John J. Lang vs. Boston Elevated Railway Company

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1912-05-20

211 Mass. 492

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the motorman's length of employment and training because such evidence was immaterial to the question of whether the motorman was negligent, and the judge's subsequent instructions to the jury did not sufficiently and clearly withdraw the prejudicial implications of that evidence. The exceptions to the admission of this evidence are sustained.

A streetcar motorman collided with the plaintiff, and the defendant railway company was sued. At trial, evidence was admitted regarding how long the motorman had been employed and the instructions he had received. The trial judge allowed this evidence, suggesting it might shed light on whether the motorman exercised due care, though he later instructed the jury that employment duration was irrelevant if the motorman had not been negligent. The appellate court found these instructions contradictory and insufficiently corrective of the initial error.

The court held that evidence of the motorman's length of employment and training history was immaterial to determining whether he acted negligently in the collision itself. The court reasoned that unless the motorman's conduct was shown to be negligent, any separate negligence by the employer in hiring or training him could not have contributed to the accident. The conflicting statements to the jury created ambiguity about which instruction the jurors would follow, and the court found the later clarification did not adequately withdraw the prejudicial implications of admitting the evidence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Materiality of evidence regarding employee training and tenure to negligence liability
Whether a motorman's conduct itself constitutes the proper focus for negligence determination
Adequacy of jury instructions to cure prejudicial admission of immaterial evidence
Employer liability for negligence in hiring versus employee negligence in performance

Procedural posture

The defendant railroad company appealed from a judgment rendered after a jury trial in a negligence action arising from a collision between the plaintiff and the defendant's streetcar.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Hammond, J.

One of the questions was whether in the circumstances of the collision between the plaintiff and the defendant’s car the motorman was negligent. That was to be determined by his acts either of commission or omission. Upon the questions what those acts were and whether they or any of them were negligent, the length of time he had been in the defendant’s employ as a motorman and the nature and amount of his instructions were entirely immaterial and the evidence upon those matters was wrongly admitted. The defendant seasonably excepted to its admission. It is suggested by the plaintiff that putting an inexperienced or incompetent person in the position of a motorman might be of itself evidence of the defendant’s negligence. But unless there was evidence of negligence in the conduct of the motorman the negligence of the defendant in employing him did not contribute to the accident and therefore was immaterial.

It is further argued by the plaintiff that the error, if any, was corrected by the words of the presiding judge to the jury. It appears that after the evidence had been admitted and during the further cross-examination of the motorman by the plaintiff, the presiding judge remarked to the jury upon the bearing of the evidence as follows: “The company was represented by the motorman, so far as the running of the car under the direction of the conductor. Now if the motorman was not careless, not lacking in due care, it is not of the slightest importance how many days had intervened since he had ceased receiving instructions from an inspector, or whatever may be the name of the official that accompanied him and gave him instructions, whether a day or a year. If he was not careless, it is certainly of no importance. But I have let the evidence in as to how long he had been there, and it may or may not throw a little light upon the question of whether or not he was in the exercise of due care. It may or may not. If it does not, that is the end of it. If he was careful it makes no difference. I only mention this to you so that you will understand the purport of the evidence as it proceeds.” In his final charge at the close of the case he spoke upon this matter as follows: “If you find that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care, then you come to the question of the motorman; and the discussion of his due care has been involved somewhat in that of the plaintiff. Was he managing that car as a prudent motorman should — reasonably prudent? ... It is of no importance, I take it, whether he had been in the employ of the company one month or one year, or five years. The question is, did he act as a reasonably prudent man should, under the circumstances, no matter how long or how short his services?”

It will be observed that there was no express withdrawal of the remarks first made to the jury. If there was inconsistency in the two statements it cannot be known which statement the jury followed. We think that the original remarks were not sufficiently withdrawn either expressly or by fair implication.

The evidence was immaterial, and to one accustomed to trial by jury in this class of cases it is not difficult to see that it was calculated to be prejudicial to the defendant upon the question of the negligence of the motorman.

Whether the evidence as to damages was properly admitted in the way in which it was presented is not free from doubt, but in view of the result to which we have come upon the other part of the case we do not think it necessary to consider it.

Exceptions sustained.