Joseph R. Charron vs. Harry W. Day, executor

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1917-10-23

228 Mass. 305

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court's denial of the executor's motion for a directed verdict was proper; the deceased woman's statements that the physician would be paid from her estate after her death, combined with her acknowledgment of the charges, supported an inference of an implied promise to bind her estate for the medical services, and such a contract is valid and enforceable.

A physician sued the executor of a deceased woman's estate to collect payment for medical services he had provided to her over a period of years. The woman had been married and her husband typically provided household funds, though she made some payments to the doctor herself. While no formal agreement existed between the woman and the physician, she told him on multiple occasions that he would be paid from her estate after her death, and she appeared to acknowledge his charges by directing payments and crediting at least one item against her property.

The court found that the woman's statements to the physician—that he would receive payment from her property after her death—could reasonably be interpreted as an implicit promise to bind her estate for the debt. The court reasoned that such a promise, made with the apparent intent that the doctor understand her estate would satisfy the obligation, was equivalent to a direct commitment to pay and therefore enforceable. The trial court properly denied the executor's request to dismiss the claim, as the evidence supported an inference of contractual intent.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a married woman's estate may be bound by an implied promise to pay for medical services
Whether statements indicating payment would come from the woman's property after death constitute a binding contract
Distinction between express agreement and implied obligation inferred from conduct and statements

Procedural posture

The trial court denied the defendant executor's request for a directed verdict, and the executor appealed on exceptions.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Rugg, C. J.

This is an action by a physician to recover for services rendered to the defendant’s testatrix during a period of years extending to the time of her death. She was then a married woman living with her husband, who worked for the support of the family and furnished her the money with which she paid the household bills, including certain cash payments to the plaintiff.

The law implies an obligation on the part of the husband to pay for medical attendance rendered to his wife. But under the present statute the wife also may incur an obligation to pay for such attendance. St. 1910, c. 576, whereby a married woman may be held liable under stated conditions jointly with her husband for debts for necessaries not exceeding $100 in value, has no application to the facts of the case at bar. But a married woman may bind her separate estate to pay for necessaries furnished to her by an express promise or by conduct and words from which an intentional obligation to that effect may be inferred. Labaree v. Colby, 99 Mass. 559. Caldwell v. Blanchard, 191 Mass. 489. R. L. c. 153, § 2.

The auditor’s findings bearing upon this point are that “No express agreement was made by Mrs. Day to pay Dr. Charron for his services. . . . Mrs. Day often told Dr. Charron that there would be property enough left by her after her death to pay him and that he would get his pay. ... All payments made on account of this bill were cash with the exception of one item of credit, which was one load of hay December 5, 1902, $10. Mrs. Day owned the land from which this hay was cut and knew of the transaction. . . . His charges were made against Mrs. . . . Day and whenever payments were made on account of his bill Mrs. Day made them or they were made by her direction,” presumably, however, out of money furnished her by her husband. “I do not find that . . . she knew the amount of Dr. Charron’s charges against her, nor that she knew that Dr. Charron- was charging her for services to other members of the family, nor do I find that there was ever any promise to pay upon her part any bill of Dr. Charron during her lifetime, but that she told the doctor that, if you do not get your money now, you will sometime after my death.” The finding was against the plaintiff so far as services rendered to other members of the family are concerned, and no question arises on that point.

The request of the defendant for a ruling that the plaintiff could not recover was denied rightly in view of these findings, of fact. The testatrix knew that the attendance was rendered to her and apparently knew that the charges were made against her. One credit upon the account was made seemingly out of her property with her knowledge and consent. The finding. that there was no “express agreement” on her part to pay must be considered in connection with the further finding that she said to the doctor that she would leave property enough to pay the bill, and that he would get his pay after her death. The fair implication of these words might reasonably be found to be that she intended him to understand that her estate should be bound to pay his charges, if they were not paid before her decease. If this was so, then it would be equivalent to a direct promise to pay the debt after her death. “A contract to pay money after one’s own death is valid.” Earle v. Angell, 157 Mass. 294, 296.

Exceptions overruled.