Raymond W. LONGERNECKER, Appellant, v. Harvey V. HIGLEY, Administrator, Veterans Administration, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit1955-12-22No. No. 12568

229 F.2d 27

Summary · law.co

Holding. The District Court properly lacked jurisdiction to review the Veterans Administrator's denial of educational benefits because federal statute made such decisions final and conclusive, precluding all court review except for insurance claims. The judgment was affirmed.

Longernecker, a former Army serviceman, received a discharge certificate under conditions neither honorable nor dishonorable (commonly called a 'blue' discharge). He applied to the Veterans Administration for educational training benefits as an electrician, but the Administrator denied his applications. Longernecker sued in District Court, seeking a declaration that the Administrator's denial was unauthorized and unlawful.

The District Court lacked authority to review the Administrator's decision due to two federal statutes. A 1933 law made all Administrator decisions regarding educational benefits final and conclusive, with no court jurisdiction to review them. A 1940 law similarly made all Administrator decisions on benefits claims final and conclusive, barring judicial review except for insurance matters. Although the court noted that the Administrator ideally should have been bound by the War Department's characterization of the discharge, the statutory language clearly stripped courts of power to overturn the Administrator's benefits determinations.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether courts have jurisdiction to review Veterans Administration benefit decisions
Scope of statutory preclusion of judicial review of administrator determinations
Whether the Administrator could override the War Department's discharge characterization

Procedural posture

The District Court dismissed Longernecker's action seeking judicial review of the Veterans Administrator's denial of educational benefits, and Longernecker appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judge.

Our appellant, Longemecker, brought an action in the District Court, praying the court to declare that certain actions of the Administrator of the Veterans Administration were without authority and contrary to law. He had been in the United States Army and, subsequent to a summary court-martial, had been issued a discharge certificate, technically W. D. A. G. O. Form 56, known colloquially as a “blue” discharge. This certificate signified separation from the service under conditions neither honorable nor dishonorable. Longernecker filed applications with the Veterans Administration for educational training as an electrician. The Administrator denied the applications.

The District Court was met at the outset with two provisions of law which prevented it from giving consideration to Longernecker’s claims. One is an Act of 1933, appearing in the United States Code as Section 705 of Title 38, and the other is an Act of 1940, which appears as Section lla-2 of the same Title. The former reads as follows:

“All decisions rendered by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs under the provisions of sections 701 [subsection (f) of which covers educational benefits] * * * of this title or the regulations issued pursuant thereto, shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review by mandamus or otherwise any such decision.”

The 1940 Act reads as follows:

“Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, except as provided in sections 445 and 817 of this title, the decisions of the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any Act administered by the Veterans’ Administration shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decisions.”

Although we think the Veterans Administrator should have felt himself bound by the decision of the War Department as to the nature of the discharge, it is conclusively established! that the foregoing provisions of the statute withdraw from the jurisdiction of the courts every final decision of the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs in regard to benefits to veterans, with the exception of insurance benefits.

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

. 48 Stat. 9.

. 54 Stat. 1197.

. The exceptions relate to insurance and are immaterial here.

. Part VIII of Veterans’ Regulation Numbered 1(a), as amended, 38 U.S.C.A. c. 12A, Reg. #1(A), Part VIII, is incorporated in the statute, 57 Stat. 43 (1943), as amended, 38 U.S.C.A. § 701(f), by reference. The statute reads:

“Any person who served in the active military or naval forces on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of hostilities in the present war, shall be entitled to vocational rehabilitation subject to the provisions and limitations-of Veterans’ Regulation Numbered 1(a), as amended, part VII, or to education or training subject to the provisions and limitations of part VIII.”

Part VIII of Veterans’ Regulation Numbered 1(a) provides in pertinent part:

“Any person who served in the active military or naval service * * *, and who shall have been discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable, * * * shall be eligible for and entitled to receive education or training * *

Longernecker received a certificate of discharge other than dishonorable. There were three types of discharge. Two of them, an honorable discharge and a blue certificate, were other than dishonorable. Thus the conditions under which he was discharged were determined by the War Department itself when it discharged him. It would not appear that Congress intended the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs to have power to change a decision of the War Department as to the reasons or grounds upon which that Department discharges a serviceman. It surely did not intend, for example, that the Administrator could decide that although a man had an honorable discharge he should have had a dishonorable discharge.

. Hahn v. Gray, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 203 F.2d 625 (D.C.Cir.1953); Slocumb v. Gray, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 179 F.2d 31 (D.C.Cir.1949); Snauffer v. Stimson, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 155 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir.1946); Van Horne v. Hines, 74 App. D.C. 214, 122 F.2d 207 (D.C.Cir.1941), certiorari denied, 1941, 314 U.S. 689, 62 S.Ct. 360, 86 L.Ed. 552; Barnett v. Hines, 70 App.D.C. 217, 105 F.2d 96, (D.C.Cir.1939), certiorari denied, 1939, 308 U.S. 573, 60 S.Ct. 88, 84 L.Ed. 480.