INTERNATIONAL IMAGES, INC. et al. v. SMITH

Court of Appeals of Georgia1987-01-16No. 73395

181 Ga. App. 543352 S.E.2d 846

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's decision that the corporations must pay rent accrued during the appeal period in order to recover their stored property, as the supersedeas doctrine does not suspend rent obligations that arise independently from the judgment itself.

This case concerns whether corporations storing property in a shed owned by Ray Smith must pay rent that accumulated while their initial judgment was under appeal. Smith had won a jury verdict for $300 in rent, which was affirmed on appeal in May 1984. When the corporations tendered the judgment amount plus interest to recover their property, Smith demanded additional rent for the months during which the appeal was pending. The corporations argued that the appeal automatically suspended their obligation to pay rent under a legal doctrine called supersedeas.

The court rejected this argument. While a supersedeas generally halts enforcement of a judgment during appeal, it does not suspend obligations that arise independently from the judgment itself. Here, rent continued to accrue for the ongoing storage of the property—a debt that existed separate from the judgment. Since Smith was a bailee for hire legally entitled to retain possession until receiving full payment, the corporations could not reclaim their property without paying all accumulated rent, including the amount that had accrued during the appeal period.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a notice of appeal serves as supersedeas to suspend rent obligations
Whether a bailee for hire may retain property until all rental charges are paid
Scope of supersedeas—whether it applies to obligations arising independent of the judgment

Procedural posture

The corporations appealed a Superior Court judgment that conditioned return of their property on payment of rent accumulated during the pendency of their appeal from a prior State Court judgment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Sognier, Judge.

This is the second appearance of these parties before this court. International Images v. Smith, 171 Ga. App. 172 (318 SE2d 711) (1984), involved a jury award of $300 to Ray Smith in rent against International Images, Inc. and The Great Inland Ship Company (the corporations) for their use of Smith’s shed to store materials. On May 3, 1984, we affirmed the judgment of the State Court of Hall County entered on that jury verdict; on May 9, 1984, the corporations tendered the amount of the judgment plus interest to Smith and requested return of the stored property. Smith refused the tender, and demanded rent for the period during which the appeal of the state court judgment had been pending. The corporations filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Superior Court of Hall County to determine whether, in order to reclaim their property, they were obligated to pay rent for the months the property was in Smith’s shed while the state court judgment was on appeal. The Superior Court determined that the corporations could recover their property only upon payment of all rent accrued during the appeal period, and the corporations now appeal.

Decided January 16, 1987.

Lawrence C. Chrietzberg, for appellants.

Jack C. Bell, for appellee.

Appellants contend the superior court erred by determining that rent was due for the months in which the state court judgment was on appeal because the appeal acted as a supersedeas. In Intl. Images, supra, we held that appellee was a bailee for hire. As a bailee, appellee was entitled to retain possession of appellants’ property until a proper demand with indicia of ownership and an offer to pay rental charges was made. Id. at 174 (1). Appellants argue that OCGA § 5-6-46 (a) provides that in civil cases the notice of appeal shall serve as supersedeas, and thus relieves them of any obligation to pay the rent accrued during the pendency of the appeal proceedings. We do not agree.

“ ‘The general rule is that a supersedeas suspends all further proceedings in the suit in which the judgment superseded is rendered, such as are based upon and relate to the carrying into effect of that judgment.’ [Cits.] ‘Under this rule the supersedeas, during its pendency, prevents any steps to enforce or carry into effect the judgment, such as issuing an execution based thereon.’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Tanner v. Wilson, 184 Ga. 628, 633-634 (192 SE 425) (1937). The accrual of rent for the shed in which appellants’ property was stored was not based upon or related to the carrying into effect of the judgment on appeal, and therefore was not prohibited by the supersedeas. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that no demand and tender of rent was made by appellants for the property stored in appellee’s shed until May 9, 1984 so that the bailment continued until that date. It follows that the trial court did not err by conditioning the return of appellants’ property upon the payment of rent accrued during appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, C. J., and Banke, P. J., concur.