Florence Lynch vs. Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust Company, administrator with the will annexed; Elizabeth Lynch vs. Same

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1936-03-31

294 Mass. 170

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court sustained exceptions to the jury verdict and entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish gross negligence on the part of the driver as a matter of law.

The plaintiffs, who were passengers in an automobile driven by the defendant's intestate, Cimbel, were injured when his vehicle collided with a truck on a clear, dry, two-lane road late at night. The sole issue on appeal was whether evidence supported a finding of gross negligence by Cimbel. The plaintiffs presented evidence that Cimbel accelerated as the car climbed a hill, was traveling at speeds between 35 and 50 miles per hour, and failed to avoid the truck despite warnings from a passenger. The defendant introduced evidence that Cimbel had consumed some alcohol several hours before the accident, though one passenger testified he appeared sober at the time of the collision.

The court determined that the evidence was insufficient to establish gross negligence. The court found that any potential contribution from alcohol consumed earlier in the evening was too speculative. Beyond speed, the evidence showed no deliberate inattention, voluntary risk-taking, or persistent negligent conduct—the hallmarks of gross negligence. The court emphasized that the accident may have resulted from a momentary lapse in perception or judgment, and that the speed, while possibly excessive, was not extraordinary for that road. The late warning from the passenger could not transform conduct that was at most ordinary negligence into gross negligence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether speed and inattention sufficient to constitute gross negligence
Role of prior alcohol consumption hours before accident in establishing gross negligence
What conduct rises to the level of gross negligence versus ordinary negligence

Procedural posture

The plaintiffs appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendant administrator, presenting exceptions to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a gross negligence finding.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Qua, J.

The plaintiffs, while riding as guests of one Cimbel, the defendant’s intestate, in an automobile driven by him, were injured by a collision with a large truck which was proceeding in the same direction on the highway. The only question is whether there was any evidence of gross negligence on the part of Cimbel.

There was evidence of the following tenor: At about 10:30 p.m. Cimbel invited the two plaintiffs and another girl to ride from Springfield to their home in Westfield. When they reached Tubbs Hill, so called, in West Springfield, going in a westerly direction, the Cimbel automobile ran into the rear of the truck, killing Cimbel and injuring the plaintiffs. The road was a two-lane cement road, straight and dry. The weather was clear. There was no east bound traffic. The truck was on its right hand side of the road. The back of it was lighted with six lights. The accident happened about 10:40. The headlights of the Cimbel automobile were lighted. One of the plaintiffs testified that as the automobile neared the foot of Tubbs Hill she noticed a marked increase of speed; that there was a lighted vehicle about half way up the hill; that because of the speed she looked at Cimbel and saw his head and eyes straight ahead, his hands on the wheel and the wheel moving just enough to give it direction. Looking back to the road she noticed that they were close up to the vehicle and she shouted, “look out.” The Cimbel automobile was then about thirty yards from the truck and going at least fifty miles an hour. The other plaintiff testified that as far as she knew Cimbel was looking straight ahead; that she saw the truck when they were about twenty-five yards away; and that Gimbel’s speed was at least thirty-five or forty miles an hour. The third passenger testified that Gimbel stepped on the gas as they started up the hill and that Gimbel was looking straight ahead.

There was evidence that between 5:15 and 7 p.m. Gimbel had several drinks of whiskey and some food, and that at seven o’clock he was “feeling good.” One of the plaintiffs testified that Gimbel was sober at the time of the accident. Neither of the other passengers noticed or recalled any indication of liquor about him.

We think on this evidence it was a matter of conjecture whether any liquor which Gimbel had taken early in the evening was a contributing cause of the accident at 10:40. Marcienowski v. Sanders, 252 Mass. 65, 67. See Bertera v. Cuneo, 273 Mass. 181. With this element out of the case, it seems to a majority of the court that there was not quite enough to support a finding of that high degree of culpability and indifference to duty which is the essential characteristic of gross negligence. Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 591. There is no evidence of deliberate inattention, or of voluntary incurring of obvious risk, or of impatience of reasonable restraint, or of persistence in a palpably negligent course of conduct over an appreciable period of time. These are some of the more common indicia of gross negli-. gence. The evidence leaves the deceased immediately before the accident holding the wheel and looking ahead. So far as appears, this accident, serious as it was, may have resulted from a mere lapse of eyesight, perception or judgment which may have been only momentary. There was evidence of a speed which could have been found excessive, but it was by no means extraordinary or even very unusual on a road of that kind. The warning came too late to brand the conduct of the deceased as grossly negligent.

Although each case must be decided upon its own peculiar facts, attention is called to the following as sufficiently close to be instructive: Shriear v. Feigelson, 248 Mass. 432; Bertelli v. Tronconi, 264 Mass. 235; Cook v. Cole, 273 Mass. 557; McKenna v. Smith, 275 Mass. 149; Richards v. Donohue, 285 Mass. 19; Curley v. Mahan, 288 Mass. 369. We think the case is distinguishable from Stowe v. Mason, 289 Mass. 577, Lefeave v. Ascher, 292 Mass. 336, and other cases cited by the plaintiffs.

In each case the entry must be

Exceptions sustained.

Judgment for the defendant.