KAREN D. CICOGNA v. JOHN H. HOLDER

Supreme Court of North Carolina1997-02-10No. No. 125A96

345 N.C. 488

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed and remanded, holding that it was error to submit contributory negligence to the jury when the plaintiff was proceeding through an intersection on a green light and was struck by a driver who violated a red light, absent evidence that would have alerted the plaintiff to the danger. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of damages.

A driver proceeding through an intersection on a green light was struck by another driver who ran a red light. At trial, the judge submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, and the jury found the plaintiff partially at fault. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a contributory negligence verdict. The court agreed, holding that a motorist with a green light has the right to assume that other drivers will obey their red lights unless something specifically alerts them to the danger. Here, nothing warned the plaintiff that the defendant would violate the traffic signal, so the plaintiff was not required to anticipate the defendant's illegal conduct.

The court rejected the defendant's reliance on cases requiring drivers to maintain proper lookout, finding that those cases involved additional evidence of negligence beyond the intersection collision itself—such as a warning from a passenger or a driver's inattention while entering the intersection. Because no such additional evidence of the plaintiff's negligence existed in this case, submitting contributory negligence to the jury was improper. The court also determined that the negligence and contributory negligence issues were sufficiently separate that an erroneous jury verdict on contributory negligence would not necessarily taint the verdict on negligence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Sufficiency of evidence to submit contributory negligence to a jury
Right to assume other drivers will obey traffic signals
Duty to anticipate negligent conduct by other motorists
Scope of new trial when an evidentiary issue is submitted in error

Procedural posture

The plaintiff appealed from a trial court judgment that included a jury verdict finding contributory negligence.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

WEBB, Justice.

The question raised by this appeal involves the quantum of evidence necessary to submit contributory negligence to the jury when the plaintiff’s vehicle is struck by another vehicle while the plaintiff is proceeding through an intersection pursuant to a green light. There is no evidence in this case that there was anything that would have put the plaintiff on notice that the defendant would not obey the traffic light. Absent such evidence, contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury. The plaintiff was not required to anticipate that the defendant would be negligent. Penland v. Greene, 289 N.C. 281, 221 S.E.2d 365 (1976). The only evidence presented was that the plaintiff had the green light and was struck by the defendant, who violated the red light. This is not sufficient evidence of contrib utory negligence by the plaintiff to submit contributory negligence to the jury.

This case is similar to Jones v. Schaffer, 252 N.C. 368, 114 S.E.2d 105 (1960), in which we said a person “has a right to assume that any motorist approaching from his left on the intersecting street will stop in obedience to the red light facing him unless and until something occurs that is reasonably calculated to put him on notice that such motorist will unlawfully enter the intersection.” Id. at 375, 114 S.E.2d at 111; see also Myrick v. Peeden, 113 N.C. App. 638, 439 S.E.2d 816, disc. rev. denied, 336 N.C. 781, 447 S.E.2d 426 (1994); Snead v. Holloman, 101 N.C. App. 462, 400 S.E.2d 91 (1991).

The defendant relies principally on two cases: Bass v. Lee, 255 N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (1961), and Frugard v. Pritchard, 112 N.C. App. 84, 434 S.E.2d 620 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 338 N.C. 508, 450 S.E.2d 744 (1994). Neither is helpful to him. Each of these cases reiterates the rule that a motorist, although he has the green light, must keep a proper lookout. In each case, however, there was evidence of negligence in addition to a collision in an intersection. In Bass, a passenger in the defendant’s automobile warned him that the vehicle approaching the intersection would not stop. In Pritchard, the defendant was looking to the right and waving to friends as he entered the intersection. This was additional evidence that the defendant did not keep a proper lookout. There was no such evidence regarding the plaintiff in the case before us.

We hold it was error to submit contributory negligence to the jury in this case. In ordering a new trial, it is within the discretion of this Court whether to grant a new trial on all issues. If the issue which was erroneously submitted did not affect the entire verdict, there should not be a new trial on all issues. See Fortune v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., 292 N.C. 557, 234 S.E.2d 605 (1977). In this case, the evidence as to negligence and contributory negligence was separate. The verdict as to contributory negligence should not have affected the negligence issue.

We therefore remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to Superior Court, Lee County, for a new trial on the issue of damages.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.