SHEWMAKER et al. v. CAPITAL TRANSIT CO.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit1944-05-29No. No. 8535

143 F.2d 142

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court reversed the judgment, holding that the evidence presented questions of fact regarding negligence and liability appropriate for jury determination, and the jury's verdict should have been upheld rather than set aside by the trial judge.

Plaintiffs sued a streetcar company for injuries sustained in a vehicular collision, alleging the company negligently operated the streetcar. The trial court initially allowed the case to proceed to the jury despite the defendant's motions for a directed verdict at the close of each side's case. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, the trial judge granted the defendant's post-trial motion and entered judgment in the defendant's favor, effectively overturning the jury's verdict.

The appellate court established the legal standard for evaluating motions to set aside a jury verdict in negligence cases. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, with credit given to every reasonable inference that can be drawn from it. A directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate only when no reasonable jury could find for the party bearing the burden of proof. The appellate court found that the trial record presented factual questions suitable for jury determination, including whether the defendant was negligent and whether causation and injury were established.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Standards for granting a directed verdict in negligence actions
Standards for entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50
Sufficiency of evidence to submit negligence case to jury
Standard of appellate review of post-trial judgment

Procedural posture

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment entered by the trial court setting aside a jury verdict in their favor on a motion made pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

MILLER, Associate Justice.

The injuries complained of in this case resulted from a collision between two automobiles. Appellants, as plaintiffs in the trial court, contended that the accident was caused by the negligent operation of a streetcar owned and operated by appellee. The trial court denied motions to direct a verdict, which were made by appellee, first, at the close of appellants’ case and, again, at the close of all the evidence. After the jury had returned a verdict for appellants the court entered judgment for appellee upon a motion to set aside the verdict, made pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This appeal is from that judgment.

The rule applicable in the District of Columbia on a motion for a directed verdict, in an action founded upon negligence, is that the evidence must be construed most favorably to the plaintiff; to this end he is entitled to the full effect of every legitimate inference therefrom; if upon the evidence, so considered, reasonable men might differ, the case should go to the jury; if, on the other hand, no reasonable man could reach a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the motion should be granted; a mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient; the question is not whether there is any evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party upon whom the onus of proof is imposed; the burden being upon the plaintiff to establish the negligence and injury alleged, if the evidence fails adequately to support either element the motion should be granted. The same rule is applicable on a motion to set aside the verdict under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

While a verdict may properly be directed when there is no more than a scintilla of evidence, or none upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, that was not the situation of the present case. The trial judge is to be commended for adopting the practice suggested by Rule 50; thus permitting a full trial and determination of the issues, instead of taking the case from the jury and necessitating, in case of reversal, a second bite or even successive bites at the cherry. However, if the trial judge thereafter enters judgment n. o. v., then, as well as when he directs a verdict, his action must be subjected to the test stated in the preceding paragraph. Unlike the situation which exists when the, judge acts as the trier of facts, the appellate court is required to balance the weight of the evidence against the judge’s determination and in favor of the jury’s determination. The question is, not whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings and decision of the judge, but whether there is evidence upon which reasonable men might differ as to negligence and other elements of liability; whether a jury of reasonable men could properly reach a verdict in favor of the party upon whom the/ onus of proof is imposed.

A careful examination of the record persuades us that the evidence presented questions appropriate for the jury’s determination and that its verdict should stand.

Reversed.

28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

Tobin v. Pennsylvania R. R., 69 App. D.C. 262, 263, 100 F.2d 435, 436; Jackson v. Capital Transit Co., 69 App.D.C. 147, 99 F.2d 380, and eases there cited.

Roberts v. Capital Transit Co., 76 U. S.App. 367, 131 F.2d 871. See Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., Inc., 72 App.D.C. 141, 144, 112 F.2d 577, 580; Duncan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 8 Cir., 108 F.2d 848, 852, modified on another point, 311 U.S. 243, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147; Jaggers v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 6 Cir., 126 F.2d 762.

Pennsylvania R. R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343, 53 S.Ct. 391, 77 L.Ed. 819; Jackson v. Capital Transit Co., 69 App.D.C. 147, 148, 99 F.2d 380, 381.

Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed. 720.

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 253, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147.

Munsey v. Webb, 37 App.D.C. 185, 188, affirmed, 231 U.S. 150, 34 S.Ct. 44, 58 L.Ed. 162; LeFoe v. Corby Co., 38 App.D.C. 54; Standard Oil Co. v. Allen, 50 App.D.C. 87, 267 F. 645; Washington, Alexandria & Mt. Vernon Ry. v. Lukens, 32 App.D.C. 442, 454.