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Vandyke against Christ

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1844-07
7 Watts & Serg. 373

Summary

Holding. The court reversed the judgment and awarded a new trial, holding that a general assignee for creditors is neither a purchaser nor a creditor's representative and therefore cannot invoke fraudulent conveyance statutes to challenge transfers of the assigned property.

A general assignee appointed to distribute a debtor's property among creditors does not occupy the legal position of a creditor or purchaser for purposes of fraudulent conveyance statutes. The statutes enacted under Elizabeth I were designed to protect actual creditors from transfers that would place property beyond the reach of execution, and to protect actual purchasers from deceptive transfers. Since a general assignee stands merely as the debtor's instrument for distribution and gains no vested interest until creditors accept the assignment's terms, the assignee cannot claim the protective benefits those statutes extend to creditors or purchasers. Consequently, a transfer made by the assignee to a third party cannot be deemed fraudulent as to the assignee, who lacks privity with the creditors and cannot assert their rights or attributes.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a general assignee stands in the legal position of a creditor or purchaser under fraudulent conveyance statutes
  • The scope of protections afforded by Elizabethan fraudulent conveyance statutes
  • Whether transfers by a general assignee can be void as fraudulent conveyances

Procedural posture

The case came before the court on appeal, with the lower court having apparently found a transfer fraudulent; the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Gibson, C. J.

Fraudulent retention of possession avoids a contract of sale only as to creditors or purchasers; the first by the 13 Eliz., the second by the 27 Eliz.; and it is only necessary to turn to Roberts on Fraudulent Conveyances (Ch. V., § 3,), or any other text-book in which the cases are arranged, to see that delivery at the time of sale, is required by a free interpretation of those statutes, and not by the common law. For what purpose do [they require it ? The object of the 13 Eliz. was to avoid those collusive transfers of the legal ownership, which would put the property beyond the reach of a debtor’s creditors; that of the 27 Eliz., to avoid those that are made with an intent to deceive purchasers.: and to these ends such conveyances are deemed to be no conveyances against the party attempted to be defrauded, but good against every one else. In what position did Christ stand, as Martin’s assignee for payment of the general creditors l Not in that of a purchaser; as was ruled in Twelves v. Williams, (3 Whart. 485), and not in that of a creditor or representative of creditors.; as appears by several clauses of the statute which declares that all conveyances of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods or. chattels made “ to the end to delay, hinder or defraud creditors or others,” shall be void “ only against that person or persons, áte. whose actions, suits, debts, &c. by such guileful, fraudulent or. covinous devices and practices shall or might be in anywise disturbed, hindered, delayed or defrauded.” Creditors, therefore, are protected only against those fraudulent transfers that would eloign the property and put it beyond the reach of their executions; and what execution could this assignee have! In Twelves v. Williams it was shown that a general assignee is neither a purchaser nor the representative of the creditors; and he consequently cannot claim the benefit of provisions intended for their protection. They are not bound by the assignment till they have acceded to it by an acceptance of its conditions; nor have they gained any vested interest in it. Before that is done, what would there be to hinder the assignee from executing a reconveyance 1 He is the debtor’s instrument for distribution, and stands in relation to the property as stood the debtor himself, except that it cannot be seized in his hands on a creditor’s execution. It has been transferred to him as it would have been transferred to the debtor’s right hand, had it pleased him to exercise his common-law right of preference by payment in person. As he stands in no privity to the creditors, he cannot arrogate to himself any of their attributes or rights; and the assignment to Vandyke is consequently not fraudulent as to him. There are three small exceptions to immaterial evidence; in respect to which it is difficult to say whether it was competent or not; but the error, if there was any, is not sufficiently manifest to justify a reversal on that ground.

Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.