DAVIS et al. v. TURNER et al.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit1952-05-23No. No. 13894

197 F.2d 847

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment dismissing the complaint was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings because the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under federal law.

Helen Davis and other plaintiffs sued state officials for damages under federal law, alleging that a sheriff and deputy sheriff of Smith County, Texas unlawfully entered Davis's store without a warrant, found nothing illegal, then arrested her without cause, physically assaulted her, denied her access to counsel, and subjected her to various indignities while refusing to disclose what crime she was charged with. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, accepting the defendants' motion to dismiss.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the allegations in the complaint, which were technically admitted through the motion to dismiss, were sufficient to survive dismissal and proceed to trial. The court found that the facts described—warrantless search, unjustified arrest, physical violence, denial of legal consultation, and mistreatment by officials acting under color of state authority—established a valid claim for constitutional deprivation under federal statute. The court emphasized that official conduct undertaken under the pretense or guise of legal authority, even when exceeding or violating actual legal limits, falls within the scope of actionable conduct.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for constitutional deprivation
Whether conduct by state officials acting 'under color of law' includes unauthorized and unlawful actions
Whether unlawful search, arrest without probable cause, and physical assault by law enforcement state a valid federal claim

Procedural posture

Plaintiffs appealed from a district court order granting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

This is an action for damages for deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, which action is given to the party injured by Section 43, Title 8, of the United States Code Annotated. On motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint, because it wholly failed to state a cause of action, the court below held that the motion was well taken, and dismissed the suit at plaintiffs’ costs.

The district court had jurisdiction under Section 1343(3), Title 28, of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3). The motion to dismiss admitted the well-pleaded allegations of fact contained in the complaint, and we think that these allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action and to entitle the plaintiffs to a trial on the merits. According to the facts in this record, which are admitted by the motion to dismiss, the alleged wrongs and injuries were inflicted upon the appellant Helen Davis by the appellees in their capacity, respectively, of sheriff and deputy sheriff of Smith County, Texas.

The hard and cruel facts technically admitted are, in substance, that the appellees, on the. 18th of October, 1950, entered the store of said Helen Davis without a search warrant or warrant of any kind, searched the store, and found nothing unlawful therein. Immediately after completing said search, they arrested her, seized her violently by the arm, refused to permit her to consult an attorney, struck her, and put her in jail. The sheriff said he was the law, but refused to tell her what crime she was charged with committing. It is unnecessary to repeat in detail all the rough treatment, illegal handling, personal indignities, and incivilities, that this woman was subjected to by these two officials in the name and under color of state laws. We think the complaint states facts and circumstances that entitle the injured parties to damages under Section 43, Title 8, of the United States Code.

See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed. 676; U. S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368; Screws v. U. S., 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495; Hague v. C. I. O., 3 Cir., 101 F.2d 774, 775, as modified and affirmed by Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Picking v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 3 Cir., 151 F.2d 240, rehearing denied, 3 Cir., 152 F.2d 753; McShane v. Moldovan, 6 Cir., 172 F.2d 1016; Valle v. Stengel, 3 Cir., 176 F.2d 697; Williams v. U. S., 5 Cir., 179 F.2d 656, affirmed in 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576, 95 L.Ed. 774; Lynch v. U. S., 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 476.

In Screws v. U. S., supra, Mr. Justice Douglas said, 325 U.S. at page 111, 65 S.Ct. at page 1040: “It is clear that under ‘color’ of law means under ‘pretense’ of law. * * * If, as suggested, the statute was designed to embrace only action which the State in fact authorized, the words ‘under color of any law were hardly apt words to express the idea.”

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.