E. W. Roberts, Administrator of the Estate of Charles W. Setty, Deceased, Appellant, v. A. R. Setty, Guardian, Appellee

Kansas Supreme Court1941-12-06No. No. 35,307

154 Kan. 505119 P.2d 539

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's order overruling the demurrer and granting leave to amend the claim was affirmed. Although the original claim failed to comply with formal statutory requirements, it stated a sufficient cause of action to toll the statutory deadline for presenting claims to the estate, and therefore amendment was properly permitted.

A probate estate claim filed in February 1941 was challenged through a demurrer in probate court on the ground that it failed to comply with statutory form requirements. The probate court sustained the demurrer, but on appeal to district court, the judge indicated the claim could proceed if amended to meet statutory standards and issued an order permitting amendment. The administrator of the estate appealed, arguing that although the original claim was timely filed, it did not state a cause of action and therefore did not stop the running of the deadline for submitting claims to the estate. The administrator contended that by the time amendment was permitted, the statutory deadline had expired and could not be revived by amending a deficient pleading.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the original claim, despite its form defects, adequately communicated the nature and amount of the claim to the estate administrator. This notice function was sufficient to toll the statutory deadline for filing claims. The court emphasized that probate statutes do not require strict compliance with form when the substance of the claim is clear, and that a defect in form should not impair the claimant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the district court properly exercised its authority to allow amendment.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a defectively pleaded claim that substantially communicates its nature and amount tolls the statutory deadline for filing estate claims
Whether a trial court may permit amendment of a probate claim after the statutory filing deadline has expired
Scope of district court authority to oversee pleadings in probate appeals

Procedural posture

The appellant, as estate administrator, appealed from a district court order that overruled a demurrer and granted leave to amend a claim against the estate, which the probate court had initially sustained on statutory noncompliance grounds.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Hoch, J.:

This appeal is from an order of the district court overruling a demurrer to a claim filed against an estate being administered in the probate court and granting leave to amend. The probate court had sustained a demurrer to the claim on the ground that the petition, or demand, did not comply with the requirements of G. S. 1939 Supp. 59-2202, and the claimant had appealed to the district court.

Upon appeal from the probate court the district court is clothed with broad general powers under the present probate code to allow or require pleadings to be filed or amended. (G. S. Í939 Supp. 59-2408.) While appellant’s abstract contains no specification of errors as required by rule 5 of this court, we do not understand that he questions that power. His contention is that the original claim, although timely filed in the probate court, did not state a cause of action and that when the district court granted leave to amend, the time within which claims must be exhibited (G. S. 1939 Supp. 59-2239) had expired, and that no amendment could then lift the bar of the statute — invoking the well-established rule that the filing of a petition which does not state a cause of action does not toll the statutes of limitation. (Bortko v. Polish National Alliance, post, p. 533, 119 P. 2d 536; Clark v. Wilson, 149 Kan. 660, 88 P. 2d 1070.)

It is unnecessary to set out in full the demand as filed in the probate court on February 25, 1941. It was evidently made out on an old form used before the new probate code went into effect on July 1,1939. It purported to cover a demand against the estate for certain taxes paid- — some under a lease contract — and for certain expenditures for labor, shown in a total sum as $671.96. The supporting affidavit was as follows:

“A. R. Setty, being first duly sworn, upon his oath says: That he is the guardian of the above-named claimant; that he has personal knowledge of the facts above set forth, that credit has been given to said estate for all payments and offsets to which it is entitled, and that the said balance of six hundred and seventy-one and 96/100 dollars claimed is justly due said claimant, to the best of his knowledge and belief.”

The district court expressed the opinion that the claim did state a cause of action but that it did not comply with the requirements of G. S. 1939 Supp. 59-2202 and advised the claimant that the demurrer would be sustained unless the petition were amended to conform thereto. Claimant agreed to amend and an order permitting amendment was thereupon entered. While the order did not specifically overrule the demurrer, we think, upon the record, it should be so construed.

The demand as filed did not meet the requirements of section 59-2202, but it did give the administrator notice of the nature of the claim and the amount alleged to be due the claimant from the estate, and we agree with the trial court that it stated a cause of action in terms sufficient to toll the statute which fixes the time within which demands must be exhibited (G. S. 1939 Supp. 59-2239) and that there was no error in permitting amendment — especially so in view of section 59-2201, which provides:

“Every application in a probate proceeding, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be by petition signed and verified by or on behalf of the petitioner. No defect in form shall impair substantial rights; and no defect in the statement of jurisdictional facts actually existing shall invalidate any proceedings.”

We note, in passing, that the record submitted is defective in that it does not disclose the date upon which the nine months’ period for exhibiting demands expired in this case. The period begins to run on the date of the first published notice to creditors (G. S. 1939 Supp. 59-2239), but the record does not show what that date was. Therefore, strictly on the record before us, we could not say, even if the original claim had failed to state a cause of action, that there was not yet time to do so by amendment. However, we have accepted counsel’s statement that the time for filing claims had expired, rather than basing our determination upon inadequacy of the record.

It may be added that we are, of course, not here dealing with any questions that may arise if and when the claim is amended.

The judgment is affirmed.