City of Fall River vs. Conanicut Mills & another

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1936-03-30

294 Mass. 98

Summary · law.co

Holding. The tax sale was valid despite the collector's violation of the seven-day adjournment limit because the error was neither substantial nor misleading under the statutory savings provision, and the trial court's findings support this conclusion.

The City of Fall River sought to foreclose on a taxpayer's right to redeem property following a tax sale conducted by Conanicut Manufacturing Company. The manufacturer challenged the sale's validity, arguing that the tax collector violated statutory requirements by adjourning the sale across a total period exceeding seven days—scheduling it initially for September 1, then September 8, and finally September 15—when the law permitted adjournments totaling no more than seven days from the notice date.

The court acknowledged that the collector had indeed violated the seven-day adjournment limit. However, the court determined that this violation did not necessarily invalidate the sale. The court focused on a statutory provision stating that tax titles remain valid despite procedural errors or irregularities that are neither substantial nor misleading. The court explained that this provision was enacted to prevent the strict constructionist approach previously applied to tax sales, which had invalidated sales for even minor violations. Under the current statutory framework, procedural requirements become directory rather than mandatory conditions when they meet this test.

Applying this standard to the facts, the court found that the adjournment violation was neither substantial nor misleading under the circumstances. The trial judge had determined that the delay could not have harmed anyone and actually benefited the property owner. Accordingly, the court concluded the sale was valid despite the collector's procedural failure.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether violation of statutory adjournment limits invalidates a tax sale
Application of statutory savings clause for non-substantial and non-misleading procedural errors
Distinction between mandatory and directory statutory requirements in tax sale procedures

Procedural posture

The case was a petition for foreclosure of redemption rights following a tax sale, with the taxpayer-respondent defending on grounds that procedural irregularities in conducting the sale rendered it invalid.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Qua, J.

This is a petition brought under G. L. c. 60, § 65, for the foreclosure of all rights of redemption under a tax sale. The respondent Conanicut Mfg. Co. contends that the tax lien is invalid, because the collector adjourned the sale to a time later than seven days after the time specified in the notice in violation of G. L. c. 60, § 44.

The sale was advertised for September 1. On that day, no bidder appearing, the collector adjourned the sale until September 8, and on September 8, there being still no bidder, he adjourned it again until September 15, on which day the sale took place. Section 44 provides that “The collector may adjourn the sale from time to time not exceeding seven days in all ... .” This means that the aggregate of all adjournments must not bring the actual sale later than seven days after the date specified in the notice. This is the natural meaning of the language used. The history of the section confirms it. Rev. Sts. c. 8, § 30. R. L. c. 13, § 42. No serious contention is made to the contrary. The collector violated said § 44. See Oakham v. Hall, 112 Mass. 535, 539.

But it does not necessarily follow that the sale was invalid. Section 37 of said c. 60 contains a provision that “No tax title shall be held to be invalid by reason of any errors or irregularities in the proceedings of the collector which are neither substantial nor misleading.” The real question in the case is whether this section saves the sale.

In general, tax laws are construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer. Collector of Taxes of Boston v. Revere Building, Inc. 276 Mass. 576. Before the enactment of what is now that part of § 37 just quoted, this principle had been carried so far in relation to tax sales of real estate that failure to comply with statutory requirements, even in minute particulars, invalidated the sale. Charland v. Home for Aged Women, 204 Mass. 563, 567. Shurtleff v. Potter, 206 Mass. 286. Conners v. Lowell, 209 Mass. 111. Koch v. Austin, 225 Mass. 215. The purpose of the enactment was to mitigate the severity of this rule as to errors and irregularities which were neither substantial nor misleading. It was part of an important revision of the law by which fundamental changes were made in the effect of sales for collection of taxes. St. 1915, c. 237. See now G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 64 et seq. This clause appeared in § 17 of the 1915 act. After that revision the sale no longer transferred title at once to the purchaser, but gave him merely a lien which could be enlarged into a complete title only after proceedings in court for foreclosure of the right of redemption. §§ 1, 3, 4. Jenney v. Tilden, 270 Mass. 92, 94. Those changes in the statutes might be thought to give additional protection to the taxpayer, so that the former strictness could be relaxed. This does not mean that this provision, which now appears at the end of the present § 37 (see St. 1935, c. 269), renders useless or nugatory all those requirements of law, failure to observe which could be found to be neither substantial nor misleading, but it does mean that, when this part of § 37 applies, such requirements become directory in .character and cease to be conditions precedent to a valid sale. Similar instances are not uncommon in the law. Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. 64, 67. Clemens Electrical Manuf. Co. v. Walton, 168 Mass. 304. Cheney v. Coughlin, 201 Mass. 204, 211. Clancy v. Wallace, 288 Mass. 557, 566.

Whether an error or irregularity is substantial or misleading must be decided according to the circumstances of each case. Very likely many of the statutory requirements as to the method of conducting tax sales are so vital to the preservation of the rights of parties interested that failure to observe them, at least in substance, could never be found to be “neither substantial nor misleading.” The error in the present case seems somewhat more serious than that which was held not fatal in Lynn v. Lynn Commercial Realty Co. 286 Mass. 368. But adjournment of the sale for a longer time than “seven days in all” is not always and necessarily an error which is substantial or misleading. Here the judge has found that it could not have misled or harmed anybody and that it “was for the benefit of the land owner.” On those findings, we think that § 37 applies and that the sale was valid.

Wood v. Wilson, 256 Mass. 340, is distinguishable. The section there involved (now § 45) expressly provided that the deed should not be valid unless recorded within thirty days.

Decision affirmed.