John LEE, Appellant, v. E. B. SWOPE, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Alcatraz, California, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit1955-09-14No. No. 14608

225 F.2d 674

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's dismissal of Lee's habeas corpus petition without prejudice was affirmed. A federal court properly refuses to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction when a petitioner challenging one of multiple sentences would not be entitled to release even if that challenge succeeded, because another valid sentence would continue to justify his detention.

Lee, an inmate at Alcatraz, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of a court-martial conviction. The district court dismissed his petition without prejudice, reasoning that even if Lee succeeded in invalidating the court-martial sentence, he would remain in custody under a separate, valid sentence that had not yet expired. Lee argued he was denied due process by the inability to promptly challenge the court-martial conviction, which was issued after his restoration to civilian status for an offense committed while serving in the Army.

The appellate court upheld the dismissal, applying the established principle that habeas corpus relief is unavailable when a petitioner is subject to multiple sentences and at least one valid sentence would continue to support his detention regardless of the outcome of the challenge. The court found that Lee's cited precedents actually supported the district court's position, and that Supreme Court precedent confirms habeas corpus cannot be used to adjudicate questions that would not affect the lawfulness of custody.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether habeas corpus lies to challenge a sentence when the petitioner is subject to multiple independent sentences
Whether the timing of a court-martial conviction relative to a petitioner's civilian status affects the court's jurisdiction to hear the challenge
Scope of habeas corpus review when only one of multiple sentences is challenged

Procedural posture

Lee appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition challenging a court-martial conviction to the circuit court of appeals.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.

The district court’s order here appealed from is as follows:

“Ordered that petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice, and the order to show cause heretofore issued out of this Court is hereby discharged.” (Dated and filed October 22, 1954.)

The district court refused relief because the petition for the writ reveals upon its face that even if the petitioner’s attack upon the validity of his conviction by a United States [Army] Court Martial was upheld, it would not act to release the petitioner from custody, since he is also being held under a former unexpired sentence, the validity of which is not attacked.

Petitioner claims he has been denied “due process” under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, in that the first, or valid sentence, will not expire for around six years and that he may be prejudiced if the validity of the second sentence is not inquired into promptly. The basis for the claim of invalidity is that petitioner was tried by a United States [Army] Court Martial after petitioner had been restored to civilian status, for an alleged offense committed while he was a member of the United States Army.

Petitioner seeks to bolster his claim that the district court should have taken jurisdiction and decided the merits of it, by citing Gutterman v. Hiatt, D.C.Pa. 1946, 65 F.Supp. 285, and U. S. ex rel. Pruett v. Hiatt, D.C.1944, 55 F.Supp. 993. Neither of these cases supports the claim. In fact, they are directly against it. It is true the court in the Gutterman case, 65 F.Supp. at page 288, said:

“* * * [it] considered petitioner’s contentions as to both sentences in order that he may be fully advised in relation thereto.”

The ruling on the point of using habeas corpus in the circumstances was, however, as follows:

“As already stated, petitioner is restrained by reason of two sentences, either of which considered independently, would not as yet have expired; consequently, if any one of the two sentences is valid, he would not be entitled to immediate release.” [Citing numerous authorities.] 65 F.Supp. 285, 288.

This court has held to the principle stated in the quotation, in the following cases: Ex parte Melendez, 9 Cir., 1938, 98 F.2d 791; McNealy v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 1938, 100 F.2d 280; Dunlap v. Swope, 9 Cir., 1939, 103 F.2d 19; De-maurez v. Squier, 9 Cir., 1941, 121 F.2d 960; Graham v. Squier, 9 Cir., 1944, 145 F.2d 348; McDonald v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 1945, 149 F.2d 768; Oddo v. Swope, 9 Cir., 1951, 193 F.2d 492; Woollomes v. Heinze, 9 Cir., 1952, 198 F.2d 577.

The Supreme Court of the United States has definitely settled the question in McNally v. Hill, 1934, 293 U.S. 131, 137, 55 S.Ct. 24, 27, 79 L.Ed. 238, wherein it says:

“There is no warrant in either the statute or the writ for its use to invoke judicial determination of questions which could not affect the lawfulness of the custody and detention, and no suggestion of such a use has been found in the commentaries on the English common law.”

The judgment is affirmed.

. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division.