Daniel vs. The State of Georgia

Supreme Court of Georgia1880-02

65 Ga. 199

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly excluded hearsay evidence of a third party's alleged confession as inadmissible to rebut the presumption of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen property, and properly excluded testimony regarding the defendant's statements from the preliminary hearing. The judgment of conviction in both cases is affirmed.

Daniel was convicted in two separate trials in Dougherty County Superior Court of cattle stealing, a form of simple larceny. He moved for new trials in both cases, which the court denied. On appeal, Daniel challenged the exclusion of two pieces of evidence: first, hearsay testimony from witnesses who claimed to have heard a third party named Henry Dixon confess to stealing the cattle and boast of escaping punishment; and second, testimony from the magistrate who presided at Daniel's preliminary hearing regarding statements Daniel allegedly made at that time. The record indicated that Daniel had sold the stolen property in Albany shortly after the loss. The appellate court examined both evidentiary rulings and upheld the trial court's exclusions.

Regarding the first issue, the court explained that possession of recently stolen property creates a strong legal presumption of guilty possession that places the burden on the possessor to prove innocent acquisition. Hearsay accounts of what someone else said they did cannot overcome this presumption and are inadmissible to rebut it. To allow such evidence would effectively require acquittal whenever a defendant could produce witnesses willing to claim they heard someone else confess to the crime, a result no court has endorsed. On the second issue, the court noted that while statute requires statements made by a defendant during preliminary hearings be reduced to writing and returned with court papers, the trial court may have properly rejected the magistrate's testimony because this statutory procedure was not followed, or because allowing the defendant to introduce his own prior statements would be improper. In any event, the alleged statement—that Daniel had received the property from Dixon—would not have changed the verdict had it been admitted.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of hearsay evidence to rebut the presumption of guilt from possession of stolen property
Whether a third party's alleged confession can exonerate a defendant found in possession of stolen goods
Admissibility of magistrate testimony regarding defendant's preliminary hearing statements without proper written reduction

Procedural posture

Daniel appealed his two convictions for cattle stealing from Dougherty County Superior Court to the appellate court after his motions for new trials were denied.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Crawford, Justice.

There were two several indictments against the plaintiff in error in the superior court of Dougherty county for simple larceny, the specific crime being cattle stealing; he was found guilty in both cases, moved for a new trial in each, which was refused and he excepted.

The two cases were heard in this court together, and the judgment therein will be so pronounced.

One of the grounds in each case relied upon by the defendant was, that he offered two witnesses, viz: Maly Johnson and Minerva Jenkins to prove that they had heard Henry Dixon say that he had stolen the steers for which the defendant was indicted, and that he was sharp enough to get out of it, which testimony was rejected by the court, and the defendant assigned that as error. The testimony in the record shows that the defendant, shortly .after the loss of the property, had carried it to Albany and there sold it.

1. The rule is too well settled to be disturbed, that the possession of stolen property immediately after it is ■stolen, puts upon the possessor the burden of provingthat his was not a guilty possession.

These witnesses were therefore offered to remove this .legal presumption of the defendant’s guilt, by showing that they had heard one Dixon say that he had stolen the steers. We are at a loss to see how, under any well defined or even loose principle of law, this testimony was .admissible. To allow such hearsay as this to rebut and overcome so strong a legal presumption of guilt, would be about equivalent to holding that if the prisoner could get some one to say that he committed the crime for which the accused was indicted, and then offer witnesses to prove that they heard it said, then, in all such cases, it would be the duty of the jury to acquit. No court within our reading has so held, and this will not certainly be the first to establish such a precedent.

2. Another, and a separate ground, taken in one of these cases is, that the court refused to allow the magistrate presiding at the commitment trial to testify as to the statement made by the prisoner at that time. In ■preliminary trials the court shall always permit the ■defendant to make his own statement of the transaction. Whenever such statement is made it shall be reduced to writing and returned to the proper court with the papers, in the event of a commitment. Code, §4733.

When there is a statement, and this requirement of the statute is followed, it is “ the highest and best evidence as to what the defendant did state.” 54 Ga., 156.

The court below may have rejected this testimony because the statement was not reduced to writing as the law required, and that to allow it as offered, would have been giving the defendant an opportunity to introduce his own sayings in evidence to support his innocence. Be the reason whatsoever it may, the statement thus sought to have been introduced was, that he had received the stolen property from Dixon, and if admitted, could not have changed the verdict, which was right under the law and .the evidence.

Judgment affirmed.