United States v. Hirsch

Supreme Court of the United States1879-10

100 U.S. 3325 L. Ed. 5391879 U.S. LEXIS 1798SCDB 1879-008

Summary · law.co

Holding. Counts three and four, which allege specific false classification of goods in violation of the revenue protection statute, arise under the revenue laws of the United States. Counts one and two, which allege conspiracy to defraud the United States, do not arise under the revenue laws despite appearing in an act concerned with revenue, because the conspiracy statute applies generally to all conspiracies against the United States and contains no specific reference to revenue. The three-year statute of limitations applies to counts one and two, barring prosecution, while the longer statute of limitations for revenue crimes applies to counts three and four.

The defendant was indicted on four counts relating to customs fraud. The central question in this case concerns whether all counts arise under federal revenue laws, which matters because different statutes of limitations apply to revenue crimes versus other federal offenses. The third and fourth counts clearly described violations of the specific revenue protection statute governing false classification and misstatement of goods' weight or measure. These counts unquestionably constitute crimes under the revenue laws.

The first two counts charged conspiracy to defraud the United States. Although the conspiracy statute under which these counts were brought was originally enacted as part of a revenue-focused law, the statute itself contains no language limiting it to revenue matters. Instead, it applies broadly to any conspiracy against the United States or to defraud it in any manner. The court determined that while the conspiracy might have been directed toward defrauding the revenue, the offense of conspiracy itself is punishable under general federal law against all conspiracies, not specifically under revenue laws. The fact that a statute appears in legislation primarily concerned with revenue does not automatically make every provision within that legislation a revenue law.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether conspiracy to defraud the United States constitutes a crime arising under federal revenue laws
Whether statutes should be interpreted as revenue laws based on their placement within revenue-focused legislation
Application of the statute of limitations to different categories of federal offenses
Distinction between specific revenue violations and general federal conspiracy crimes

Procedural posture

The case comes before the court to determine whether an indictment's counts describe crimes arising under revenue laws, a question material to determining which statute of limitations applies.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Miller,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question before us is whether the indictment describes crimes arising under the revenue laws of the United States.

There can be little doubt that the crimes set out in the third and fourth counts, conforming as they do to the description of the offence found in sect.. 5445, of a false classification of goods as to value and quality, and effecting an entry of goods at less than the true weight or measure, arise under the revenue laws. The section, intended solely for the protection of the revenue arising from customs, was originally the third section of the act of Márch 3,1863, entitled “ An Act to prevent frauds upon the revenue, to provide for the more certain and speedy collection, of claims-against the United States, and for other purposes.” 12 Stat. 737. It is, beyond question, a revenue law, and the offence defined by it is therefore a crime arising under the revenue laws of the United States.

With regard to the first two counts the answer is not so clear.

The gravamen of the offence here is the conspiracy. For this there must be more than one person engaged. Although by the statute something more than the comnaon^law definition of a conspiracy is necessary to complete the offence, to. wit, some act done to effect the object of the. conspiracy, it remains true that the combination of minds in an unlawful purpose is the foundation of the offence, and that a party who did not join in the previous conspiracy cannot, under this section, be convicted on the overt act.

Nor does the section, as found in the Revised Statutes or in the original act, make any special reference to the revenue or to the revenue laws. Its language is: “ If two or more persons conspire, either to commit any offence against the United States or to defraud the United States in any- manner or for any purpose, and one or more such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parses shall be liable,” &c.

The conspiracy here described is a conspiracy to commit any offence against the United States. The fraud mentioned is any fraud against them. It may be against the coin, or consist in cheating the government of its land or other property. The offence may be treason, and persons have been- convicted, under this statute for a conspiracy to do the • acts which constitute treason against the United States.

Since, then, the section does not mention the revenue or the revenue laws, but in terms includes every form of conspiracy against the United States, and every form of conspiracy to defraud them, it is difficult to see how the crimes it defines, and which are punishable under it, can be said to arise under the revenue laws. Specific acts-which are violations of the laws made to protect the revenue may .be said to be crimes arising under the revenue laws, as are those in the third and fourth counts; .but a conspiracy to defraud the government, though it máy be directed to the revenue as its object, is punishable by the general law against all conspiracies, and can hardly be said, in any just sense, to arise under the. revenue laws.

In support of the opposite view, it is said that sect. 5440 was originally sect. 30 of the act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 484), which was a revenue law, and that this section must be held also to be a revenue law.

It must be admitted that in construing any part of the Revised Statutes it is admissible, and often necessary, to recur to its- connection in the act of which it was originally a part.

The force of the argument arising from finding an enactment in a statute directed mainly to a particular subject is much diminished by our experience of the manner in which incongruous legislation is combined in the same bill as passed by the two Houses of Congress. The important principle, revolutionary in the law of evidence, by which parties to suits and persons having a pecuniary interest in the results are made competent witnesses, is found in a few words, inserted as a proviso to an appropriation bill.

The act of 1867 is entitled “ An Act to amend existing laws relating to internal revenue, and for other purposes,” and it consists of thirty-four sections. Every section except the one defining conspiracies has reference to internal revenue, and if the argument is worth any thing, the act must be limited to that kind of revenue.

But the title indicates th.at other purposes than revenue may be found in the provisions of the act.

Looking, then, to the section in question, which makes no mention of revenue whatever, but enacts in the most general terms a law against conspiracies, we are of opinion that one of the other purposes of the act was to adopt this general penal provision, and that an offence punishable under that section alone is not a crime arising under the revenue laws, though the overt act necessary to be alleged may be one affecting the revenue of the United States.

It will be certified to the Circuit Court that the plea of the Statute of Limitations of three years is good in bar of the first two counts of the indictment, and is bad as to the third and fourth; and it is

So ordered.