Mary J. Carlton, Appellant, v. Jack K. Carlton, Appellee

Kansas Supreme Court1975-07-17No. No. 47,717

217 Kan. 681538 P.2d 727

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's termination of alimony payments, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of changed circumstances and that the alimony modification statute is constitutionally valid and does not deny equal protection based on sex.

Mary Carlton appealed a district court order terminating her alimony payments four years after her divorce from Jack Carlton. The couple had divorced in 1970 after twenty-two years of marriage, with the court awarding each party equal property valued at $49,141 and ordering the husband to pay the wife $250 monthly in alimony until her remarriage or either party's death. In January 1974, the husband sought to end these payments, and the trial court granted his request in March 1974, finding that changed circumstances made continued payments unfair and inequitable.

On appeal, Carlton challenged the trial court's factual finding that circumstances had changed and argued that the state statute governing alimony modification violated her constitutional right to equal protection. She contended that because women typically receive alimony, a statute permitting modifications without consent placed women in a classification unrelated to the law's purpose. The appellate court rejected this constitutional argument, noting that the statute itself contains no sex-based distinction and applies equally to either party as the recipient of alimony. The court also found substantial evidence in the record supported the trial court's determination of changed circumstances.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether changed circumstances justified termination of alimony payments
Whether alimony modification statute violates equal protection by discriminating against women
Standard of review for appellate examination of trial court factual findings

Procedural posture

The case was appealed from a district court order terminating alimony that had been awarded in a 1970 divorce decree.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Per Curiam:

This is an appeal from an order terminating alimony payments to the appellant, Mary J. Carlton. On May 7, 1970, the parties ended a twenty-two year marriage by divorce. The district court ordered an equal division of the property awarding property valued at $49,141 to each. The decree further provided for alimony payments to the appellant-wife of $250 per month until her remarriage or the death of either party. The appellee-husband regularly made such payments until January 15, 1974, when he filed a motion for their termination. On March 18, 1974, the district court terminated said payments effective after February 28, 1974, on the basis that “it would not be fair, equitable, or just in light of the circumstances as they exist at this time for defendant to . . . continue the alimony payments.”

Appellant claims error in three respects on this appeal. These center around the finding by the trial court that circumstances had changed so as to justify the termination of alimony and the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding. The purpose of alimony is to provide for the future support of the divorced spouse. (Drummond v. Drummond, 209 Kan. 86, 495 P. 2d 994; Herzmark v. Herzmark, 199 Kan. 48, 427 P. 2d 465.) The amount thereof is to be based upon the needs of one party and the ability of the other party to pay. (Baumgardner v. Baumgardner, 207 Kan. 66, 483 P. 2d 1084; Cool v. Cool, 203 Kan. 749, 457 P. 2d 60.) A change of circumstances may justify a reduction of alimony. (Blair v. Blair, 210 Kan. 156, 499 P. 2d 546.) An examination of the record discloses substantial evidence of a change of circumstances. The role of this corut is not that of a trier of fact. We are required to accept the evidence which is most favorable to the prevailing party and where there is substantial competent evidence in the record to sustain the judgment, it is our duty to sustain it. (Wehking v. Wehking, 213 Kan. 551, 555, 516 P. 2d 1018.) See, also, Parsons Mobil Products, Inc. v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 256, 531 P. 2d 428.

A large portion of the appellant’s brief is devoted to a constitutional attack on K. S. A. 60-1610 (c). The thrust of this argument is that the statute denies to the appellant equal protection of the law. The statute provides for a modification of the amount of alimony not yet due, except that the amount cannot be increased without the consent of the party liable for the alimony. Appellant claims this latter portion discriminates against her. She argues that since women are usually the recipients of alimony this places them in a classification which has no rational relation to the purpose of the legislation, and constitutes invidious discrimination. The statute, however, explicitly provides that alimony, where deemed necessary and proper, may be awarded to either party. There is no male-female distinction made. Appellant’s argument that an invidious classification based upon sex exists is without merit. The statute is constitutionally valid.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Fromme, J., not participating.