John W. MORTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit1955-06-09No. No. 12507

228 F.2d 431

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of Morton's complaint, holding that his allegations of wrongful transfer, detention, and mistreatment arise from discretionary functions of federal agencies or from tort claims explicitly excepted under federal sovereign immunity statutes, and therefore do not state a cause of action against the United States.

John Morton, a federal prisoner serving a sentence for second-degree murder, filed suit against the United States seeking $500,000 in damages plus taxes and costs. He alleged that high-ranking federal officials, including the Attorney General and Surgeon General, conspired to transfer him to a medical facility, detain him without proper commitment, falsely classify him as mentally defective, and deny him adequate food, medical care, and mail access. The district court dismissed the complaint, and Morton appealed that dismissal.

The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, finding that Morton's claims fell within statutory exceptions to the federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity. The court determined that Morton's allegations either concerned discretionary functions of federal agencies—specifically the Bureau of Prisons' authority over prisoner care and placement—or sounded in tort claims explicitly excepted from liability, including false imprisonment and assault. Because the Federal Tort Claims Act excludes such categories of claims, the court concluded that Morton had failed to state a valid cause of action against the United States.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether federal sovereign immunity bars claims based on discretionary functions of federal agencies
Whether tort claims against the government arising from prisoner detention and treatment fall within statutory exceptions to federal liability
The scope of exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act

Procedural posture

The appellant appealed from a district court order granting the government's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

DANAHER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant sought judgment against the United States for $500,000 “plus all income and any other taxes,” and costs and expenses of suit. The Government’s motion to dismiss was granted, hence this appeal.

It was alleged that “Tom C. Clark, U. S. Attorney General on June 27, 1948 (now employed in the U. S. Supreme Court), Leonard A. Scheele, Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Service, James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons, [and] Donald Clemmer, General Superintendent, District of Columbia Penal Institutions” in violation of law and to appellant’s damage, conspired: (1) to cause appellant to be transferred from the District jail to the United States Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, (2) there, for a substantial period to be held without a commitment, (3) as a mental defective contrary to fact, and (4) to deprive him of nourishing food, medical and optical service, and to subject him to other forms of mental and physical cruelty as well as to deprive him of access to and privacy of use of the mails.

Enough has been set forth to indicate clearly the nature of the grounds upon which appellant would rest his claims against the Government. While the United States has waived its traditional immunity under certain circumstances, it has made explicitly certain that it is not to be subject to liability for claims which might be said .to be based upon the “exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” Appellant, after conviction of second degree murder, was sentenced on December 17, 1943, to the custody of the Attorney General for imprisonment for the period of fifteen years to life. This court affirmed on January 22, 1945. On April 19, 1948, he was ordered transferred to the Medical Center for federal prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. Provision for the care, as well as for the protection of persons convicted of offenses against the United States is a function of the Bureau of Prisons, and to the extent that the allegations charge improper exercise of discretionary functions of the officers or federal agencies involved, they come squarely within the exception quoted. Insofar as the complaint otherwise sounds in tort, its allegations are encompassed within the statutory exception of claims “arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest and the like.

The complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted, and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

. See, e. g„ 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).

. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1952).

. Morton v. United States, 1945, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 147 F.2d 28 certiorari denied 1945, 324 U.S. 875, 65 S.Ct. 1015, 89 L.Ed. 1428.

. 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1952) ; and see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4081-4082 (1952).

. Cf. Dalehite v. United States, 1953, 346 U.S. 15, 32, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427; Smart v. United States, D.C.W.D. Okl.1953, 111 F.Supp. 907, affirmed 10 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 841.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1952). And see Duenges v. United States, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1953, 114 F.Supp. 751; Tinkoff v. United States, 7 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 890, 892.

. It may be noted that charges not unlike those alleged here were pressed in habeas corpus proceedings, previously disposed of in Missouri. Morton v. Steele, 8 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 13.