Brobst versus Ruff

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1882-10-02

100 Pa. 91

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that a prosecutor cannot escape liability for malicious prosecution by claiming to have acted on the advice of a justice of the peace, though such advice from a qualified attorney would provide protection.

To succeed in a malicious prosecution case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant initiated a prosecution without probable cause and was motivated by malice. The court explained that malice can be inferred from the absence of probable cause, but if probable cause exists, the prosecutor's motives become irrelevant. The determinative question in this case involved whether a prosecutor could rely on advice from a justice of the peace to shield himself from liability for malicious prosecution.

The court held that while a prosecutor who obtains advice from a lawyer and acts in good faith on that legal opinion receives protection from malicious prosecution claims, the same protection does not extend to advice from justices of the peace. Justices of the peace lack the legal training and professional qualifications necessary to provide binding legal advice. Their role is judicial in nature—they review complaints and determine whether presented facts justify issuing warrants—not to serve as legal advisors to prosecutors. An educated business person, though potentially more knowledgeable than an inexperienced justice, would similarly be unable to shield a prosecutor from liability through their advice.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Elements required to establish malicious prosecution
Whether probable cause eliminates liability regardless of motive
Distinction between advice from attorneys versus justices of the peace
Scope of protection afforded to prosecutors acting on legal advice

Procedural posture

The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution against the defendant, and the trial court rejected evidence that the defendant had obtained advice from a justice of the peace before instituting the prosecution.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Mercur

delivered the opinion of the court, October 2nd 1882.

To maintain an action for malieious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove the prosecution to have been made without probable cause, and that the prosecutor was actuated by malice towards the plaintiff. Malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause; but if there be probable cause, it matters not that the prosecution be malicious. If the act be lawful the motives of the prosecutor will not be inquired into. Whether certain facts constitute probable cause, must be determined by the -court; but, whether such alleged facts exist, is for the jury to find. The law applicable to the case was correctly stated by the learned judge, and we discover no error in the admission of evidence.

The main question arises under the eleventh assignment. The plaintiff in error offered to prove, substantially, that he stated to the justice of the peace, before whom the prosecution was about to be instituted, the facts as he had heard them, and he was advised by the justice that they were sufficient upon which to base a criminal prosecution against the defendant in error. The evidence was rejected.

When a prosecutor fully and fairly submits to his counsel learned in the law all the facts which he knows are capable of proof, and is advised that they are sufficient to sustain a prosecution, and, acting in good faith on that opinion, does institute the prosecution, he is not liable to an action for malicious prosecution, although the opinion be erroneous. Shall the advice of a committing magistrate have the same effect? We think not. Justices of the peace are not required to be learned in the law. In fact, generally through the state they are not. They are not qualified by a course of study to give advice on questions of law. They do not pursue it as a profession. They are not charged with the duty of advising any person to commence a prosecution. They ought not to act as attorney or agent for one in regard to a prosecution he is about to institute before them. Their duties are judicial; they may in the discharge thereof reduce the substance of the complaint to writing-, in the form of an information of the prosecutor, then, they judicially determine whether the facts therein averred, be sufficient to justify the issuing of a warrant.

An educated business man may be much better qualified, than many inexperienced justices of the peace, to advise as to the law; yet I am not aware that the advice of such a person has ever been held to protect against damages for a malicious prosecution.

The conclusion at which we have arrived, is not in conflict with any decision of this court. It is the logical sequence of the rule declared in Walter v. Sample, 1 Casey, 275. In that ease, tbe prosecutor bad acted under tbe advice of a member of the bar. The protecting power of the rule extends no further than the advice of one learned in the law. In an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant cannot be permitted to ?rove that he acted under the advice of a magistrate: Straus v. Young, 37 Md. 282; Olmstead v. Partridge, 82 Mass. 381.

There was no error in permitting the amendment after a trial on the merits.

Judgment affirmed.