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G. U. R. CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit1941-01-17No. No. 7398
117 F.2d 187

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals' decision upholding the Commissioner's determination that the taxpayer's capital loss deduction should be limited to $804.76 rather than $7,159.51, finding that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in determining the cost basis of the stock as its fair market value on the transfer date and in reallocating the loss under Section 45 of the Revenue Act of 1934.

A corporation owned by George Uihlein sought to challenge the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's determination of a capital loss deduction for 1934. The taxpayer had acquired 300 shares of American Superpower Company stock from a commonly controlled company (Oakwood Company) on December 28, 1931, recording it at Oakwood's original cost of $37,117.50 for all 1,500 shares. When the taxpayer sold 300 of those shares for $263.99 in 1934, it claimed a loss of $7,159.51. However, the Commissioner determined that the fair market value of those 300 shares on the transfer date was $1,068.75 and allocated a loss deduction of only $804.76. The transaction was structured to improve the taxpayer's liquidity position ahead of a bank loan renewal, with the Commissioner exercising authority under Section 45 of the Revenue Act of 1934 to reallocate deductions between commonly controlled entities.

The court upheld the Commissioner's decision, finding that the Commissioner did not abuse his broad discretion in determining the actual cost basis of the stock. The statute grants the Commissioner significant latitude to allocate income and deductions between related entities when necessary to prevent tax evasion or to clearly reflect income. The court concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate arbitrary or capricious action and that the Commissioner's use of fair market value as the basis for the transferred stock was supported by applicable precedent.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether the Commissioner abused discretion in determining actual cost basis for stock acquired from a commonly controlled entity
  • Application of Section 45 authority to allocate deductions between related entities
  • Proper basis for calculating capital loss on securities transferred between affiliated companies

Procedural posture

The taxpayer appealed from the Board of Tax Appeals' affirmation of the Commissioner's proposed income tax deficiency for 1934.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

SPARKS, Circuit Judge.

Appellant petitioned for review of a proposed deficiency in income tax liability for the year 1934. The deficiency was due to reduction in a capital loss sustained on the sale of 300 shares of American Superpower Company stock. Respondent, under Section 45 of the Revenue Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code § 45, made his determination on the basis that the stock had been acquired from a company under common control with petitioner. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the respondent’s ruling, and determined petitioner’s income tax for 1934 to be $2,713.59.

The question presented is whether the action of the Commissioner was arbitrary or capricious, in allocating to the taxpayer -the amount of $804.76, as a deduction from gross income, rather than $7,-159.51 claimed by the taxpayer.

The Board found the facts to be as follows : George Uihlein was the sole stockholder of the taxpayer and of the Oakwood Company, both of which were under his control. In 1934 the taxpayer, through a broker, sold 300 shares of the Superpower Company stock for $263.99. In its return for 1934, taxpayer claimed a loss of $7,159.51 by reason of this sale, being the difference between the alleged cost of the stock and its sale price. This stock was part of 1500 -shares of the Superpower Company which had been acquired by the taxpayer in a transaction with the Oak-wood Company on December 28, 1931. The 1500 shares had been placed on taxpayer’s books at a cost to it of $37,117.50, which was the original cost of this stock to Oak-wood. However, the fair market value of 300 shares of that stock on the date of transfer to the taxpayer was $1,068.75.

On this date the taxpayer had a maturing loan of $100,000 at the Marine National Exchange Bank of Milwaukee. Its portfolio of securities on that date had a market value of $91,075 which with its cash of $4,060.05 constituted its only liquid assets, making a total of $95,135.05. Its only other asset at that time was an open account advance to the Oakwood Company of $929,644.40, and its only other liability was an advance from Uihlein, its sole stockholder, of $561,687.08.

In order to present an acceptable bank statement and to obtain liquid assets in excess of its bank loan, the taxpayer purchased securities from Oakwood, including the stock here involved. These securities were figured at Oakwood’s cost of $369;-654.90, and Oakwood assumed the taxr payer’s debt to Uihlein of $561,687.08. The total of these figures exceeded Oakwood’s debt to taxpayer of $929,644.40 by $1,697.-58, which was paid to Oakwood on the same day by taxpayer’s check. This transaction in effect cancelled Oakwood’s account owing to taxpayer, rendered all of taxpayer’s assets liquid, and protected taxpayer on all of its obligations except that to the bank.

On the same day, after the transaction, taxpayer renewed its note at the bank. Both the renewal note and the maturing note were collateral obligations of the taxpayer alone, but the bank looked to the credit of taxpayer’s sole stockholder in making the loans.

The Commissioner used $1,068.75, the fair market value of 300 shares of the Superpower Company on the date of the transfer, as taxpayer’s basis, and allocated to it $804.76 of the loss, on the ground that such allocation was necessary in order to properly reflect the taxpayer’s income for that year. In this we think there was no error.

Congress has placed broad discretion in the Commissioner and the Board and we cannot substitute our judgment for theirs unless that discretion has been abused. Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U.S. 502, 53 S.Ct. 413, 77 L.Ed. 921. The Revenue Act, of course, provides that cost is the proper basis for determining loss on securities sold. But the question of what is actual cost is to be determined by the Commissioner as a matter of fact, and he is given a wide latitude under Section 45 of the Act in making such determination. The evidence here does not convince us that the Commissioner abused his discretion. We think he is supported in principle by Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 234. We approve the Board’s decision, and it is affirmed.

“ § 45. In any ease of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Commissioner is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross Income or deductions between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.”