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Jones et al. vs. Sligh et al., commissioners, et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1885-12-22
75 Ga. 7

Summary

Holding. The statute authorizing counties to levy and collect a tax for erecting and maintaining fences is unconstitutional as exceeding the taxing powers granted to counties under the state constitution. The judgment refusing the injunction was affirmed.

The case concerns the validity of a state statute authorizing county commissioners to levy a tax on property within a district to pay for the construction and maintenance of fences. Plaintiffs challenged the tax as unconstitutional. The court examined the state constitution's enumeration of purposes for which counties may be authorized to collect taxes, including education, public buildings, prisoner maintenance, court costs, poor relief, and similar functions. The court found that fence construction and maintenance was not among the constitutionally permitted purposes and therefore the statute violated the constitution by attempting to grant counties taxing power beyond their constitutional limits. The court distinguished between taxes, which burden all property and persons alike, and assessments for local improvements, which are limited to properties receiving direct local benefits. Since the challenged law imposed a tax rather than an assessment, it could not be justified as a local improvement charge. The court also determined that because the tax collector was not named as a defendant in the lawsuit, the trial court properly refused to grant an injunction against the county commissioners alone.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a county may be authorized by statute to levy a tax for fence construction and maintenance
  • Whether fence maintenance falls within constitutionally permitted county taxing purposes
  • Distinction between taxes and assessments for local improvements
  • Proper parties defendant for enjoining tax collection

Procedural posture

Plaintiffs sought an injunction against county commissioners to prevent collection of a tax levied on property in a no-fence district, and the trial court denied the injunction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Bimndford, Justice.

The question here is as to the constitutionality of §1455(b) of the Code. That section declares, “ Said ordinary (or such tribunal as may have jurisdiction over county matters) shall be empowered to levy and collect a tax upon the property of said district sufficient to defray the expenses of erecting and maintaining said fences, said tax to be collected at the same time and in the same manner as other state and county taxes are collected.” The commissioners of Paulding county assessed a tax of twenty-five per cent on the state taxes on the property in the district which had declared for no fence at an election held therefor under the act of 1880, as embraced in section 1455 of the Code, and this bill is filed against the county commissioners to enjoin the collection of this tax.

Art. 7, Sec. 6, Par. 2, constitution of this state, Code, §5190, provides that, “the general assembly shall not have power to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose, except for educational purposes in instructing children in the elementary branches of an English education only ; to build and repair the public buildings and bridges; to maintain and support prisoners; to pay jurors and coroners, and for litigation, quarantine, roads, and expenses of courts; to support paupers and pay debts heretofore existing.”

There is no authority, nor can the legislature grant any authority to a county to levy and collect a tax for any other purpose than that above specified. The authority granted by the legislature in section 1455(b), before set out, does not fall within either of the exceptions, which authorizes the legislature to grant to a county the right to levy and collect a tax, but its purpose is to levy and collect a tax for the purpose of erecting and maintaining fences. This purpose, for which the tax, when collected, is to be used, is not a purpose for which taxes can be laid and collected, as specified in the paragraph of the constitution quoted. There being no provision in the constitution which authorizes a tax to be levied and collected, as contemplated in section 1455 (b), it must follow that the authority granted to collect a tax under this section of the Code is unconstitutional, consequently of no effect.

The money provided to be raised under this law is raised by taxation, and not by assessment. This court held, in Hayden vs. The City of Atlanta, 70 Ga., 822, 823, that, “taxes are different from assessments for local improvements, taxes being burdens upon all persons and property alike, and compensated for by equal protection to all, while assessments are not burdens,but equivalents, and are laid for local purposes upon local objects, and are compensated for to some extent in local benefits and improvements enhancing the value of the property assessed.” This decision is sustained by numerous decisions which are referred to. All property under this law in the district is to be taxed, and the same is to be collected as other state and county taxes are collected. If the act had provided for the assessment of a sum of money upon the land alone in the district and provided for its collection, probably this would not have been obnoxious to the constitution. The record shows that a large majority of the voters in the district are in favor of no fence. They could voluntarily raisethe money or means to build the fences contemplated by the law, when they could have such an act passed as would not be objectioable.

The tax collector not having been made a party to the bill as a defendant, and the county commissioners only being such parties, the injunction was properly refused.

Judgment affirmed.