Patrick Beston & another vs. Frances A. Amadon

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1898-10-20

172 Mass. 84

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court sustained the plaintiffs' exceptions and held that the jury should have been permitted to find that the defendant authorized the work based on evidence that she knew of the valuable improvements being made on her property, the son-in-law's subsequent insolvency, and the suspicious circumstances surrounding an order given without clear indication it was for his sole benefit.

The plaintiffs, who performed construction work on a greenhouse, sought payment from the defendant. A directed verdict at trial was entered in the defendant's favor, apparently on the basis that there was insufficient evidence the defendant's son-in-law, Cartter, who ordered the work, acted as her agent. The defendant, her husband, daughter, and son-in-law all lived on the property. Cartter had hired the farm under an oral arrangement and began construction in spring 1895; the work was valued at $10,000–$12,000. The defendant knew the work was occurring, and her husband had previously paid for other improvements on the property using her money.

The court held that the jury should have been permitted to decide whether the defendant authorized the work. Even though Cartter ordered the bricks and the defendant presented contradictory evidence, the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances—particularly the defendant's knowledge of ongoing valuable work on her property and Cartter's subsequent insolvency—that he acted with her authority rather than for his own benefit. The court noted that when valuable services are performed on an owner's property with her knowledge, such facts may warrant a jury finding of an implied contract to pay, and the interested denials of the defendant and Cartter would not prevent that inference.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an order for work given by a household member may constitute authority from the property owner
Whether knowledge of valuable work being performed on one's property supports an inference of implied contract
Whether interested testimony denying agency can bar a jury from inferring implied authority

Procedural posture

The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed by exception.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Holmes, J.

The bricks were ordered by one Cartter, the defendant’s son in law. At the trial a verdict was directed for the defendant, we presume on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendant’s son in law was her agent.

The defendant, her husband, her daughter, and her son in law lived together on the place where the greenhouse was put up. The defendant’s evidence was that Cartter hired the farm at fifty dollars a month under some oral arrangement, but even this precarious tenure seems not to have been admitted by the plaintiffs. In April or May, 1895, Cartter began the greenhouse, having conveyed pretty much all the personal property which he used upon the place to the defendant in January, and going into insolvency in November, soon after the work was finished. The value of the work done that summer was estimated by the plaintiff, an expert, at from $10,000 to $12,000. There was evidence that the defendant knew of the work while it was going on, and it was not disputed that some painting on the place was paid for by the defendant’s husband, who was her general agent, with her money. We are of opinion that on these facts the jury would have been warranted in finding that the building was ordered by the defendant’s authority. It is true that the defendant introduced evidence which tended the other way, but the jury might have preferred to disbelieve it rather than to suppose that the order was given by Cartter on his own behalf alone under circumstances where it would have looked very much like a deliberate fraud. In most of the cases like this which have been cited for the plaintiffs, the order was given by the husband of the owner of the place, and in some, not all, there was evidence that he was the general agent or manager for his wife. Gannon v. Shepard, 156 Mass. 355. Dyer v. Swift, 154 Mass. 159. Jefferds v. Alvard, 151 Mass. 94. Wheaton v. Trimble, 145 Mass. 345. Arnold v. Spurr, 130 Mass. 347. Lovell v. Williams, 125 Mass. 439. But in Westgate v. Munroe, 100 Mass. 227, the report of the judge stated that there was no evidence tending to show who employed or procured the services of the plaintiffs in making the repairs, yet the court, speaking, through Mr. Justice Hoar, said that they entertained “ no doubt that if a person, with the knowledge of the owner, performs valuable services upon the separate property of a married woman, it is evidence of an employment by her, and may authorize a jury to find a contract by her to pay for it.” If in addition to the evidence in that case the name of a member of the household had been given as that of the person who gave the order, plainly it would not have changed the opinion of the court, nor could the result be affected if he and the alleged principal should unite in denying that he acted on the defendant’s behalf. The jury might disbelieve their testimony, and draw the same inference that they would have had a right to draw if the interested evidence had not been given. Dyer v. Swift, and Jefferds v. Alvard, ubi supra.

It is not argued for the defendant that the fact that the plaintiffs took Cartter’s note when they supposed they were dealing with him alone is a bar to this action. The note had been offered back. Lovell v. Williams, 125 Mass. 439.

Exceptions sustained.