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William F. BRADT, Libelant-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit1955-04-07No. No. 237, Docket 23409
221 F.2d 325

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's damage awards for unseaworthiness and rejected the statute of limitations defense, but reversed and remanded the maintenance and cure cutoff date for further fact-finding regarding whether medical treatments Bradt received after September 1, 1948 were part of his curative care.

William Bradt, an assistant engineer, developed tuberculosis while employed aboard the vessel Pittston Victory. The trial court found the ship's unseaworthy conditions caused his illness and awarded him $13,000 in compensatory damages plus $2,000 for pain and suffering, along with maintenance and cure payments through September 1, 1948. The United States appealed the damage awards, while Bradt contested the cutoff date for his maintenance and cure benefits.

The appellate court rejected the government's argument that the statute of limitations began running when Bradt experienced vague symptoms while still aboard ship. The court held that a seaman cannot reasonably be expected to self-diagnose a progressive disease, and the limitations period does not commence until a physician formally diagnoses the condition. The court found no clear error in the trial judge's finding of unseaworthiness, noting that Bradt was healthy when hired and tuberculous when discharged. However, regarding maintenance and cure, the court found the record insufficient to determine whether Bradt's continued pneumothorax treatments after September 1948 constituted part of his ongoing cure, necessitating further proceedings.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • When statute of limitations begins for seaman's unseaworthiness claim
  • Whether vague symptoms put seaman on notice of progressive disease
  • Sufficiency of evidence of vessel unseaworthiness
  • Duration of maintenance and cure obligation during rehabilitation and ongoing treatment

Procedural posture

The case was appealed from the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, with the government appealing the damage awards and the libelant appealing the maintenance and cure cutoff date.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

CLARK, Chief Judge.

Libelant, an assistant engineer on the vessel Pittston Victory, contracted tuberculosis during his employment on board the ship. Judge Bruchhausen found the illness to have been caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel’s crew and facilities and awarded him $13,000 as compensatory damages and $2,000 for pain and suffering. D.C.E.D.N.Y., 122 F. Supp. 190. These are the awards contested by the respondent on this appeal. Libelant also received $2,610 for maintenance and cure from April 11, 1946, to September 1, 1948, which libelant argues is inadequate, since he continued to receive pneumothorax treatments subsequent to the court’s cutoff date.

Respondent’s appeal raises an interesting question of law concerning the timeliness of this action. An action for unseaworthiness must be brought within two years of the date of injury, under § 5 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 745. Respondent maintains that the vague symptoms which the libel-ant had while he was on board the Pittston Victory were sufficient to put him on notice of his illness so that his claim is now barred. Judge Bruchhausen rejected this argument, and so do we. The seaman cannot and should not be expected to make a self-diagnosis of a progressive disease like tuberculosis. We hold that the statute did not here begin to run until the libelant was informed of his illness by a physician. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 11 A.L.R.2d 252.

The remainder of respondent’s appeal is devoted to an attack on the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence concerning unseaworthiness. All this is amply discussed in Judge Bruchhausen’s excellent opinion, and we need say no more than that his deductions from the testimony and his resolution of conflicting evidence were not clearly erroneous. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 75 S.Ct. 6; Buch v. United States, 2 Cir., 220 F.2d 165. Much depended on libel-ant’s veracity, of which the district court was certainly the best judge. The causal connection between the condition of the ship and libelant’s injury can hardly be gainsaid when he was healthy when he signed up for duty, and tuberculous when he left. There is no reason to suppose that a traumatic injury late in his employment could have done more than accelerate the course of the disease, if that. We thus conclude that there is no merit to respondent’s appeal.

This brings us to libelant’s contention that the district court prematurely cut off his right to maintenance and cure. The date fixed by the district court, September 1, 1948, was the time when libelant returned to Maritime School on a full-time basis. This effort at rehabilitation on the part of the libelant should not prejudice his recovery for maintenance and cure if he was still undergoing curative treatments at that time. Libel-ant testified without contradiction that he received pneumothorax treatments from the United States Marine Hospital at Neponsit until August 17, 1949, and thereafter by a private physician. Since tuberculosis is not an incurable disease, these treatments may well have been part of a comprehensive program for libel-ant’s cure. The situation thus seems to differ from that considered by us in Desmond v. United States, 2 Cir., 217 F.2d 948, and Buch v. United States, supra. The district judge made no specific findings concerning the nature of these treatments in the interim before libelant resumed gainful employment. We cannot therefore enter a decree for the additional maintenance sought, but must remand the case for further action in the district court.

The judgment is affirmed on respondent’s appeal, and reversed and remanded on that of the libelant.