Cornelius J. McGreevey vs. Boston Elevated Railway Company

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1919-03-01

232 Mass. 347

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court overruled the father's exceptions, holding that the judgment in the son's prior personal injury action does not establish the defendant's liability in the father's separate action for loss of services and medical expenses, and the father must independently prove all essential elements of his claim.

A father sued a railway company for damages stemming from injuries his minor son sustained in 1908. The son had previously brought his own action against the same defendant and obtained a judgment in 1913. The father's present lawsuit, filed in 1914, sought to recover expenses for medical care and nursing as well as compensation for lost earnings of his son. The father argued that the defendant's liability was already established by the son's prior judgment and should bind this action.

The court rejected this argument, holding that a father's right to sue for loss of services and medical expenses is legally independent from a minor son's right to sue for personal injuries. Although both claims arise from the same negligent act, they protect different interests: the son's action compensates for his pain, suffering, and lost wages, while the father's action compensates for his own direct financial losses. Because the father was not a party to the son's judgment, he must independently prove all elements of his own claim, and the prior verdict does not bar his action.

The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendant in the father's case. The father's remaining objections to evidentiary rulings and jury instructions were either proper exercises of counsel's discretion or became moot following the jury's verdict.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a prior judgment in a minor's personal injury action bars a parent's subsequent action for loss of services and medical expenses
Whether a parent's and minor child's causes of action arising from the same negligent injury are independent or derivative
Measure of damages distinguishable between a minor's injury claim and a parent's loss of services claim

Procedural posture

The father appealed the trial court's refusal to rule that the defendant's liability was fixed by the son's prior judgment, and the jury's subsequent verdict for the defendant.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Braley, J.

The plaintiff’s son Joseph McGreevey, a minor living with his father, sued the defendant in 1912 for personal injuries suffered in 1908 when he was fifteen years of age, and recovered judgment in 1913 for a substantial amount, which apparently was paid to his counsel of record, who also is the attorney for the plaintiff in the present action, brought on June 18, 1914.

It is alleged in the declaration that, because of the defendant’s negligence causing injuries to his minor son, the plaintiff has been “put to great expense for medicines and for doctoring and nursing said injuries and has been deprived of the earnings of his said minor son.” The record states that, while there was evidence tending to show negligence of the defendant and due care of the son, the jury to whom the case was submitted under instructions, to which no exceptions were taken, returned a general verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted to the refusal of the judge to rule that the liability of the defendant "is fixed by the previous trial in the case of Joseph McGreevey by his next friend, the present plaintiff, against the defendant railroad.”

The ruling was denied rightly. It is familiar law that a minor, even if living with and supported by his father, is entitled to sue for damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of another, and, being liable for his own torts, can of course be sued by those who are thereby injured. Tripp v. Gifford, 155 Mass. 108. Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick. 492. But, even if the son had a cause of action against the defendant, the father also could sue for loss of services as well as to recover expenditures incurred for the care and cure of his child. Wilton v. Middlesex Railroad, 125 Mass. 130. Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 347. The measure of damages in the first action was the injury to the child and not the injury to the father. The father’s right of action was not in any just sense consequential upon that of the son. It was independent of his right and was based upon the father’s personal loss. The son’s action was for the pain and suffering caused by the injury and for the loss of wages or diminution1 of earning capacity after he became of full age. King v. Viscoloid Co. 219 Mass. 420, 422. The rights of each although springing from the same wrong are independent, and the judgment in the son’s case is no bar to the maintenance of the present action. Wilton v. Middlesex Railroad, supra.

It follows, that in order to recover, the plaintiff, who was not a party or a privy to the former judgment, must prove every essential allegation of the declaration as if the son’s action had not been brought or was pending for trial. Duffee v. Boston Elevated Railway, 191 Mass. 563. Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474. Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467.

The remaining exceptions to the admission of evidence, to the statements of counsel for the defendant in his opening, and in his closing argument to the jury, and to the refusal of the court to rule, “that there was no evidence that any money had been paid over to Joseph until he attained his majority,” either were within the legitimate rights of counsel or relate to the question of damages .and, having become immaterial because of the verdict, require no discussion. Robinson v. Fitchburg & Worcester Railroad, 7 Gray, 92. Carroll v. Boston Elevated Railway, 200 Mass. 527, 533. Ducharme v. Holyoke Street Railway, 203 Mass. 384, 392.

Exceptions overruled.