Hurlbut Rogers Machinery Company vs. Boston and Maine Railroad

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1920-04-01

235 Mass. 402

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court's judgment was affirmed. Registration was properly denied because the petitioner's deed did not extend to the disputed portion of land, and Massachusetts law precludes acquiring title to railroad-located land through adverse possession when the railroad has not abandoned its location.

Hurlbut Rogers Machinery Company sought registration of land it claimed to own, but the Boston and Maine Railroad disputed the boundary, contending that a portion of the petitioner's property fell within the railroad's location. The trial court found that under the recorded deed, the petitioner's land extended only to the railroad's northerly boundary line, and this factual finding was supported by evidence including surveys, plans, and how the parties actually used the land.

The petitioner alternatively argued it should gain title through adverse possession, having occupied and used the property openly and continuously for the required statutory period. However, Massachusetts law prohibited an adjoining landowner from acquiring title to railroad-located land through adverse possession so long as the railroad maintained its location and had not abandoned it. The court distinguished the petitioner's reliance on a prior case involving railroad abandonment, finding that distinction inapplicable here. The court also rejected the petitioner's claim to an easement or other servitude, as the statute expressly barred acquiring any right to railroad corporation land under these circumstances.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a boundary line dispute determines the true extent of petitioner's title
Whether adverse possession can defeat a railroad's location rights when the location remains active
Whether statutory protections of railroad locations apply to prevent adverse possession claims
Whether an easement or servitude right can be acquired in railroad-located land

Procedural posture

The trial court entered judgment against the petitioner in a land registration proceeding, and the petitioner appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Braley, J.

The first question is, whether any portion of the land described in the petition for registration comes within the location of the respondent’s railroad. If the boundary lines shown on the plan filed with the petition are the true boundaries, it is manifest that no part of the location is included. But the respondent contended and introduced evidence tending to show that the northerly line of the location ran through the extreme southwesterly corner of the land and buildings leaving a small triangular parcel and part of the chimney within the limits of the railroad location. The boundary being in controversy it was a question of fact on all the evidence, including the various surveys and plans, and the actual occupation and user by the parties, where the true line originally ran and was to be established in the ascertainment of the petitioner’s title. Dodd v. Witt, 139 Mass. 63. Temple v. Benson, 213 Mass. 128. Morrison v. Holder, 214 Mass. 366, 368, 369. Hobart v. Towle, 220 Mass. 293. The adverse finding, that, under the grant appearing of record, the petitioner’s land extended only to the northerly side line of the location, having been warranted by the evidence is conclusive. American Molting Co. v. Souther Brewing Co. 194 Mass. 89. Boston & Albany Railroad v. Reardon, 226 Mass. 286, 291.

The petitioner, however, having also claimed title by adverse possession, the next question is, whether on this ground registration could be decreed. The continuous, open, peaceable and unopposed use and occupation by the petitioner of the premises under claim of title for more than the prescribed period undoubtedly is shown by the record, and was found at the trial. It ordinarily would follow that the petitioner would be entitled to registration. Holloran v. Holloran, 149 Mass. 298. First Baptist Church of Sharon v. Harper, 191 Mass. 196, 208. Keith v. Kennard, 222 Mass. 398. R. L. c. 128, § 18, as amended by St. 1905, c. 249, § 2. But the respondent while not claiming title by deed relies on a location acquired presumably under Gen. Sts. c. 63, §§ 17, 18, the validity of which is not questioned. The petitioner’s deed although dated January 16,1872, was not recorded until 1875, and the taking by the respondent, who is not shown to have had actual notice of the conveyance, was on July 31,1872. By St. 1861, c. 100, in force when these transactions occurred, and St. 1874, c. 372, § 107, Pub. Sts. c. 112, § 215, R. L. c. 111, § 271, St. 1906, c. 463, Part II, § 80, of similar import and effect, which were operative during the entire period during which prescription is asserted, no length of possession or of occupation of the land belonging to or included within the location of a railroad by an adjoining owner or occupant shall create in him any right to the land belonging to the railroad corporation “so inclosed or occupied.” The purpose of these enactments is that title by adverse possession, where the location has not been abandoned, cannot be gained by an adjoining landowner to the whole or a part of a railroad location whether it is acquired by the corporation by purchase or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Boston & Albany Railroad v. Reardon, 226 Mass. 286. Hall v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 211 Mass. 174.

The case of Amee v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 212 Mass. 421, on which the petitioner places much reliance, is plainly distinguishable. The respondent in the case at bar never having abandoned the location, the statute governs, while in Amee v. Boston & Albany Railroad there was evidence from which abandonment could have been found, and if so found then there was no location in existence upon which the prohibited intrusion could be made.

It is further urged that even if no title in fee exists, yet an easement of support for the building and chimney has resulted which can be enforced. But the express wording of the statute negatives “ a right to such land of the corporation” whether in the nature of a fee or of an easement or servitude of the character disclosed by the record.

We discover no error in the rulings of the trial-judge and the exceptions must be overruled.

So ordered.