Per Curiam.
In this appeal, defendant challenges the authority of the trial court to enter an order revoking her probation. Our disposition is controlled by State v. Nelson, 92 Wn.2d 862, 601 P.2d 1276 (1979) (overruling sub silentio In re Myers, 20 Wn. App. 200, 579 P.2d 1006 (1978), and one of the alternative holdings of State v. Haugen, 22 Wn. App. 785, 591 P.2d 1218 (1979)). There, the court held that a superior court has no jurisdiction to revoke or modify a defendants probation where the motion to revoke is filed after the probationary term has expired. RCW 9.95.230. This rule applies to cases in which the superior court has deferred sentencing as well as to those cases in which sentence is imposed but its execution suspended. See also State v. Mortrud, 89 Wn.2d 720, 575 P.2d 227 (1978) and State v. Hultman, 92 Wn.2d 736, 600 P.2d 1291 (1979). Here, an order modifying defendants probation and extending it for 2 years was entered after the defendants probation on two separate charges had expired. There is no evidence that the State petitioned the court for this order before the end of defendants probationary term. Hence, that order is void, and the subsequent order revoking defendants probation is also void.
Reversed.