COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Richard B. GLENN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1974-11-20No. No. 104

459 Pa. 545330 A.2d 535

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of sentence was affirmed. The court held that Glenn's self-incrimination privilege was not violated by the psychiatrist's testimony, and that while the psychiatrist's reference to Glenn's invocation of his privilege was prejudicial, the trial judge's curative instruction adequately protected Glenn's rights.

Richard Glenn was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his father and received a life sentence. On appeal, he claimed two trial errors: first, that his self-incrimination privilege was violated when the prosecution's psychiatrist testified about Glenn's mental state at the time of the killing, and second, that prejudicial error occurred when the psychiatrist disclosed in front of the jury that Glenn had invoked his right not to answer certain questions.

The court rejected the first claim, finding no self-incrimination violation because Glenn was not compelled to speak with the psychiatrist, was aware of his rights, selectively answered questions, and the psychiatrist's testimony did not reference Glenn's own statements or admissions. Regarding the second claim, while the court acknowledged the psychiatrist's remark about Glenn's invocation of his privilege was prejudicial, it found no reversible error because Glenn's counsel objected, the trial judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard the statement and warned against drawing negative inferences from it.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether testimony from prosecution's psychiatrist violated defendant's self-incrimination privilege
Whether psychiatrist's statement about defendant's invocation of privilege before jury constituted reversible error
Adequacy of jury instruction to cure prejudicial remarks about invocation of privilege

Procedural posture

Glenn appealed his first-degree murder conviction and life sentence, raising claims of trial error.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

O’BRIEN, Justice.

Appellant, Richard B. Glenn, was tried by a judge and jury and found guilty of murder in the first degree. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Appellant’s conviction arose out of the murder of his father, Dr. Richard A. Glenn, on January 31, 1972. In this appeal, appellant raises two trial errors in support of his request for reversal of the judgment of sentence.

Appellant first argues that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated when the Commonwealth was permitted to offer on rebuttal the testimony of Dr. Bowman, a staff psychiatrist for the Allegheny County Behavior Clinic. Dr. Bowman had interviewed appellant at the Behavior Clinic pursuant to a local rule of court and testified, contrary to the defense psychiatrist’s testimony, that appellant was not psychotic at the time he murdered his father, this testimony being relevant on the issue of the degree of homicide. Appellant contends that this testimony was violative of our pronouncement in Commonwealth v. Pomponi, 447 Pa. 154, 284 A.2d 708 (1971). We do not agree.

Appellant in the instant case was not compelled to answer the questions of the Commonwealth’s psychiatrist and, in fact, refused to answer many questions, telling the psychiatrist that he had been informed by his lawyer not to answer any questions that might incriminate him. Under this set of facts, it becomes apparent that appellant was aware of his privilege against self-incrimination at the time he was questioned by the prosecution’s psychiatrist and chose to answer those questions he thought would not incriminate him. Moreover, Dr. Bowman’s testimony made no direct reference to answers given to him by appellant, nor did he testify to any damaging admissions. Under these circumstances, we fail to find a violation of appellant’s right against self-incrimination.

Appellant next argues that prejudicial error was committed when the Commonwealth’s psychiatrist stated in the presence of the jury that appellant had exercised his privilege against self-incrimination during the course of his interview with appellant. We agree with appellant that this remark was prejudicial and that it may have been grounds for a mistrial, had appellant’s counsel so requested under Rule 1118 of Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, 19 P.S. Appendix. However, since appellant’s counsel only interposed an objection to the remark and the trial judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard the remark, and admonished them that they could not and should not draw any unfavorable inferences from the remark, we are of the opinion that appellant’s rights were fully protected. Cf. Commonwealth v. Haideman, 449 Pa. 367, 296 A.2d 765 (1972). Moreover, we are of the opinion that this type of remark is not one that would allow a trial judge to sua sponte declare a mistrial, which is obviously what appellant alleges should have occurred. Cf. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616 (1974).

Finally, appellant raises other allegations of error that he failed to object to at trial and has, therefore, waived them on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Clair, Pa., 326 A.2d 272.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.