OPINION BY
Judge RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER.
Rafael Falette appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (common pleas) that granted the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s (Commonwealth) petition for forfeiture (Petition) of $84,440 under the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act (Forfeiture Act). Common pleas found that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof under the Forfeiture Act and that Falette did not establish that he was “the owner of the currency, that the currency was lawfully obtained and that he does not possess the currency for illegal purposes.” (Order, May 15, 2014.) On appeal to this Court, Falette argues that common pleas erred in concluding that the Commonwealth established the required nexus between the seized cash and unlawful activity necessary under the Forfeiture Act and in admitting certain opinion testimony without proper foundation. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
On August 7, 2009, Pennsylvania State Police (State Police) Trooper Derek Fels-man (Trooper Felsman) was patrolling Interstate 80 (1-80) in Monroe County when, at 6:00 p.m., he initiated a traffic stop of a black Lincoln Town Car for Traveling Too Closely to Another Vehicle, i.e., tailgating. Trooper Felsman explained that he observed four individuals in the vehicle, including the driver, Juan Lugo. Lugo produced a valid New Jersey driver’s license and registration card, which revealed that Lugo’s sister owned the vehicle. Sitting next to Lugo was his brother and there were two other passengers in the back seat. Subsequently, Trooper Felsman searched the vehicle and discovered four ecstasy pills in the cigarette outlet in the center console area of the vehicle and four small plastic bags containing marijuana “in the right rear passenger door, underneath the cigarette ashtray.” (Hr’g Tr. at 16,18, R.R. at 33a, 35a.) Lugo admitted that the drugs were his. Trooper Felsman continued his search and found $34,440.00 in cash hidden under the seatbelt attachment in the “B pillar” on the passenger side of the vehicle. Lugo and the other passengers denied ownership of the cash or knowing that it was there. The State Police confiscated the cash and drugs.
Trooper Felsman gave Lugo a warning for tailgating and charged him with possession of a controlled substance for personal use (the ecstasy tablets); possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use; and possession of drug paraphernalia (the plastic bags that contained the marijuana). Lugo pleaded guilty in December 2009 to the marijuana possession charge, the remaining charges were nolle prossed, and he was sentenced to 15 to 30 days in prison and a fine of $105.
The Commonwealth filed the Petition on November 24, 2009, seeking to forfeit the $34,440.00 found in the vehicle. Falette, who was not present during the August 7 traffic stop, filed an answer (Answer) asserting ownership of the cash, and that the cash had no relationship to illegal activity, but was derived from the settlement of a personal injury lawsuit. Attached to the Answer were two checks from a law firm made out to Falette with the notation “Settlement Proceeds to Client.” or “Settlement Funds.” (Answer, Exs. 1-2.) One check, dated June 17, 2009, was for $14,496.22, and the second, dated July 16, 2009, was for $23,303.33. (Answer, Exs. 1-2.)
Common pleas held a hearing on the Petition on April 17, 2014, at which the both the Commonwealth and Falette presented evidence. The Commonwealth offered Trooper Felsman’s testimony. Trooper Felsman explained that, upon effectuating the traffic stop, he observed four individuals in the vehicle: Lugo, Lugo’s brother, and two others in the back seat. Lugo indicated that his sister, who owned the car, let him and others use her vehicle. On that day, he was taking a friend, one of the back seat passengers, somewhere in Pennsylvania. Lugo stated that he did not know exactly where they were traveling, but that the friend was giving him directions to their destination. After collecting the occupants’ identification, Trooper Felsman ran a search on the State Police database, which revealed that Lugo and his brother had been charged with assault, burglary, and credit card fraud. The back seat passengers had no criminal charges or convictions.
Trooper Felsman then asked Lugo for permission to search the vehicle because: he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana; there were air fresheners in the vehicle; he suspected that the passengers in the back seat were pretending to be sleeping; and the portion of 1-80 where he had stopped Lugo was “a heavily travelled drug corridor.” (Hr’g Tr. at 9-10, R.R. at 26a-27a.) Falette objected to Trooper Felsman’s testimony regarding 1-80 as lacking foundation, which was overruled. Trooper Felsman stated that Lugo consented to the search. Trooper Felsman found four ecstasy pills in the cigarette outlet in the center console area of the vehicle and four small plastic bags containing marijuana “in the right rear passenger door, underneath the cigarette ashtray.” (Hr’g Tr. at 16, 18, R.R. at 33a, 35a.) Lugo admitted the drugs were his, and Trooper Felsman charged Lugo with possession of drugs for his own personal use.
During the search, Trooper Felsman noticed that a screw was missing from the B Pillar on the vehicle’s passenger side and, shining his flashlight in that area, he saw black plastic bags behind the plastic. He decided to investigate further, and, as he was removing the plastic housing from the seatbelt attachment, which “took a while,” he observed Lugo giving him a “long blank” or “thousand yard stare.” (Hr’g Tr. at 15, R.R. at 32a.) Trooper Felsman explained that watching the behavior of individuals during a traffic stop is important because that behavior can be an indicator of illegal activity. Trooper Felsman found two black plastic bags, each of which contained cash. The bags were transferred to the State Police barracks, counted, and found to total “$34,440 in numerous denominations of hundred dollar, fifty dollar and twenty dollar bills.” (Hr’g Tr. at 15-16, R.R. at 32a-33a.) None of the vehicle’s occupants claimed the money and “denied knowing [that it] was there, [] whose money it was, how it got there, or how much it was.” (Hr’g Tr. at 16-17, R.R. at 33a-34a.) Falette’s name was never mentioned during or after the traffic stop.
Falette testified that he was a long-time friend of Lugo and Lugo’s sister, and they all lived in Passaic, New Jersey. Falette claimed that the $34,440.00 found in the vehicle was his and part of the settlement proceeds he received in a personal injury lawsuit from a 2006 automobile accident. The case settled shortly before the August 2009 traffic stop, and he received two settlement checks from his lawyers for a total of $37,799.55. Cross-examination elicited the following testimony. Falette explained that after he deposited the checks in the bank he decided that he wanted to have cash on hand to impress people. Although Falette indicated that he took the cash out of the bank little by little over a period of months, Falette acknowledged that he deposited those checks on July 16, 2009, just a couple of weeks before the traffic stop. He said he spent a considerable amount of the proceeds, and then “stashed” the remaining $34,440.00 inside the- B Pillar of the vehicle, which he regularly borrowed. (Hr’g Tr. at 28, R.R. at 45a.) Falette indicated that he did not tell anyone about his stash of cash, and did not know that Lugo was “going tb use the car, you know, somehow, so fast.” (Hr’g Tr. at 23-24, R.R. at 40a-41a.) He acknowledged that his decision to use someone else’s vehicle as a savings bank was “stupid,” and he attributed his bad decision to being young and foolish. (Hr’g Tr. at 24, R.R. at 41a.)
After hearing argument, common pleas took the matter under advisement. On May 15, 2014, common pleas found that the Commonwealth established a “nexus between the seized currency and unlawful activity” and granted the Petition. (Order, May 15, 2014, at 1.) The court explained:
Pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Commonwealth v. Burke, 49 A.3d 542 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012), the Commonwealth has sufficiently established a nexus between the seized currency and unlawful activity based on the following factors: (1) presence of drugs in" close proximity to the currency at the time of the stop which creates a rebuttable presumption that it is related to drug trafficking,[] (2) inconsistent statements made by the vehicle occupants’ [sic] as well as their unusual behavior at the time of the stop, including the back passengers who were pretending to be asleep during the Stop; [sic] (3) the drivers’ [sic] drug-related conviction as a result of the stop, (4) the placement of the currency in the B Pillar of the car, an area which was not intended for use by the manufacturer, (5) the packaging of the money in two plastic bags, and (6) the fact that the car was registered to a third party.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the claimant, Raphael [sic] Falette, failed to establish himself as the owner of the currency, that the currehcy was lawfully obtained and that he does not possess the currency for illegal purposes. Fal-ette testified that the money was proceeds from a civil lawsuit settlement and that he placed it in the B Pillar to show it off to his friends and for easy access to the money. We find this explanation to be both illogical and devoid of any credibility. The money was neither easily accessible nor was it openly stored for showing it off to his friends. Instead, it was in an area of another person’s vehicle which was not intended for use by the manufacturer. Therefore, the placement of the money is not consistent with [Falette’s] explanation,
(Order, May 15,2014.)
Falette appealed, and common pleas directed him to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Falette did so, challenging common pleas’ conclusion that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving a nexus between the cash and unlawful activity and admission of Trooper Felsman’s testimony regarding 1-80 being a “drug corridor.” (1925(b) Statement,. Falette’s Amended Br. at 28.) In its 1925(a) opinion,-common pleas stated that it had adequately.addressed the issues raised in Fal-ette’s 1925(b) Statement in its May 15, 2014 Order. Common pleas further con-eluded that, while it believed that the Commonwealth had laid the proper foundation for Trooper Felsman’s 1-80 “drug corridor” testimony, if it had erred, any error was ■ harmless because that testimony “played no part in [the] adjudication of this matter.” (1925(a) Op. at 1.) Falette now appeals to this Court.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Falette first argues that common pleas erred in concluding that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving a substantial- nexus between the $34,440.00 and unlawful drug activity by a preponderance of the evidence. Falette contends that common pleas could not rely on the rebuttable presumption that money found in close proximity to controlled substances is derived from selling such substances because common pleas did not find that the. drugs and cash were found in close proximity to each other. He maintains that, even if the presumption applies, it was rebutted by the lack of evidence that normally is present for establishing a substantial nexus between cash and illegal drug activity. Absent from this record, according to Falette, is evidence such as: traces of drugs on the money; a canine sniff of the money; that the money was bundled in a manner consistent with drug dealing; histories of drug crimes for the vehicle’s occupants; or paraphernalia related to drug sales. He further points to the small amount of drugs found in the car that were for Lugo’s personal use and not for sale. At most, Falette asserts, the Commonwealth- established a suspicion that there was a nexus between the cash and illegal drug trafficking, which is insufficient to warrant forfeiture pursuant to Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 739 A.2d 152 (1999), Burke, 49 A.3d at 549, and Commonwealth v. $15,000.00 U.S. Currency, 31 A.3d 768 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011). Finally, Falette contends that, even if the Commonwealth met its burden, his unre-butted testimony established that he was an innocent owner pursuant Section 6802(j) of the Forfeiture Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j).
The Commonwealth responds that it met its burden via the rebuttable presumption provision found at Section 6801(a)(6)(ii) of the Forfeiture Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(h), and that Falette had to comeforward with contrary evidence-or face inevitable defeat. Commonwealth v. $259.00 U.S. Currency, 860 A.2d 228, 231 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). According to the Commonwealth, the cash was in close proximity to both the ecstasy pills recovered from the vehicle’s front console and the marijuana stored in the rear passenger door. Having met its burden, the burden then shifted to Falette to establish that he is an innocent owner under the Forfeiture Act, which the Commonwealth asserts he did not because common pleas found Falette’s explanation “completely implausible.” (Commonwealth’s Br. at 17 (quoting Hr’g Tr. at 34-35, R.R. at 51ar-52a).) Therefore, the Commonwealth maintains, common pleas’ Order granting the Petition must be affirmed.
The Forfeiture Act authorizes the forfeiture of money that is “furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act[ (Drug Act) ], and all proceeds traceable to such exchange.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(i)(A). Money that is “used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of [the Drug Act]” is also subject to forfeiture. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(i)(B).
In a forfeiture proceeding involving money, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a substantial nexus between the money being forfeited and a violation of the Drug Act. Commonwealth v. $2,52348 U.S. Currency, 538 Pa. 551, 649 A.2d 658, 660 (1994). Under Section 6801(a)(6)(ii) of the Forfeiture Act, “money and negotiable instruments found in close proximity to controlled substances possessed in violation of [the Drug Act] shall be rebuttably “presumed to be proceeds derived from the selling of a cork-trolled substance in violation of [the Drug Act].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(ii) (emphasis added). When the rebuttable presumption is triggered, “the Commonwealth satisfied] its evidentiary burden by using the presumption.” $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency, 860 A.2d at 231. Once the Commonwealth establishes that the money is forfei-table, the burden shifts to the person claiming the money to establish that he owns the money, he lawfully acquired it, and the money was not unlawfully used by him, i.e., that he is an “innocent owner” of the money. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j); $2,52348 U.S. Currency, 649 A.2d at 660.
In general, our Courts have held that cash found within arm’s length of controlled substances is in sufficiently close proximity to trigger the rebuttable presumption. Commonwealth v. $6425.00 Seized from Esquilin, 583 Pa. 544, 880 A.2d 523, 532 (2005). In Esquilin, Esqui-lin was observed standing next to a cohort conducting drug sales and, when Esquilin was later arrested, the police recovered $6,425.00 on his person. Id. at 525-26. Although Esquilin was not the one making the drug sales, because Esquilin’s cohort holding the drugs was “close enough to [Esquilin] that he could simply hand the cash over from the sales,” our Supreme Court determined that the rebuttable presumption was triggered. Id. at 532 (quotation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Porrino, 96 A.3d 1132, 1141 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014) (noting that, in Esquilin, the cash was found in close proximity to the drugs such that the rebuttable presumption was triggered because, “Esquilin, who had no drugs on his person, was within arm’s length of the person who did have drugs.”).
Here, it is undisputed that the $34,440.00 in cash was found within the passenger side B pillar of the vehicle driven by Lugo. (Hr’g Tr. at 14-15, R.R. at 31a-32a.) Specifically, the bags containing the cash were found underneath the plastic molding where the front passenger seat-belt bolts into the frame of the vehicle. (Hr’g Tr. at 14-15, R.R. at 31a-32a.) It is also undisputed that four tablets of ecstasy were found inside of the cigarette outlet in the center console area of the vehicle and four small plastic bags containing marijuana were found “in the right rear passenger door, underneath the cigarette ashtray.” (Hr’g Tr. at 16, 18, R.R. at 33a, 35a.)
Based on Esquilin, the cash and drugs found in the vehicle were within sufficiently close proximity of each other to trigger the rebuttable presumption set forth in Section 6801(a)(6)(ii) of the Forfeiture Act. Here, both the marijuana and cash were located on the passenger side of the vehicle. Moreover, the cash, found in the area of the vehicle where the front passenger seatbelt is attached to the frame of the vehicle, was located across the passenger front seat from the ecstasy located in the center console. It is well-established that Courts may “ ‘take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge.’ ” Kyu Son Yi, DVM v. State Board of Veterinary Medicine, 960 A.2d 864, 877 n. 22 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (quoting Ohio Bell Telephone Company v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 301, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937)). It is common knowledge that the area of the vehicle where the seatbelt is attached to the frame is within arm’s length of both the right rear passenger door as well as the center console area of the vehicle. Because the cash was found within arm’s length of both the ecstasy tablets and the marijuana, under Es-quilin, the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the drugs and cash were in close proximity to each other.
That Lugo was only charged with possession of a small amount of ecstasy and marijuana for personal use, rather than possession with intent to sell, is not relevant. Similarly irrelevant is the lack of evidence regarding how the $34,440.00 was bundled, that a drug dog alerted on the cash, or that placing the cash in the B pillar is a known means for drug dealers to hide their proceeds. Although such facts might have been relevant had the Section 6801(a)(6) (ii) presumption not been triggered, which would have required the Commonwealth to rely on other factors to meet its initial burden of proof, that is not the case here. Section 6801(a)(6)(ii) does not require, for the presumption to arise, someone be charged or convicted with possession with intent to sell, a particular quantity of controlled substances, a particular storage locale for the cash or controlled substances, or a particular manner for the money to be bundled. All that it requires is that the “money [be] ..; found in close proximity to controlled substances possessed in violation of [the Drug Act].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(ii). Moreover, the cases Falette relies upon, Fontanez, Burke, and $15,000.00 U.S. Currency, did not involve situations where the money was found in- close proximity to any controlled substances; indeed, no drugs were found in those cases. Fontanez, 739 A.2d at 153-54; Burke, 49 A.3d at 544; $15,000.00 U.S. Currency, 31 A.3d at 770-71, 773. As such, they did not involve the presumption set forth in Section 6801(a)(6)(ii) and are inapt comparisons; Accordingly, the Commonwealth sufficiently established close proximity between the $34,440.00 and the drugs thereby triggering the statutory rebuttable presumption, and it had no obligation to present any more evidence. $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency, 860 A.2d at 232.,
Once the Commonwealth satisfied its burden by using the presumption, the burden shifted to Falette to demonstrate that he was the owner of the cash, that he lawfully acquired the cash, and “[t]hat it was not unlawfully used or possessed by him.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j)(3). Falette was required to present evidence that would rebut the presumption “or suffer inevitable defeat.” $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency, 860 A.2d at 232. Falette, however, was unable to rebut the presumption. Falette testified that he was awarded the money in a lawsuit and that, after initially depositing the money in a bank, he withdrew the money in order to have cash on hand to impress his friends. However, as common pleas pointed out, Falette then hid the money in the vehicle driven by Lugo, which is contrary to his explanation that he wanted to have the cash handy to impress others. (Hr’g Tr. at 23-24, R.R. at 40a-41a.) On cross-examination, Fal-ette stated that he did not tell Lugo that he hid the money in the vehicle. (Hr’g. Tr. at 24-25, R.R. at 41a-42a.) Common pleas did not find Falette’s version of the events credible. As an appellate court, we cannot disturb credibility determinations or entertain challenges to the weight given to the evidence by common pleas. $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency, 860 A.2d at 232-33. Because common pleas found that Falette was not credible, Falette did not satisfy his burden of demonstrating .that he lawfully acquired, possessed, and used the cash as required under Section 6802© of the Forfeiture Act,42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j).
III. Conclusion
Here, the Commonwealth presented credited evidence to • establish that the $34,440.00 was in close proximity to the controlled ’ substances in the vehicle thereby triggering the rebuttable presumption set forth in Section 6801(a)(6)(ii) of the Forfeiture Act. In so doing, the Commonwealth met its burden of proving a substantial nexus between the cash and unlawful, activities under the Drug Act. Falette did not rebut-that presumption . with credited evidence. Accordingly, we affirm common pleas’ Order. ,
ORDER
NOW, April 19, 20Í6, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of. Monroe County entered in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.
. This case was reassigned to the authoring judge on December 9, 2015,
. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6801-6802.
, A B pillar” is one of two support posts that connect a vehicles roof to its body at the rear of the front door.” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/b-pillar (last visited May 26, 2015).
. Section 6801 (a)(6)(ii) of the Forfeiture Act provides that "money and negotiable instruments found in close proximity to controlled substances possessed in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act[(Drug Act), Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101-780-144,] shall be rebuttably presumed to be proceeds derived from the selling of a controlled substance in violation of [the Drug Act].” 42 Pa. C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(ii).
. "This Court’s review in an appeal from a forfeiture proceeding is limited to examining whether findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v. $11,600,00 Cash, U.S. Currency, 858 A.2d 160, 163 n. 3 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). “It is axiomatic that as factfinder the trial court is empowered to decide what evidence is credible and to draw any reasonable inferences from all of the. evidence.” Id. “Discretion is abused when, in reaching its conclusion, the trial court departs from or misapplies the law or the judgment it exercises is manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.” SAS, Inc. v. State Police Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement, 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 263, 638 A.2d 455, 458 n. 6 (1994).
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S.§§ 780-101-780-144.
. Section 6802(j) provides:
Owner’s burden of proof. — At the time of the hearing, if the Commonwealth produces evidence that the property in question was unlawfully used, possessed or otherwise subject to forfeiture under [SJection 6801(a) or 6801.1(a), the burden shall be upon the claimant to show:
(1)That the claimant is the owner of the property or the holder of a chattel mortgage or contract of conditional sale thereon.
(2) That the claimant lawfully acquired the property.
(3) That it was not unlawfully used or possessed by him. In the event that it shall appear that the property was unlawfully used or possessed by a person other than the claimant, then the claimant shall show that the unlawful use or possession was without his knowledge or consent. Such absence of knowledge or consent must be reasonable under the circumstances presented.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j).
. The dissent contends that common pleas, in misstating the presumption set forth at Section 6801(a)(6)(ii), impermissibly expanded that presumption to create a broader range of activity to which the presumption would apply. In re $34,440.00, 138 A.3d 102, 115-16, 117 (Pa.Cmwlth.2016) (Leavitt, J., dissenting). Our reading of common pleas’ Order is that its use of the phrase “related to drug trafficking” instead of “derived from the selling of a controlled substance,” (Order, May 15, 2014), was merely the use of imprecise language and not intended to expand the presumption.
. The dissent further posits that, in order for the presumption to remain valid, there must be a charge of or conviction for possession with intent to sell; however, this conclusion is inconsistent with this Court’s decision in $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency. In that case, this Court affirmed the forfeiture of $259 found in close proximity to a ten-dollar a.packet of heroin.” $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency, 86Ó A.2d at 228, 229 n. 1. The petitioner was arrested for possession of a controlled substance, a charge to which he pleaded guilty, but was not arrested or charged with possession with intent to deliver. Id, at 229. Although the petitioner attempted to prove that the money was derived from legal means, common pleas granted the forfeiture. We affirmed, agreeing with the Commonwealth that it had met its burden of proof via the rebuttable presumption and noting that [i]t is not necessary ... that a forfeiture be supported by an underlying criminal conviction.” Id. at 231, 232 n. 7. The Superior Court cases .cited by the dissent are not binding on this Court, Wertz v. Chapman Township, 709 A.2d 428, 433 n. 8 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), and this Court has taken the contrary position in $259.00 Cash U.S. Cunency. Moreover, we observe that the Superior Court, in Commonwealth v. $15,836.85-Cash, 354 Pa.Super. 279, 511 A.2d 871, 873 (1986), did not apply the presumption because it had been added to the statute after the seizure of the property had occurred and it was not clear that the trial court had relied on the presumption to grant forfeiture, rather than the evidence presented by the Commonwealth. Further, in Commonwealth v. Tate, 371 Pa.Super. 611, 538 A.2d 903, 905-06 (1988), the Superior Court held that the appellant rebutted the presumption based on the stipulated facts that he “had borrowed $3,000 from the Central Bank in Cleveland and that the $1,950 in question was found in an envelope marked Central Bank [which gave] rise to a reasonable inference that the money contained in the envelope was the balance left from the $3,000 cash advancement,” The evidence here presented to rebut the presumption was Falettes testimony and evidence of the settlement checks, which common pleas found not credible for a variety -of reasons. Although the dissent is correct that an adverse credibility determination does not constitute positive evidence that the money was derived from selling drugs, In re $34,440.00, 138 A.3d at 118-19 (Leavitt, J„ dissenting), the presumption established that fact and it was Falettes burden to present evidence that would meet his burden under Section 6802(j) and rebut the presumption. He did not do so and, therefore, “suffer[ed] inevitable defeat.” $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency, 860 A.2d at 232,
. The dissent cautions that we must both “ listen attentively to what the statute says ... [and] .what it does not say.f” In re $34,440.00, 138 A.3d at 115 (Leavitt, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 611 Pa. 381, 26 A.3d 1078, 1090 (2011) (quotation omitted)). In Johnson, our Supreme Court vacated the sentence of the appellant that had been enhanced based on his possession” of multiple packets of heroin as a co-r conspirator” of the person who had actual possession of the heroin. Johnson, 26 A.3d at 1087-88. - The Supreme Court examined the relevant statutory bases alleged for enhancing the appellant’s mandatory minimum sentence and found that the Commonwealth could not rely on the conspiracy charge to impute possession on the appellant because [n]owhere in th[e] list of crimes to which the minimum sentence applies upon conviction, however, did the legislature include a conviction of conspiracy” and the legislature did not choose to include the offense of conspiracy in the list of enumerated criminal offenses to which. 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 7508(a)(7)(i) applies upon conviction.” Johnson, 26 A.3d at 1090-91. Here, Section 6801(a)(6)(ii) expressly states that money .:. found in close proximity to controlled substances possessed in violation of >[the Drug Act] shall be rebuttably presumed to be proceeds derived from the selling, of ’a controlled substance in violation of [the Drug Act].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(ii). The legislature did not place any caveats on this provision. Thus, in affirming common -pleas’ Order, we are listening] attentively to what the statute says .., [and] what it does not say," Johnson, 26 A.3d at 1090, and are applying it as written.
. Because we conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof by utilizing the presumption set forth in Section 6801(a)(6)(ii), it is unnecessary to determine whether common pleas erred in admitting Trooper Felsman’s testimony regarding 1-80 being a drug corridor. (Hr’g Tr. at 10, R.R. at ‘27a.) However, we note that common pleas did not refer to this testimony in its May 15, 2014 Order and indicated in its 1925(a) opinion that this testimony did not influence . the decision to grant the Petition. Therefore, even if it was error, it was harmless.