UNITED STATES ex rel. TURPIN v. WARDEN OF GREEN HAVEN PRISON OF STATE OF NEW YORK

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit1951-07-03No. No. 295, Docket 22053

190 F.2d 252

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the discharge of the habeas corpus petition, holding that although the Wisconsin trial judge failed to advise the defendant of his right to counsel, the defendant did not meet the federal constitutional requirement to demonstrate that lack of counsel created actual unfairness in his guilty plea proceedings.

A prisoner challenged his conviction in Wisconsin that was later used to enhance his sentence in New York as a repeat offender. He argued that his guilty plea was constitutionally defective because the trial judge failed to inform him of his right to counsel or create a record of such advice, as required by Wisconsin law. The court examined whether this procedural violation amounted to a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that while Wisconsin's statutory requirements may not have been followed, federal constitutional protections do not universally require that judges inform defendants of their right to counsel in all felony cases. Rather, to invalidate a guilty plea on this basis, a defendant must demonstrate that the lack of counsel's assistance created actual unfairness in the proceedings. Here, the trial judge found credible evidence that the prosecutor had explained the charges and advised the defendant of his right to counsel, and the defendant neither denied committing the underlying crime nor presented evidence of oppressive conduct that denied him a fair hearing. Therefore, the defendant failed to meet the constitutional standard for relief.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether failure to advise defendant of right to counsel violates due process
Standard for invalidating guilty plea based on counsel deprivation
Application of federal due process standards to state sentencing procedures

Procedural posture

This habeas corpus petition challenged a Wisconsin conviction used to enhance a sentence imposed in New York, following a prior reversal and remand in the same case.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

The relator is serving a sentence imposed upon him as a second offender by the County Court of Queens County on his plea of guilty. The conviction which the Queens County court accepted as making him a second offender was a sentence imposed in 1945 by the court of Richland County, Wisconsin upon charges to which he had there pleaded guilty. His present writ seeks to inquire into the legality of his conviction in Wisconsin. He contends that he was denied his constitutional rights of “due process” when sentenced on his plea of guilty, because the judge did not inform him of his right to counsel and cause a record of such advice to be made upon the minutes of the court or in a transcript of the proceedings, as required by section 357.26(2) of the Wisconsin statutes. Whether his sentence was regular under the Wisconsin statutes does not determine the application of the federal rule of due process. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require that counsel be assigned to the accused in all felony prosecutions, although, if he asks for counsel, the refusal to assign one in a capital case is a denial of due process. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398. Nor is the failure to advise the accused of his right to counsel necessarily a denial of his constitutional rights. From a review of the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court the rule has emerged that “To invalidate a plea of guilty the prisoner must establish that ‘for want of benefit of counsel an in gredient of unfairness actively operated in the process that resulted in his confinement.’ ” Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 666, 70 S.Ct. 910, 913, 94 L.Ed. 1188. The appellant did not meet this test at the hearing below. Judge Clancy found that although the County Judge of Richland County, Wisconsin failed to advise the accused of his right to counsel, the District Attorney in Wisconsin had explained to him the crimes charged and advised him of his right to counsel. His denial of the District Attorney’s testimony was not believed by Judge Clancy. He did not deny that he stole the car in Wisconsin, nor was there any showing of oppressive conduct which deprived him of a fair hearing. Under the rule of the Quicksall case, supra, the relator was not entitled to relief and the writ was properly discharged.

. A prior order denying the relator’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was reversed by this court in United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder, 2 Cir., 183 F.2d 742. Upon remand that proceeding was dismissed because, among other reasons, the petitioner was not then serving time in excess of the longest sentence that could be imposed upon him as a first ofEender. This was no longer the fact when the present writ was issued.

. See State ex rel. Doxtater v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 593, 22 N.W.2d 685.

. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 67 S.Ct. 1716, 91 L.Ed. 1955; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 S.Ct. 184, 93 L.Ed. 127.