ESQUIVEL v. THE STATE

Court of Appeals of Georgia1999-02-09No. A98A2035

236 Ga. App. 325512 S.E.2d 61

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate deficient performance or resulting prejudice under the applicable legal standard, and that counsel's tactical choices were strategic decisions entitled to deference.

A defendant convicted of aggravated child molestation appealed his conviction, claiming his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance. The defendant identified 19 instances where he argued counsel's performance fell below acceptable standards, focusing primarily on counsel's deliberate choice to avoid using the term "alleged" when referring to alleged victims and their testimony. According to counsel's explanation, he intentionally departed from standard defense terminology because he believed it would antagonize the jury, and he was pursuing a theory that the defendant had been framed by his ex-wife who allegedly influenced the children and planted evidence.

The court reviewed the legal standards for ineffective assistance claims, which require a defendant to demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice—meaning a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's errors. The court found that the trial counsel's decisions reflected strategic choices made after investigation, which are generally beyond challenge on appeal. After examining the hearing record where counsel explained his tactical decisions, the court concluded the defendant failed to meet the legal burden required to prove ineffective assistance.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether trial counsel's deliberate avoidance of standard defense terminology constituted ineffective assistance
Whether strategic trial decisions made after investigation are subject to challenge on ineffective assistance claims
Application of the Strickland standard requiring proof of deficient performance and resulting prejudice

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his conviction by jury for aggravated child molestation, challenging the trial court's overruling of his motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty of a sole count of aggravated child molestation. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, enumerating as error the overruling of his motion for new trial on the special ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Held:

“In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that defense counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the defense was prejudiced by the deficient performance, i.e., show a reasonable probability that but for the trial counsel’s [un]professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Cit.]” Etheridge v. State, 210 Ga. App. 96, 97 (435 SE2d 292).

Here, defendant lists 19 specifications where trial counsel’s performance allegedly fell below the level of reasonably effective assistance that members of the Bar in good standing are presumed to render. See Shaw v. State, 211 Ga. App. 647, 649 (2) (440 SE2d 245). Defendant did not urge that trial counsel was unprepared. Rather, he argues only trial counsel’s stated “desire [not] to follow standard defense trial interrogation,” i.e., to avoid the use of term “alleged” in describing victims or characterizing their testimony. Trial counsel defended his tactic, precisely because that term was “standard defense terminology, [which trial counsel] wanted to avoid ... at all costs.” Trial counsel explained he wanted to avoid antagonizing an intelligent jury with defense jargon. He had a theory that “defendant had been set up by his wife, who was divorcing [defendant], and she had essentially planted concepts in the minds of her children and . . . planted evidence that [his] client had molested . . . children.”

Decided February 9, 1999.

Gaines C. Granade, for appellant.

Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Pamela D. South, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

“The decisions on which witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examinations, which jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategies and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 77 (1), 79 (447 SE2d 74). In the case sub judice, it is not necessary to address specifically and individually each and every one of defendant’s numerous instances of challenged trial tactics. It is sufficient to note that strategic choices made after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable. Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 120, 121 (2), 122 (453 SE2d 443). We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing where trial counsel defended his decisions and find ample evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that defendant failed to show ineffective assistance under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 690 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674). Consequently, the denial of defendant’s motion for new trial on this special ground is affirmed. Smith v. State, 256 Ga. 483 (351 SE2d 641).

Judgment affirmed.

Blackburn and Eldridge, JJ, concur.