THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, A Corporation, Petitioner v. Brian Eugene TOWE, Jerry Edward Alexander, and William Wayne McClaskey, Defendants, of whom William Wayne McClaskey is Respondent

Supreme Court of South Carolina1994-02-22No. 24016

314 S.C. 105441 S.E.2d 825

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that McClaskey's injuries arose out of the use of Towe's automobile because a causal connection existed between the vehicle and the injuries, and Alexander's act of throwing the bottle did not constitute an independent act breaking that connection.

Home Insurance Company sought review of a Court of Appeals decision regarding whether injuries sustained by McClaskey arose from the use of an automobile driven by Towe. McClaskey was struck by a bottle that Alexander threw from Towe's moving vehicle while aiming at a road sign. The trial court initially ruled the injuries did not arise from the vehicle's use, but the Court of Appeals reversed, applying the causal connection test established in a prior Supreme Court decision.

The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Home's arguments on three grounds. First, the court held that the causal connection test applies regardless of whether an injury results from negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct. Second, the court found a sufficient causal link because the vehicle's use positioned Alexander to throw the bottle and the vehicle's speed increased the projectile's velocity and injury severity. Third, the court determined that Alexander's act of throwing was not an independent intervening act breaking the causal chain, but rather was inextricably linked to the vehicle's operation as one continuing act.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the causal connection test for vehicle-related injuries applies to intentional acts
Whether a sufficient causal connection existed between the automobile and McClaskey's injuries
Whether the passenger's intentional act of throwing the bottle breaks the causal link to vehicle use

Procedural posture

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals decision that reversed a trial court judgment in a declaratory judgment action brought by an automobile insurer.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Harwell, Chief Justice:

We granted Home Insurance Companys (Home) petition for writ of certiorari to review Home Insurance Company v. Towe, — S.C. —, 425 S.E. (2d) 784 (Ct. App. 1992). Home contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the injuries William McClaskey (McClaskey) received when struck by a bottle thrown from a passing ear arose out of the “ownership, maintenance or use” of Brian Towe’s (Towe) automobile. We disagree and affirm.

I. FACTS

While riding in an automobile driven by Towe, Jerry Alexander (Alexander) threw a bottle from the moving vehicle at a road sign. Instead of striking the sign, the bottle shattered on the steering wheel of a tractor McClaskey was driving in the opposite direction, seriously injuring McClaskey and causing minor damage to the tractor. Thereafter, Mc-Claskey filed suit against Towe and Alexander.

Home, Towe’s insurer, brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether McClaskey’s injuries arose out of the “ownership, maintenance or use” of Towe’s automobile. The trial judge found that McClaskey’s injuries did not arise out of the use of Towe’s automobile and McClaskey appealed. While McClaskey’s appeal was pending, this Court held that for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, an injury arises out of the use of an automobile if there is a causal connection between the vehicle and the injury and if no act of independent significance breaks the causal link. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Howser, — S.C. —, 422 S.E. (2d) 106 (1992). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge’s ruling, finding that under Wausau, McClaskey’s injuries arose out of the use of Towe’s vehicle.

II. DISCUSSION

Home first argues that Wausau applies only to intentionally inflicted injuries and, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the Wausau test to the facts of this case. We disagree.

The test for determining whether an injury arose out of the use of a vehicle turns on the causal connection between the vehicle and the injury. Wausau at —, 422 S.E. (2d) at 108. No distinction is made as to whether the injury resulted from a negligent, reckless, or intentional act. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 126 N.J. Super. 29, 312 A. (2d) 664 (Super. App. Div. 1973), Affd, 64 N.J. 152, 319 A. (2d) 732 (1974) (substantial nexus existed between injury and the use of the car regardless of whether the object blew out of the car window, fell out, or was pushed or thrown out). We reject Home’s claim that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Wausau to the facts of this case.

Home next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there is a causal connection between the automobile and McClaskey’s injuries. We disagree.

The use of the automobile placed Alexander in the position to throw the bottle at the sign and the vehicle’s speed contributed to the velocity of the bottle increasing the seriousness of McClaskey’s injuries. Home, — S.C. at —, 425 S.E. (2d) at 786. As in Wausau, the automobile was an active accessory that gave rise to the injuries. Home at —, 425 S.E. (2d) at 786. Therefore, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that a causal connection exists between the use of Towe’s automobile and McClaskey’s injuries.

Home next argues that Alexander’s act of throwing the bottle is an act of independent significance that breaks the causal connection between McClaskey’s injuries and the use of Towe’s automobile. We disagree.

The use of the automobile and Alexander’s throwing of the bottle were, as in Wausau, “inextricably linked” as one continuing act. Accordingly, there was no act of independent significance that broke the causal connection between the use of the automobile and McClaskey’s injuries. Accord Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So. (2d) 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (injuries that resulted from passenger’s throwing a bottle from a car were causally connected with the use of the automobile and no intervening event broke the causal link).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals’ holding that McClaskey’s injuries arose out of the use of Towe’s car is

Affirmed.

Chandler, Finney, Toal and Moore, JJ., concur.