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Davis vs. The State of Georgia

Supreme Court of Georgia1887-11-03
79 Ga. 767

Summary

Holding. The judgment of conviction for assault with intent to murder is reversed. The court held that because Tompkins failed to inform Davis that he was an officer with a warrant for his arrest before attempting to enter his home, Davis had the right to resist, and the conviction cannot stand.

Ephraim Davis was convicted of assault with intent to murder after he shot a man named Tompkins who attempted to arrest him at his home. Tompkins was acting under a warrant issued against Davis, but Tompkins never informed Davis that he was an officer, that he had authority to make an arrest, or that a warrant existed. When Tompkins tried to enter Davis's house with a pistol drawn, Davis shot him with a shotgun.

The court found that the trial judge erred in denying Davis's motion for a new trial. Under the law governing arrests, an officer must notify a person that he is an officer and that he has a warrant before attempting to arrest them. Without such notice, a person has the right to resist, and any resulting injury to the officer cannot constitute murder or assault with intent to murder. Because Tompkins provided no such notification and Davis had no way of knowing Tompkins was acting in an official capacity, Davis was entitled to resist the arrest.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether an officer executing an arrest warrant must notify the person being arrested of the officer's identity and authority
  • Whether a person may legally resist an arrest when the arresting officer has not identified himself or disclosed the warrant
  • Whether killing or injuring an unidentified person attempting forced entry into one's home constitutes murder or assault with intent to murder when the person is actually an officer

Procedural posture

Davis was convicted at trial by Judge Carswell of assault with intent to murder; his motion for a new trial was denied by Judge Hines and the case was appealed to the appellate court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Simmons, Justice.

Ephraim Davis was indicted by the grand jury of Washington county for the offence of assault with intent to murder. Upon the trial of the case he was convicted. Fie made a motion for new trial on two grounds: (1) That the verdict was contrary to law and to the evidence; (2) that the verdict was wholly without evidence to support it. The case was tried by Judge Carswell, and the motion for new trial was heard and refused by Judge Hines, the present judge of the Middle circuit.

It appears, from the evidence in the case, that a warrant had been sued out against the defendant by one Crafton, a constable of the district in which he and the defendant lived. This warrant was issued by the magistrate upon Grafton’s affidavit, and placed in the hands of Grafton to execute. Grafton claimed to have deputized one Tompkins to execute the same. Tompkins went to the house of the defendant, and without informing him that he had a warrant for his arrest, or that he had been deputized by the constable, undertook to arrest the defendant, and the defendant resisted and broke loose from Tompkins, running around his house, Tompkins following him; and he finally ran into the back door of his house, and upon Tompkins attempting to enter with a pistol in his hand, the defendant shot him with a single-barrelled shot-gun, loaded with squirrel-shot.

Under this statement of facts, we think the court erred in refusing a new trial in this case. If Tompkins was an officer of the law, he shouldhave informed the defendant of the fact, and of the additional fact that he had a warrant for his arrest. “ The officer must at the time be engaged in executing his duties, and the defendant must be notified thereof; and unless there be notification or knowledge to this effect, the killing of the officer in resisting the arrest will not be murder. Thus, where a bailiff pushed abruptly and violently into a gentleman’s chamber early in the morning, in order to arrest him, but not telling his business or using words of arrest; and the party, not knowing that the other was an officer, in the first surprise snatched down a sword which hung in his room and killed the bailiff, this was ruled to be only manslaughter.” 1 Wharton’s Grim. Law, §648. There was no notice given the defendant by Tompkins that he was an officer, or that he had a warrant for his arrest. It is claimed by the State that he was acting as the posse of the constable. If he was, we think that the constable should have accompanied him, or at least that he should have informed the defendant that he was acting under the authority of the constable. We doubt, however, under the facts in this case, whether Grafton, the constable, had the right, to deputize Tompkins, or summon him as a posse to assist him in the execution of the warrant. Grafton was the prosecutor in the case, and we think it was improper, at least, for the magistrate to give the prosecutor the warrant to execute, even though he was a constable of the district.

But we put the case on the ground that Tompkins, not having informed the defendant that he was an officer and that he had a warrant for his arrest, and the defendant having gone into his house, and Tompkins endeavoring to enter the house with a pistol in his hand for the purpose of completing the arrest, and the defendant not knowing that he was an officer, he had a right to resist such arrest; and if Tompkins had died from the wounds inflicted by the defendant, under the facts as disclosed by this record, it would not have been murder; and therefore he ought not to have been convicted-of an assault with intent to murder. 2 Bishop’s Grim. Law, 653.

Judgment reversed.