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Plitt versus Cox

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1863-01-26
43 Pa. 486

Summary

Holding. The lower court's decree was affirmed. The plaintiff was entitled to an injunction preventing the defendant from erecting a building that would obstruct the railroad corridor, because the plaintiff's long-standing use of that corridor as a passageway, combined with Levengood's implicit grant of access rights when he sold the basin lots, gave the plaintiff a permanent right to keep the corridor open.

The Commonwealth constructed a railroad on land that had once belonged to Peter Levengood and subsequently settled with him, obtaining a release of his claims. Levengood later sold parcels adjacent to this railroad corridor to various buyers, including the plaintiff. These lot owners and their predecessors used the railroad land for more than twenty-five years as the only means of access between their properties and Railroad Street, constructing lateral railroads, turntables, and passages across it. When the original Portage Railroad fell into disuse and its track was removed, Levengood sold a portion of the former railroad land to the defendant, who began erecting a building on it that would block the plaintiff's access route.

The court found that the prolonged, uninterrupted use of the railroad corridor as a passageway for over twenty-one years established a legally protectable right. Additionally, when Levengood originally sold the basin lots, they fronted directly on the open space that had been surrendered as a public highway. By conveying those lots, Levengood implicitly granted the use of that highway access as a permanent feature attached to the property itself. Just as a seller cannot later close off a common road running through a farm against those who purchased lots bordering it, Levengood and his successors cannot reclaim and obstruct the railroad corridor that had become an essential appurtenance of the plaintiff's lot.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether abandonment of a railroad easement permits the original owner to reclaim and obstruct the land
  • Whether long-term use of a passageway establishes a protectable right of way
  • Whether a seller of property impliedly grants permanent access rights across land that fronts the sold lots

Procedural posture

The plaintiff filed a bill in equity seeking to prevent the defendant from erecting a building on land adjacent to the plaintiff's property, and the lower court granted relief; the defendant appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered, by

Strong, J.

It is not easy to understand this case, in consequence of our not having been furnished with any of the plots or drafts that were used in the court below, not even with those that were proved by the testimony of witnesses taken by the examiner. The facts, however, as we glean them from the evidence, appear to be as follows: — The Commonwealth had a canal basin upon land .which had belonged to Peter Levengood. Upon one side of the basin the canal commissioners had constructed the Portage Railroad, adjacent to and along the line of what was called Railroad street, in the borough of Conemagh, and they had settled with Peter Levengood, who was the owner of - all the ground between the basin and the street, and had .taken his release. Subsequent to this, which was in 1834, Levengood sold lots on the basin, between it and the railroad, and separated from Railroad street only by the railroad. Of these lots the complainant is the owner of one. He and the other basin lot-holders have used the ground occupied by the railroad for lateral railroads, turn tables and passage to the street for more than twenty-five years, and in fact the lotowners, when they purchased, had no outlet landward except across the ground occupied by the Portage Railroad to the street, nor have they had at any time since. An open space, where the railroad was constructed, was at the time of Levengood’s sale, essential to the enjoyment of the basin lots purchased from him. The railroad having fallen into disuse, as such, and the track having been taken up by the purchasers from the Commonwealth, Mr. Levengood has sold a part of the ground upon which the track was laid, and the defendant who purchased mediately or immediately from him, has proceeded to erect a building upon it, between the property of the complainant and Railroad street. It was to prevent such an érection that his bill was filed. It may be doubted whether, under the Act of May 16th 1857, which authorized the sale of the railroad and canal, there could be any such abandonsr--.- as would authorize Levengood or his assignees to resume possession of the railroad track, and use it for any other purpose than that of a public highway. If he can, it must be done in direct collision with the enactment which declares that the railroad shall remain a public highway for ever. But, without pressing this consideration, the continued and uninterrupted use of the ground, as a passage-way by the complainant, or those under whom he holds, and the other basin lotholders for more than twenty-one years, which the proofs sufficiently establish, raises such a presumption of right as to entitle the complainant to have the ground remain open.

And still more, when Mr. Levengood sold the lots on the basin, they fronted on the open space occupied by the railroad, which he had previously surrendered for a highway. By his sale, then, he annexed the use of that highway to the ownership of the lots, and neither he nor any person under him can take it away. His case is like that of one who has sold lots fronting on a common road through his farm. If the road be vacated, and the rights of the public cease, he may not close it up against his vendees, for his grant estops him. All ways passed as permanent appurtenances to the lots conveyed.

It follows that the act of the defendant, in erecting a building on the ground intervening between the lots of the complainant and Railroad street was contrary to law, and such as a court of equity will enjoin against.

And now, to wit, June 26th 1863, this cause having been submitted upon printed arguments, and having been duly considered, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria county be affirmed, with costs, and the record is remitted.