Anna Sylvias Case

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1943-02-24

313 Mass. 313

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Superior Court's decree is reversed. The Travelers Insurance Company is ordered to pay compensation, and the claim against Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company is dismissed, because the industrial disease referees' binding finding that the September 1941 disability was a recurrence of the original December 1938 injury—not a new injury—established that The Travelers Insurance Company, as the insurer at the time of the initial causal injury, bears liability for the entire compensation obligation.

An employee who worked with chemical-treated leather developed dermatitis in December 1938 and experienced recurrences in early 1941 and again in September 1941. Two different insurance companies covered the employee during these periods—The Travelers Insurance Company during the original injury and early recurrence, and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company at the time of the final disability. The question was which insurer bore responsibility for compensation during the last episode.

A board of industrial disease referees and a reviewing board both found that the September 1941 disability constituted a recurrence of the original December 1938 injury rather than a new injury. Under workers' compensation law, when successive insurers are involved with the same underlying condition, liability attaches to the insurer covering the risk at the time of the most recent causal injury. Because the industrial referees' findings supported a recurrence theory, The Travelers Insurance Company—which insured the employee when the original injury occurred—remained liable for all compensation stemming from that ongoing condition.

The Superior Court attempted to overturn the referees' findings, but the court lacked authority to do so. The referees' report carries binding effect and high evidentiary weight under the applicable statute, and their determination that this was a recurrence rather than a new injury was reasonably supported by the evidence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Which insurer is liable when an employee experiences recurrent disability under successive workers' compensation policies
Whether a board of industrial disease referees' factual findings are binding on courts and reversible only in limited circumstances
The legal distinction between a recurrence of an existing occupational injury and a new injury for insurance liability purposes

Procedural posture

The employee appealed a Superior Court decree that had reversed findings by the Industrial Accident Board's single member and reviewing board, dismissed the claim against The Travelers Insurance Company, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Lummus, J.

The employee worked at seasoning leather, using wooden swabs wet with chemicals. On December 19, 1938, she suffered a dermatitis caused by her work. She was paid compensation by The Travelers Insurance Company, the then insurer, until April 4, 1939. Again in February, 1941, she suffered a similar disability for which the same company paid compensation through May 12, 1941. She did not return to work again until September 30, 1941, and then after working two days she was disabled again from the same cause. She has not worked since. At the time of the last attack the Lumber mens Mutual Casualty Company was the insurer. The only question is, which insurer is liable to pay compensation?

A board of industrial disease referees was appointed under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 9B, inserted by St. 1935, c. 424, and amended by St. 1938, c. 462. It is provided that their report “shall be binding on the parties,” and it appears from Latorre’s Case, 302 Mass. 24, 27, that their report “is given high evidentiary value by the statute,” to say the least. That board reported that “this employee had a dermatitis three years ago which recurred again about August, 1940, and again in September, 1941.” The single member found that the employee “on September 30 and on October 1, 1941, did not sustain a new injury but suffered a recurrence of the dermatitis that she originally contacted [contracted?] on December 19, 1938.” It is evident that the single member used the word recurrence as distinguished from a new injury. This finding was warranted by the report of the industrial disease referees, which could be interpreted in this way. This distinguishes the present case from Panagotopulos’s Case, 276 Mass. 600, 606. The Travelers Insurance Company, which covered the risk at the time of the 1938 injury, was ordered to pay compensation. The reviewing board affirmed and adopted the decision of the single member, and ordered The Travelers Insurance Company to pay compensation. But the Superior Court entered a decree reciting that the evidence did not warrant a finding that the disability resulted from injuries received on December 19, 1938, and February 3, 1941, and dismissed the claim against The Travelers Insurance Company, remanding the case to the Industrial Accident Board for further action. The employee and the Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company appealed.

For the same disability only one insurer can be charged. Donahue’s Case, 290 Mass. 239. Where there are several successive insurers, the one chargeable with the whole compensation is the one covering the risk at the time of the most recent injury that bears a causal relation to the disability. Borstel’s Case, 307 Mass. 24. Blanco’s Case, 308 Mass. 574, 577, 578. The proceedings against both or all the insurers constitute a single proceeding, which is brought as an entirety before this court on the appeal of any party. Borstel’s Case, 307 Mass. 24, 27.

The report of the board of industrial disease referees warranted the finding of the single member and the reviewing board that the disability was the result, not of a new injury, but of an old one. The Superior Court had no power to reverse that finding. The decree is reversed, and a new decree is to be entered, ordering The Travelers Insurance Company to pay compensation, and dismissing the claim against the Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company.

Ordered accordingly.