Commonwealth v. Sanders, Appellant

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1974-10-16No. Appeal, No. 342

458 Pa. 281

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because Sanders' incriminating statement was obtained in violation of the requirement for prompt arraignment following arrest, rendering it inadmissible regardless of whether he received Miranda warnings or whether the statement was otherwise voluntary.

Robert Lee Sanders was convicted of second-degree murder, conspiracy, and firearms violations in connection with the fatal shooting of a fourteen-year-old boy. Sanders was arrested on March 16, 1970, but not brought before a magistrate until the following morning—a delay of over seventeen hours. During this interval, police conducted multiple interrogation sessions, during which Sanders initially denied involvement, then agreed to a polygraph test, and after being told he performed poorly, gradually changed his account. By early morning on March 17, Sanders gave a recorded confession admitting he intentionally fired the fatal shot.

The appellate court found that Sanders' incriminating statement was obtained in violation of the requirement that arrested persons be promptly arraigned before a magistrate. Although Sanders had been advised of his Miranda rights and the trial court had rejected his challenge to the statement on involuntariness grounds, the appellate court determined that the unnecessary delay in arraignment made the confession inadmissible under controlling precedent. The court held that this defect could be raised on appeal even though it had not been explicitly argued in the trial court, because the admissibility of the statement had been challenged generally and the appellate precedent post-dated the trial proceedings.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of confession obtained after unnecessary delay in arraignment
Whether Miranda warnings alone cure defects from unreasonable post-arrest delay
Timing and procedural requirements for raising constitutional challenges on appeal

Procedural posture

Sanders appealed his conviction following the denial of post-trial motions and imposition of a five-to-fifteen-year sentence for second-degree murder.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Opinion

Per Curiam,

Robert Lee Sanders was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree, conspiracy and violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. Following the denial of post trial motions, a prison sentence of five to fifteen years was imposed on the murder conviction. Sentence was suspended on the other convictions. This appeal was then filed. We reverse and order a new trial for the reasons that follow.

The prosecution emanated from the fatal shooting of Edward Willis, a fourteen-year-old youth on March 15, 1970, as he emerged from a youth center located on West Stewart Street in Philadelphia. The appellant Sanders, suspected of being a participant in the crime, was taken into custody by the police about 3:30 p.m. on March 16th, but he was not arraigned before a magistrate until 8:30 a.m. on March 17th.

Between 3:45 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on March 16th, Sanders was questioned by the police for short periods of time on three occasions and in each instance denied any knowledge of the crime. About 8:00 p.m., he was questioned for an hour and persisted in denying guilt. Following this he agreed to take a polygraph test. After the completion of this test and upon being informed “he had not done too well”, Sanders began to change his story. He was then questioned again for about thirty minutes and it was at this time, or about 10:30 p.m., that Sanders admitted for the first time he participated in the Willis assault. However, in his description of the event at this time, Sanders said the gun involved was in the possession of a fellow gang member, one Alvin Stevens, and discharged when he grabbed it. About 11:00 p.m., Sanders was confronted by Stevens who denied ever having possession of the gun. Finally, beginning 12:15 a.m. on March 17th, and continuing until about 2:30 a.m., Sanders was questioned for the sixth time and in this instance he made a statement admitting he intentionally fired the bullet which snuffed out Willis’ life. The statement was recorded. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence of this statement was denied, and it was admitted at trial over objection.

Under the facts it is clear that Sanders’ incriminating statement was the product of an unnecessary delay between his arrest and arraignment, and its evidentiary use at trial was proscribed under our ruling in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974). The Commonwealth argues this particular objection to the statement was never raised in the trial court and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. However, since the admissibility of the incriminating statement was challenged during the suppression proceeding and at trial on the ground of involuntariness, and since all proceedings in the trial court, including the disposition of post trial motions, were concluded before our decision in Futch was filed, the validity of the statement under Futch is properly before us for consideration. See Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d 784 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Hancock, 455 Pa. 583, 586, footnote 2, 317 A.2d 588 (1974).

Judgment reversed and a new trial is granted.

Before the initial questioning, Sanders was advised of his constitutional rights as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

The facts related in this opinion are those established by the witnesses for the Commonwealth.

dissent opinion

Dissenting Opinion by

Mr. Justice Pomeroy:

I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the judgment of sentence because it is based upon a retrospective application of the exclusionary rule first announced in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). See the dissenting opinion of this writer in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 458 Pa. 425, 327 A.2d 618 (1974) and the opinions therein cited. Mr. Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Eagen join in this dissenting opinion.