Branton H. Henderson, Junior, vs. Constance B. Henderson

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1952-09-09

329 Mass. 257

Summary · law.co

Holding. The mother's appeals were dismissed because she remained in contempt of court by refusing to return the child and disclose its whereabouts, and she thereby forfeited her right to appellate review.

A mother appealed from a custody decree awarding her minor child to the father. Before the appeal hearing, the mother took the child from the father's residence and removed the child from the state without the father's knowledge or consent, violating an existing temporary custody order. The mother refused to disclose the child's whereabouts even to her own attorney. The father moved to dismiss the appeals based on the mother's contempt of court and unconscionable conduct in secreting the child.

The court recognized that a party in active contempt—particularly one who has violated custody orders and allegedly committed kidnapping—should not be permitted to proceed with appellate relief as a matter of right. The court gave the mother thirty days to return the child to the father's custody, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal of her appeals. When the mother did not comply within the deadline, the court dismissed all of her appeals.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a party in contempt of court for violating a custody order may proceed with an appeal
Whether a parent who secretes a child in violation of a custody decree waives appellate rights
The intersection of contempt of court and family law appellate jurisdiction

Procedural posture

The father sought dismissal of the mother's appeals from a custody decree, which the mother had appealed while in violation of temporary custody orders.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Wilkins, J.

. The petitioner was granted custody of the minor child of the parties by a decree dated December 18, 1951, from which the respondent has appealed. The respondent was not present and offered no evidence at the hearing, which was held on December 17, 1951, and at which she participated through counsel. Previously, on October 31, 1951, while the child was in the temporary custody of the petitioner under a decree dated September 20, 1951, the respondent went to the petitioner’s apartment, and took away the child, who was at the moment in the care of the petitioner’s mother. The respondent then wrongfully sent or carried the child out of the Commonwealth to parts unknown without the knowledge or consent of the petitioner and in violation of the order for temporary custody. The respondent has at no time disclosed the whereabouts of the child even to her own counsel of record. The respondent has also appealed from a decree denying her motion to vacate the decree for temporary custody and from a decree denying her motion to dismiss the proceedings.

The petitioner has filed in this court a motion to dismiss the appeals on the grounds that the respondent has wilfully violated the order for temporary custody and that in that and other respects she has been guilty of unconscionable, inequitable, and contemptuous conduct.

The respondent is admittedly in continued contempt of the court whose decrees she here seeks to reverse. In Campbell v. Justices of the Superior Court, 187 Mass. 509, a plaintiff, who was in contempt of court, was not allowed to go on with his case against the defendant as matter of right. On principle, we think that the respondent, who took and detains the child in violation of one or both of the custody decrees and has committed the crime of kidnapping (Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144, 151), cannot as of right insist upon proceeding with her appeals while she is secreting the child and preventing an orderly settlement of the controversy.

Ample authority exists elsewhere for granting the petitioner’s motion. McEntire v. McEntire, 213 Ala. 328. Knoob v. Knoob, 192 Cal. 95. MacPherson v. MacPherson, 13 Cal. (2d) 271, 277. Pike v. Pike, 24 Wash. (2d) 735, 742-743. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 255 Ill. 442, 445-446; Casebolt v. Butler, 175 Ky. 381. The question somewhat resembles that presented by a defendant in a criminal case whose conduct in escaping custody after conviction has been held to be a waiver of all right to seek a reversal in appellate proceedings. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138.

For the present we do not dismiss the appeals, but con- tinue the motion for thirty days from the date of the re-script. If within thirty days thereafter the respondent returns the child to the custody of the petitioner, the motion is to be denied, and the case is to be decided upon “the merits. Otherwise, the motion to dismiss the appeals is to be allowed. ,

„ 7 , bo ordered.

On October 10, 1952, the following further order was made: “It appearing that the respondent has not returned the child to the custody of the petitioner in accordance with the rescript dated September 9, 1952, the appeals of the respondent are dismissed.” — Reporter.