Frank W. Ellis vs. Sarah Simonds

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1897-05-20

168 Mass. 316

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of malicious prosecution and correctly stated that the presence of probable cause, measured by the standard of a reasonably prudent person's conduct, defeats liability even if malice exists. The court did not err in declining to give the defendant's requested instructions in their specific form, as the instructions actually provided were adequate and accurate.

This case involved a malicious prosecution claim where the plaintiff bore the burden of proving three elements: acquittal on the underlying charge, absence of probable cause for the prosecution, and malice on the defendant's part. The trial court instructed the jury that probable cause exists when a prosecutor acts with the care and prudence of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, and that the presence of probable cause defeats a malicious prosecution claim even if malice is present. The court also addressed the relationship between probable cause and malice, explaining that while malice might be inferred from absence of probable cause, the jury should consider whether inadequate inquiry by the defendant stemmed from malicious intent.

The defendant requested twelve specific jury instructions, none of which the trial court gave in the exact form requested. The appellate court found the instructions actually given were sufficient and substantially covered the requested matters. The court rejected any suggestion that the jury could have been misled by the judge's explanations of probable cause and malice, noting that the judge explicitly instructed the jury to make their own determinations on these questions.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Standard for establishing probable cause in malicious prosecution cases
Relationship between probable cause and malice in malicious prosecution
Effect of probable cause as a complete defense despite presence of malice
Adequacy of jury instructions when specific requested instructions are not given verbatim

Procedural posture

The plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action against the defendant, and the case proceeded to jury trial where exceptions were taken to the trial judge's jury instructions.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Morton, J.

The plaintiff was bound to establish three things: first, that he had been acquitted of the charge; secondly, want of probable cause on the part of the defendant; and thirdly, malice on the part of the defendant. Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 81. Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush. 217. Good v. French, 115 Mass. 201. Lister v. Perryman, L. R. 4 H. L. 521. These were to be shown affirmatively by him, as the court instructed the jury. As there was no real controversy about the fact of acquittal, the main issues related to probable cause and to malice.

In regard to probable cause the court, in effect, instructed the jury that if the defendant acted in instituting the prosecution with such care and prudence as a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would have acted under the circumstances, then they should find that there was probable cause, and that that would end the case. We think that this was correct. If the prosecutor acts as a reasonable and discreet person would have acted under the circumstances, then it must follow that there is probable cause for the prosecution, or, in other words, ground for a strong suspicion of, or an honest belief in, the guilt of the accused. If there was probable cause, then, even though the prosecution was malicious, the court was right in saying that the defendant was entitled to a verdict. Stone v. Crocker, ubi supra.

In regard to the question of malice, while the court instructed the jury that malice might be inferred from want of probable cause, it did not instruct them that want of probable cause could not be inferred from malice. But the jury were told what would constitute malice and what would constitute probable cause, and what not, and it is to be presumed that they followed the instructions thus given, instead of drawing inferences about which nothing had been said. We do not understand the instructions to mean that malice was to be inferred from a want of care and caution, but that the jury might consider whether the failure to make such inquiries, as a reasonably prudent person might have made, was or was not due to a malicious purpose on the part of the defendant. This they properly were allowed to do.

The defendant presented numerous requests for instructions, twelve in all. None of them were given in the form requested, and the court was not obliged to give them in that form if it gave them in substance, so far as applicable to the questions at issue. Hudson v. Marlborough, 154 Mass. 218. Norwood v. Somerville, 159 Mass. 105. Without considering the requests in detail, we deem it enough to say that we think that the instructions which were given were sufficient. We do not think that the jury could have been biased or misled by anything which was said by the judge by way of illustrating or defining what was or was not probable cause or malice. He expressly told them that it was for them to say how the questions which he suggested should be answered, and that they were not to infer from the manner in which the questions had been stated that one answer or another was to be given.

Exceptions overruled.