The State v. Bulla, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri1886-10

89 Mo. 595

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded because the trial court erred in refusing an instruction clarifying that recent possession of stolen property does not raise a presumption of knowledge that the property was stolen in a receiving stolen property case.

The defendant was charged with two counts: grand larceny for stealing a horse and receiving stolen property with knowledge of its stolen status. He was acquitted on the larceny count but convicted on the receiving stolen property count. The court addressed two issues on appeal.

First, the court found no error in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant's general moral character after he testified on his own behalf, noting that a defendant who takes the stand may be impeached like any other witness. However, the court cautioned that on retrial, cross-examination of the defendant should be limited to matters he raised in his own testimony, and character witnesses should not be permitted to testify about specific instances of moral wrongdoing.

Second, and more significantly, the court found reversible error in the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction. The instruction stated that mere possession of stolen property does not create a presumption of knowledge that the property was stolen, and that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received the horse knowing it was stolen. The court reasoned that while recent possession of stolen property can support an inference that someone committed the theft itself, such possession cannot establish that a person knew property was stolen when charged with the receiving offense.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a defendant who testifies may be impeached through character evidence
Whether recent possession of stolen property raises a presumption of knowledge that property was stolen in a receiving stolen property prosecution
Scope of cross-examination permissible when a criminal defendant takes the stand

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his conviction on the receiving stolen property count after acquittal on the grand larceny count in the criminal court of Buchanan county.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Norton, J.

The defendant was tried in the criminal court of Buchanan county on an indictment containing two counts, in the first of which he is charged with grand larceny in stealing a horse belonging to one Sampson, and in the seconcl of which he is charged with receiving stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen. Defendant was acquitted on the first, and convicted on the second count, and from the judgment of conviction has appealed to this court.

I. It appears from the record that on the trial defendant offered himself as a witness, and was examined, and the state was then, over defendant’s objection, allowed to introduce and examine witnesses touching his-general moral character. There was no error in this. Where a defendant criminally charged is examined in his own behalf, he. may be impeached as any other Avitness, except that on his cross-examination, he can only be enquired of as to such matters as he has testified to in his examination in chief. State v. Palmer, 88 Mo. 568; State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380. As the cause, for a reason yet to be given, must be remanded, in view of the latitude allowed in the cross-examination of defendant and the witnesses who testified as to his general moral character, it may be well to remark, that in the re-trial, the cross-examination of defendant, should he again become a witness, should be confined to such matters as he may testify to. in chief, and that the witnesses, as to character, should not be allowed to testify as to single acts of moral delinquency.

II. The material error committed by the court was in the refusal of the following instruction:

“4. Unless the jury believe, from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant bought or received the horse, mentioned in- the indictment, from some other person, knowing said horse to have been stolen, they will find him not guilty as charged in the second count of the indictment, and the mere naked fact of the possession of said horse by the defendant raises no presumption that the defendant knew that said horse had been stolen by another.”

In view of the fact which the record discloses, that, in the first count of the indictment, defendant was charged with grand larceny in stealing the property, and the further fact that the court, with reference to this count, had properly instructed the jury that possession of stolen property recently after the theft, raised the presumption that the possessor was the thief, and in view of the further fact that defendant was charged in the second count, on which he was convicted, with receiving stolen property, knowing it to be stolen, we are of the opinion that the above instruction ought to have been given. While it is well settled in this state that the possession by a person of stolen property recently after the theft, raises a presumption that he stole it, we have never gone so far as to intimate that recent possession of stolen property, by a person who is charged with receiving stolen property, knowing it to be stolen, raises a presumption that he had knowledge that it was stolen, but on the contrary, we are of the opinion that in such case no such presumption is to be indulged in.

Under the circumstances of this case, the instruction asked for was not a mere abstraction, having no practical application, to the facts, and it was error to refuse it, and for this error the judgment will be reversed and cause remanded.

All concur.