Commonwealth vs. James H. Langley

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1897-06-29

169 Mass. 89

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court overruled the defendant's exceptions and upheld his conviction. A corporate officer may be held personally criminally liable for fraud committed in an official capacity to benefit the corporation, and evidence of the corporation's subsequent disbursement of fraudulently obtained funds is not admissible in the defendant's favor.

James Langley was convicted of obtaining money through false pretenses while serving as a corporate treasurer. Langley argued that because the money went to the corporation rather than to himself personally, he could not be guilty of the crime. The court rejected this argument, holding that an officer of a corporation can be criminally liable for fraud committed in an official capacity even when the proceeds benefit the entity rather than the officer personally, provided the defendant acted with intent to defraud and used false pretenses to obtain possession of the property.

Langley also contended that evidence showing the corporation later disbursed the money and he received no personal benefit should have been admitted in his defense. The court disagreed, ruling that the crime was complete once he obtained possession of the money through fraudulent means. What the corporation did with the funds afterward was irrelevant to whether the fraud occurred, and evidence of subsequent disposition by third parties could not help Langley's defense.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a corporate officer can be guilty of obtaining money by false pretenses when the proceeds go to the corporation rather than to the officer personally
Whether evidence of the corporation's subsequent use of fraudulently obtained money is relevant to the defendant's guilt
Whether personal pecuniary gain is a necessary element of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses while acting as a corporate treasurer, challenging both the procedural handling of his motion to quash and the substantive elements of the crime.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Barker, J.

1. The motion to quash was rightly overruled. The objections stated in it were general, and were not assigned specifically, as required by the statutes. See Pub. Sts. c. 214, § 25; Commonwealth v. Sholes, 13 Allen, 554; Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors, 105 Mass. 176; Commonwealth v. Murray, 135 Mass. 530; Commonwealth v. Jenks, 138 Mass. 484. Besides this, the indictment was good.

2. The defendant contends that he was not guilty, because the title of the property out of which he cheated the persons whom he defrauded by his false pretences, and which so came into his possession as treasurer of the corporation, did not pass to himself but to the corporation. It was not necessary to allege or prove that he got the property on his own account, or that he derived or expected to derive personally any gain. Commonwealth v. Harley, 7 Met. 462. An intent to defraud, accompanied by the actual commission of a fraud, by means of the false pretences used for the purpose of perpetrating it, constitutes the offence. Commonwealth v. Drew, 19 Pick. 179, 182. Commonwealth v. McDuffy, 126 Mass. 467. If, by the use of false pretences, one is defrauded by being induced to part with his possession of property, and to confide it to the defendant, when he would not otherwise have done so, the defendant is guilty of the offence. Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, 502.

A person who is an officer of a corporation must answer personally for the crimes which he commits while acting in his official capacity, where the wrong is. done to third persons for the benefit of the corporation, as in the more ordinary case where the wrong is done to the corporation for the benefit of himself. Commonwealth v. Moore, 166 Mass. 513. In the present case there was no allegation that the defendant intended to acquire the property for himself, but only to obtain and get it into his hands and possession. Aside from some possible question of variance this was enough, and no question of variance was raised at the trial or argued here.

3. The remaining contention made by the defendant’s brief is, in substance, that evidence that the money obtained by his frauds was disbursed by the corporation, and that he personally received no benefit from it, was competent in his defence. So far as this contention is founded upon the theory that the offence was not committed unless he intended to get the title to the property in himself, or to personally get pecuniary benefit from it, it is disposed of by what has been said above. So far as such evidence might have tended to show the defendant’s true intent, he cannot complain that it was excluded. The subsequent disposition of the money by the corporation was no part of the transaction which constituted his crime. That transaction closed with his obtaining the possession of the money by means of his false pretences. If the Commonwealth had contended that the corporation was a sham ora fiction, evidence of what became of-the money might have tended to throw light upon that subject. But the indictment alleged, and the government proved, the existence of the corporation. The disposition of the money by it was a subsequent fact, not part of the transaction itself. So far as others than the defendant may have acted in the disposal of the money by the corporation, it was the act of third persons; and while the defendant’s own acts in that regard might be used against him, he could not make evidence in his own favor, outside of the transaction itself.

These are all the questions argued on the defendant’s brief.

Exceptions overruled.