Hugh Gavaghans (dependents) Case

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1919-02-27

232 Mass. 212

Summary · law.co

Holding. The daughter was entitled to an equal share in the death benefit alongside the surviving widow because her physical incapacity to earn qualified her as a person conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent on the deceased employee under the workers' compensation statute. The decree was reversed.

Hugh Gavaghan died from a work-related injury sustained while employed at a mill in Lowell, Massachusetts. He left behind a surviving wife from his third marriage and an adult daughter from a former marriage. The daughter, Anna F. Mason, was totally blind and therefore physically incapacitated from earning a living. Both the wife and daughter filed claims for workers' compensation death benefits.

The insurer did not dispute that Gavaghan's wife was entitled to benefits as a surviving spouse. However, the central question was whether the adult daughter could also qualify as a dependent under the workers' compensation statute. The statute provided that children of a deceased employee would be presumed wholly dependent if they were under eighteen years old or, if older, were physically or mentally incapacitated from earning. The court determined that the daughter's total blindness satisfied the statutory requirement for a conclusive presumption of dependency, regardless of her age or marital status.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an adult child physically incapacitated from earning is presumed wholly dependent for workers' compensation purposes
Scope of dependency presumption for children of former spouses
Effect of total blindness on statutory presumption of dependency

Procedural posture

The parties submitted an agreed statement of facts for judicial determination of whether the adult daughter qualified as a dependent entitled to death benefits under the workers' compensation statute.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Pierce, J.

The following agreed statement of facts filed in the case contains all the evidence: “Hugh Gavaghan, late of Lowell in the County of Middlesex, deceased, the employee, while working at the Tremont and Suffolk Mills in said Lowell, received ¡a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employ ment, on the 11th day of December, 1917, from which death resulted on the 15th day of December, 1917. The employee left surviving him a wife by a third marriage, Lizzie Gavaghan, of said Lowell, with whom he was living at the time of his death, and one child, Anna F. Mason, of said Lowell, by a former wife, who was over the age of eighteen years, but who is physically incapacitated from earning by reason of total blindness, and both the said Lizzie Gavaghan and the said Anna F. Mason have filed claims for compensation. The said Anna F. Mason at the time of the death of her father, the said Hugh Gavaghan, was married, and was living with her husband, Arthur Mason, of said Lowell, who is also totally blind. The said Lizzie Gavaghan is entitled to compensation as a person who is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee, by virtue of paragraph (a) of § 7 of the workmen’s compensation act, us amended by § 3 of chapter 708, acts of 1914, and the only question raised by this agreed statement of facts is whether the daughter, the said Anna F. Mason, is also a person conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee by virtue of that part of paragraph (c) of § 7 of the workmen’s compensation act, as amended by § 3 of chapter 708, acts of 1914, which provides, among other things: . . . provided, that in the event of the death of an employee who has at the time of his death a living child or children by a former wife or husband, under the age of eighteen years, (or over said age, but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning,) said child or children shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon such deceased employee, and the death benefit shall be divided between the surviving wife or husband and all the children of the deceased employee in equal shares, the surviving wife or husband taking the same as a child.’ The insurer has acknowledged liability, and is ready and willing to pay compensation when this question of dependency has been decided.”

In the case of a child of a former wife or husband the Legislature considers neither the wealth, poverty, residence nor legal rights to support of that child, and concerns itself only with the question: Is the child under eighteen years of age, and if over, is he or she “ physically or mentally incapacitated from earning? ” If under eighteen years of age or physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, the child is conclusively presumed by the terms of the act to be wholly dependent for support on the deceased employee. Bolt’s Case, 230 Mass. 152. Ilolmberg’s Case, 231 Mass. 144. Upon the agreed facts the daughter is physically incapacitated from earning. It follows that the daughter Anna F. Mason is entitled to an equal share in the death benefit with the surviving widow. St. 1911, c. 751, Part II, § 7 (c), as amended by St. 1914, c. 708, § 3 (c).

Decree reversed.