.” Under the conditions here set out, a person acting in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety should have been aware that such a hazard to walking . . . would be likely to exist, and should have accordingly exercised ordinary care to avoid it . . . Her means of knowledge being equal with that of [appellee], it follows that [appellant] has failed to show a right of recovery based upon the acts of negligence alleged.’ [Cit.]” Westall v. M & M Supermarkets, 174 Ga. App. 155 (329 SE2d 237) (1985).

Decided February 4, 1986.

L. Lin Wood, Jr., John O. Moore, Eugene R. Kiser, for appellant.

Palmer H. Ansley, William R. Johnson, for appellee.

The evidence in this case clearly puts it within the line of cases involving the “plain view” doctrine. See Hadaway v. Cooner Enterprises, 172 Ga. App. 113 (321 SE2d 830) (1984); Durrance v. Bacon County Hosp. Auth., 172 Ga. App. 1 (321 SE2d 767) (1984); Inglett v. Winn-Dixie, 168 Ga. App. 192 (308 SE2d 587) (1983). In view of uncontroverted evidence that appellant had successfully navigated these stairs some 300-350 times over a 2-3 month period prior to her fall, we find no merit in appellant’s attempt to raise questions of fact under the “distraction theory” on the basis that appellant had been prevented from observing the alleged hazardous stairs due to the presence of other people traversing the stairs. Compare generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Chandler, 152 Ga. App. 427 (1) (263 SE2d 171) (1979). Therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellee is affirmed. Westall, supra.

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, P. J., and Corley, J., concur.