Ralston versus Waln et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1863-02-19

44 Pa. 279

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Court affirmed dismissal of the bill regarding the first deed of April 4, 1849, but reversed as to the relief sought under the second deed of June 25, 1849, ordering the trustees to convey and assign all estate held under the latter deed to the complainant as absolute owner.

This case involved interpretation of two separate trust deeds executed in 1849, both naming the same trustees. The first deed established a trust of stocks and securities for the complainant's life estate with a testamentary power of appointment; upon her death without exercising that power, the property would pass to whoever would have been entitled as her next of kin under Pennsylvania's intestacy laws. The second deed, executed a few months later, conveyed both real and personal property to the same trustees, again giving the complainant a life estate with a power of appointment by will.

The core dispute centered on the meaning of "legal representatives" in each instrument. Under the first deed, this phrase meant the complainant's natural heirs or next of kin as determined by intestacy law—not the complainant herself—and thus she could not compel the trustees to transfer the property to her during her lifetime. Under the second deed, "legal representatives" carried its ordinary legal meaning of executors and administrators. Because that deed also used the word "heirs" in connection with real property and included assets owned by both the complainant and her husband, the court determined she was entitled to take the entire estate as absolute owner rather than merely as a life beneficiary.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Meaning of 'legal representatives' in trust instruments
Distinction between life estates with powers of appointment and absolute ownership
Application of intestacy law language in trust documents
Rights of a beneficiary to compel conveyance from trustees

Procedural posture

The complainant appealed from a decree of the Court of Nisi Prius that dismissed her bill seeking relief under both trust deeds.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered, by

Read, J.

Two deeds of trust are included in this bill, including different properties, and clothed in different language, and demanding separate if not different constructions. The first deed, of the 4th April 1849, conveyed to the defendant certain stocks and securities therein mentioned, which had been originally held by Robert Ralston, for the sole and separate use of the complainant, then the wife of Ashbel-Gr. Ralston, in trust to receive the income and to pay over the same to the complainant, to her sole and separate use, free, clear, and discharged from the control, interference, engagements, or liabilities of the said A. G. Ralston, her husband, during all the term of her natural life, and from and immediately after her decease to have and to hold the personal property thereby granted for the use and benefit of such persons, and for such estates as she should appoint by will, and in default of such appointment “they, the said Lewis Wain and Robert Ralston Dorsey, their successor, or successors in the trust, shall, from and after the decease of the said Eliza Ralston (the complainant), have and hold the personal property hereby granted and settled, or other property or investments into which the same shall or may be hereafter converted, to and for the use and benefit of such person or persons as would have been entitled to the same at the decease of the said Eliza Ralston, as her legal representatives, had she died a widow, under and by virtue of the ‘intestate laws of Pennsylvania.’ ”

We are simply asked to construe this deed of trust, which gives a life estate to Mrs. Ralston, with a power of appointment by will, in default of the exercise of which power it is given to the person or persons who would be her next of kin at her .decease, by the intestate laws of Pennsylvania. There can be no doubt, from the language of this clause, that this is the true meaning of the words “ her legal representatives,” and the provision that they are to take, as if she had died a widow, strengthens this obvious construction: Anderson v. Dawson, 15 Vesey, Jr. 532; Hanson v. Miller, 14 Simons 22.

The trustees under this deed cannot, therefore, be decreed to transfer to Mrs. Ralston, or according to her direction.

The second deed, of the 25th June 1849, by Ashbel G. Ralston and wife (the present complainant), to the same trustees, demands an entirely different construction of the words “legal representatives,” which here clearly mean executors and administrators. By the very able opinion of V. C. Kindersley, in Re Crawford’s Trust, 23 Law Jour., N. S., ch. 625, 2 Drewry 230, it is clearly shown that the ordinary legal sense of the terms “ legal personal representatives,” “legal representatives,” “personal representatives,” and “representatives,” is executors and administrators. In the present case the words of the conveyance include both real and personal estate, -dot only’of the complainant, but also of her husband, of which he was or might be seised or possessed, by virtue of his intermarriage with her. There is then given a life estate to her separate use, with a power of appointment by will, and in default of appointment, the trustees are then “togrant and convey the said premises, and every part thereof, unto such person and persons as at the decease of the said Eliza (the complainant) shall and may be her heirs and legal representatives.” The word heirs is applicable to real estate, and undoubtedly gives Mi’S. Ralston, as widow, an absolute estate in fee simple. In the same way the words legal representatives mean executors and administrators, and of course the complainant is entitled to the personal estate absolutely: 2 Wms. on Executors 1015.

And now, February 19th 1863, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that so much of the decree of the Court of Nisi Prius as dismisses the bill in relation to the relief sought in reference to the deed of the 4th April 1849, be affirmed, the complainant not being entitled to a conveyance from the defendants of the estate embraced in it, and as to the rest of the relief sought by the plaintiff’s bill, the said decree be reversed, and the said defendant’s trustees in the deed of the 25th June 1849, are ordered to convey and assign to the plaintiff all the estate embraced in the said deed and held by them, the said plaintiff being entitled to the same as the absolute owner thereof.