Commonwealth vs. William M. Bond

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1897-12-08

170 Mass. 41

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court's admission of the defendant's written confession was not erroneous as a matter of law, and the exceptions to its admission are overruled.

This case addresses the admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings, particularly those made by young defendants. The court articulates the established procedure: when preliminary factual questions arise regarding whether a confession was voluntary or otherwise admissible, the trial judge makes the initial determination. If the judge finds the confession inadmissible, it is excluded unless a legal question is reserved for appeal. If the judge finds it admissible, it is admitted but the jury receives an instruction that they may disregard it if they disagree with the judge's assessment. The defendant retains the right to take an exception to the judge's ruling for appellate review.

In the case before the court, the trial judge admitted a written confession from a young defendant despite acknowledging that the manner in which the confession was obtained raised concerns—specifically, that the words were essentially put into the defendant's mouth by someone in a position of authority over him. However, the confession appeared on its face to be voluntary, included appropriate warnings, and the judge who observed the proceedings was satisfied with admission. The appellate court found no basis to reverse the trial judge's admissibility determination as a matter of law.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of confessions obtained from juveniles
Trial judge's role in determining voluntariness of confessions
Jury instructions regarding defendant confessions
Standard of review for appellate courts examining confession admissions

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed the trial court's decision to admit his written confession, taking exceptions to the judge's ruling on admissibility.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Holmes, J.

In regard to confessions, statements made in contemplation of death and the like, where there is a preliminary question of fact to be decided in order to determine the admissibility of the evidence in a criminal case, the practice is well settled in this State. The judge finds the fact in the first instance. If he is of opinion that the confession was not voluntary, or that when the declaration was made the speaker expected to recover, or, in general, that the preliminary facts were not such as to make the evidence admissible, he rejects it, and that is the end of the matter unless some question of law is reserved. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 165 Mass. 148, 152. If he finds the other way and is of opinion that the evidence is admissible, he admits it, but instructs the jury to disregard it if they do not agree with him. Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277. Commonwealth v. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577, 582. Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185, 188. Compare Commonwealth v. Culver, 126 Mass. 464, 466. Of course the accused has the further safeguard of a right to except, and it may be that, in considering exceptions to the admission of confessions, courts have used a slightly greater latitude than in ordinary cases of a generally similar kind. For instance, it is said that, prima fade, confessions are voluntary; Commonwealth v. Sego, 125 Mass. 210, 213; and if so, there always is some evidence that they are admissible. Yet the appellate courts not infrequently hold them inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Nott, 135 Mass. 269. Commonwealth v. Myers, 160 Mass. 530, 532. See Commonwealth v. Morey, 1 Gray, 461, 463; Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 173, 191, 192; Commonwealth v. Flood, 152 Mass. 529; Com monwealth v. Kenney, 12 Met. 235, 237, 238. But the question is whether there was any evidence to justify the admission, even if a greater freedom is to be used in considering the evidence as a whole, and in disregarding a merely technical possibility. Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, 504, 505. Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185, 188. Commonwealth v. Gray, 129 Mass. 474, 475. Costelo v. Crowell, 139 Mass. 588, 590. Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 580.

In the case at bar, considering the boy’s capacity, there were strong reasons in the way in which he was treated for hesitating to accept his confession. Not to speak of the earlier examination, the manner in which the written confession was prepared deserves criticism, as every word of it was put into the boy’s mouth by one in whose power he probably seemed to himself to be. Nevertheless, it purports on its face to be made of his own free will, without hope of favor, and after he had been duly warned. The judge who tried the case and saw the parties was satisfied to let it in, and we must presume that the jury were of his opinion. We cannot say, as matter of law, that the admission of the evidence was wrong. See Commonwealth v. Wesley, 166 Mass. 248; Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 108 Mass. 285.

Exceptions overruled.